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# Daily Report

# Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-239
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13 December 1995

# Daily Report
## Central Eurasia

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**NOTICE:** An * indicates material not previously disseminated in electronic form.

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# Key Developments

## Documentary Features NDR Candidate General Rokhlin

*LD1212173395*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1125 GMT on 12 December carries a 30-minute documentary entitled "I have the honor," devoted to Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin, a leading candidate of Russia Is Our Home [NDR]. The film is presented by veteran Soviet film actor Yevgeniy Matveyev. Matveyev is shown visiting Rokhlin and his wife in his simple apartment and accompanying him on a tour of the new war memorial complex on Moscow's Hill of Tributes. The film also includes numerous interviews with Rokhlin's junior officers.

In a voice-over which accompanies video of him approaching Rokhlin's quarters along corridors, Matveyev says: "I went to meet a man about whom I had heard much but whom I was to meet for the first time. It so happened that in the course of my creative career I had often played soldiers and, frankly, the prospect of meeting a real hero of today made me very nervous."

Interviewed individually, the junior officers recall their service under Rokhlin in Groznyy at the height of the fighting earlier this year. They all praise his valor, his leadership, his love for his men, and his sagacity in the face of the enemy. Rokhlin's wife says: "My husband tried to save every soldier and officer." One officer produces a poem about Rokhlin in Groznyy which ends with the lines: "He fought the enemy fiercely. He never trembled at the whistle of bullets. Dudayev's men feared him. They respected a Russian soldier." Archive video of combat soldiers singing a song about Rokhlin to the accompaniment of a guitar is shown; one of the lines runs "With our commander, we will live to see our pensions." Both his wife and the officers stress that he had refused to be decorated for his service in Groznyy as a mark of respect for those soldiers killed in the fighting.

In his conversation with Matveyev, Rokhlin makes no mention of his political affiliation, restricting his views to a call for better funding for the army. Otherwise he recalls his service in Chechnya and military history in general.

The program is soundtracked with classical music, solemn or stirring to suit the subject. Apart from the archive video from Groznyy, Rokhlin is shown inspecting an army barracks.

## Zhirinovskiy Makes Appeal to 'Middle Strata'

*LD0812153095 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0400 GMT 8 Dec 95*

[Statement by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, on 7 December; from the "Elections 95" program, moderated by Aleksandr Radov — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zhirinovskiy] Esteemed people of Russia, I appeal to the middle strata, to the majority. The elite, those at the top, lived well under the tsar, under the communists, and now under the democrats they continue to do so. They have villas, servants, full refrigerators, furs, and diamonds. There are different types of housing, they have a good life, as normal. The homeless, the petty thieves, the prostitutes, all the dregs of the streets will exist under any regime.

I appeal to the majority, honorable citizens of Russia. You were honorable under the tsar, under the communists, and now under the democrats; and you are the absolute majority; and there will never be a society in which everyone is in the elite or everyone is at the bottom. There will always be a stable middle majority, those who have their own flats, permanent jobs. They are not sacked because they work well — a healthy family with a wife and two or three children. They never join criminal structures, they never become drunkards.

Therefore, I am appealing to you, for you should become the reliable bulwark of the new Russia. Do not believe anyone. The monarchists come up. They are lying. The tsar betrayed the people. He himself gave up his powers and the Russian empire collapsed. The new communists come up and begin to say: We are different, we are not Bolsheviks. They are lying. It is still the same party. Read its program. They are promising the same things again. They have already had everything. They have already been in power.

Do you remember everything they promised in 1917? Factories to the workers! Did the workers receive the factories? They did not receive a thing. Land to the peasants! Did they receive it? No. Peace to the peoples! Did they receive it? We have been fighting from the very first day. Ever since they illegally came to power that night on 25 October 1917, there has been a war going on endlessly; and every year, 1 million people of Russia go to their graves because of the disputes between capitalism and socialism, nationalism and chauvinism, where to put the border posts. This is monstrous. We are destroying our own people.

Therefore, the LDPR wants to put an end to the ideological regime which forces us to die for the tsar, for the general secretary. Die for the homeland, yes, but not for Stalin and not for the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union], which was allegedly the wisdom, honor, and conscience of our epoch and which the very same communists now call a criminal regime. Is this not deception?

Who is now the main inspirer of perestroyka? Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev. The communists themselves excluded him from the party, and Zyuganov was also excluded from the party because they were not communists even then. And Shevardnadze. And Gorbachev admitted that he had never been a real communist. They were all social democrats, that is, Mensheviks. It is a terrible party which has two wings, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.

In 1917, the Bolsheviks, by force, at night, violated everything and seized power. In August, 1991, at night, by force, the Mensheviks illegally seized power, and they have remained in power the whole time because, just look: there was the tsar — was there not democracy? There was a constitution. There were four... [changes thought] three State Dumas... four parliaments. There was the army, there was money. Everything was there. Everything collapsed.

The Soviet Union. Once again there was a constitution, the Supreme Soviet, the army, there was everything, jobs. It all collapsed. The democrats, finally — once again, a constitution — the latest one was adopted two years ago. The very best one, yes? Reforms are under way, allegedly. But life is worse. Just as we lived badly under the tsar, that is how we are living now. Just as we lived meagerly under the Communists, that is how we are living now. It is just the same under the democrats.

That is, under the three regimes of the twentieth century, the top people lived well. They served the tsar at the tsar's court. The same thing happened in the Kremlin under the Communists. The top people in the CPSU lived well. And the same with the democrats — the top people live well on Kremlin rations.

But you and I create the great tsarist Russian empire, or the great Soviet Union, or the new democratic Russia; and our sons die in the trenches against the Germans or the Japanese, against the Afghans or the Chechens, while the people in the Kremlin sit drinking champagne; and they say to you: For the homeland, for Stalin, for Communism, for Socialism, for capitalism, for the new democracy!

The expansion of glasnost. That crank Gorbachev appeared, the son of a tractor driver, the son of a collective farmer, he had a collective farmer's way of thinking. A collective farmer is good in a collective farm. He should work there, milk the cows; bread, grain — fine. But when the collective farmer arrives in the Kremlin — If I was on the farm all the cows would die. I do not know how to look after cows. The collective farmer arrived in the Kremlin and the country died because he worked very well at home in Stavropol, Misha Gorbachev.

Even God marked him, gave him a mark here [points to the top of his head] and made a note that this Satan would arrive in the Kremlin and in five years would wreck our great Soviet Union. Tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, on 8 December is the fourth anniversary of the day when the great and powerful Soviet Union collapsed. On that morning of 8 December, Gorbachev was sitting in the Kremlin looking at the winter scenery and his aide said to him: Mikhail Sergeyevich, people have assembled at Belovezhskaya Pushcha — Kravchuk, Shushkevich, Yeltsin, Gaydar, Kozyrev, Shakhray, Burbulis, and they are deciding to dismember the Soviet Union. Order the KGB to arrest them immediately, take them to court. Gorbachev stood up and said: Oh, well, that is fate. He betrayed. The tsar betrayed. The general secretaries betrayed, and today's democrats are doing the same.

The market? What has the market given? Filth, prostitution, drug abuse. The same monopoly to buy vodka and contraceptives and foreign goods; and our own people have been crushed and smothered. The monopoly to be unemployed. The monopoly to lose your home. The monopoly not to have the opportunity to study or get health care. Constant deception.

The LDPR -- number 33 on the list on the first voting paper. Just the same on the second. Look for the LDPR candidate. Only our party, which will not return to tsarism or to communism and not to any kind of fascism, not to any kind of nationalism. I bid you farewell and you will see me again this evening.

[Radov] I did not have the opportunity to dispute what Zhirinovskiy said because he did not wish to have a dialogue with any of the moderators, but preferred to address the camera without reply. However, I would just like to say that I find distasteful his slights against Gorbachev, the overthrown leader, particularly as they were not made in person — this condemnation was not made in person. And I express the hope that if lawyer Zhirinovskiy comes to power and ends up in the Kremlin, then no champagne will be drunk and apparently there will be no handing out of jobs to party members, such as has impoverished Russia. Let us hope for this.

## Gaydar, Volskiy Debate on Economy; Make Forecasts

*LD1212163695*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow NTV in Russian at 1635 GMT on 11 December, in its "Hero of the Day" program, broadcasts a 25-minute program, introduced by presenter Yevgeniy Kiselev as the first in a daily series of special editions carrying live debates between politicians "whose parties and associations stand the greatest chances of success" in the State Duma elections on 17 December. The two politicians participating in the first debate are Yegor Gaydar of Russia's Democratic Choice-United Democrats [DVR-OD] and Arkadiy Volskiy of the Russian Trade Unions and Industrialists [PIPR]. They are seen on screen sitting at a table on either side of Kiselev.

The debate centers on economics, with Volskiy accusing Gaydar of contributing to the present crisis while he was prime minister and Gaydar accusing Volskiy of representing disastrous Soviet-style policies. The two politicians are asked by Kiselev to assess their own and each other's prospects at the elections and to comment on their plans for the 1996 presidential elections. Gaydar is also asked in what way, if any, his bloc differs from Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's Yabloko.

When the participants are invited to address questions of their own to each other, Gaydar asks Volskiy as a former deputy head of the Committee for the Operational Management of the USSR Economy to say who, in his opinion, was responsible for exhausting Russia's currency reserves and "squandering" money deposited in the Foreign Trade Bank. Volskiy replies that Gaydar is trying to conceal his own government's record by laying all the economic blame on the last Soviet government. He suggests to Gaydar that the economy declined sharply during his period in office and the latter retorts that the problems were the result of Soviet mismanagement.

Volskiy then produces a copy of a document signed in November 1992 by both Gaydar and himself as leader of the Civic Union political alliance entitled "A program of urgent measures to take the Russian economy out of crisis". He suggests that only ten percent of the measures have been implemented. Gaydar points out that the document was signed 20 days before his resignation from the Russian Government and that "it would be very strange to criticize me for the failure of the Chernomyrdin government, which came to power with your support, to implement the program you approved."

Gaydar then suggests to Volskiy that he failed to provide for the country's grain needs in the first half of 1992, thus saddling the new government with another crisis. Volskiy responds by quoting British economists, whom he did not name, as writing that the Gaydar reforms of 1992 resulted in "the total victory of the West" and that this was "Gaydar's mistake". Gaydar says he understands which economists Volskiy is referring to. They are, he says, a "very little-known and unauthoritative group" who did not examine the Russian economy in detail.

When Kiselev asks the debaters to name one aspect of each other's programs which they especially dislike, Gaydar chose the PIPR's plan to return the social insurance fund from state to trade union control. He says: "In my opinion this is state money, our state money, our taxes, and to hand them over to be looted — as, incidentally, they used to be looted before they came under state control — is absolutely and categorically unacceptable."

For his part, Volskiy says: "What do I find unacceptable in his program? Well, I don't know. The very word democrat is unacceptable to me. We have smeared the excellent Russian words democrat and patriot in filth. They are now so dirty that I doubt whether Yegor Timurevich [Gaydar] would say he is not a Russian patriot or someone like [deputy leader of the Russian Communist Workers' Party Viktor] Anpilov, for instance, would say that he was not a democrat."

Asked what election result he expects, Volskiy says his bloc will only expect a "big result" if there is a large turn-out because its electorate — workers, skilled workmen, and engineers — are "slightly apathetic". However, he says he does expect the bloc to clear the five percent barrier to seats in the Duma. Asked about his bloc's chances, Gaydar says that it would gain "between 5.5 and 6.5 percent" of the vote if its electorate does not panic at the last moment and turn to other blocs.

Asked to comment on each other's forecasts, Volskiy agrees that the DVR-OD will win between five and six percent but Gaydar says he doubts the PIPR's chances because of its specialized electorate.

Kiselev suggests to Gaydar that his bloc is very similar to Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's Yabloko, also a reform-orientated party, and asks him to explain why DVR-OD's program is the more attractive of the two. Gaydar says: "There are two paths, two forces with clear ideologies. These are the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] from which we know what to expect ideologically, and the DVR-OD from which we also know what to expect: It is a consistently liberal, consistently antimilitarist, consistently West-orientated — I am not afraid to use that word — party. We are well-defined. We do not change our position to suit the political situation. But an apple [yabloko] has no hard edges."

To conclude the debate, Kiselev asks about the participants' plans for the 1996 presidential election. Gaydar replies that "our party position on this is quite clear: We will weigh the results of the parliamentary elections and decide on our party's position on the presidential election. It would hardly be decent to do anything else." Asked if he rules himself out as a presidential candidate, Volskiy replies: "I exclude the possibility. I tell you that frankly, unlike Yegor Timurevich [Gaydar], I believe that the Russian president should be elected for a minimum of two terms. One would therefore need to have 8-10 years to spare. I personally do not have that. But we will do everything to enable the left-wing forces to put forward one candidate as was the case in Poland."

## Regional Activities

### Duma Candidate Comes Under Fire

*LD1212211995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2014 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[By Nikolay Styazhkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YESSENTUKI, December 12 (ITAR-TASS) — A Russian candidate for the Russian State Duma, Aleksandr Kashcheyev, 36, contacted Yessentuki police with a statement that he came under fire when he was arriving home in his car.

Police duty officer told ITAR-TASS that police examined the site indicated by Kashcheyev and interviewed possible witnesses.

The police spokesman said investigation was hindered by Kashcheyev's leaving the town immediately after his visit to police without allowing investigators to have a look at his car which he said was left with bullet holes.

According to Kashcheyev, unknown attackers fired on him passing in the car.

Kashcheyev had published his platform in a local newspaper under the headline "If I am not Killed by December 17..." He spelled the title, saying in his article that he had evidence about corrupt doings of regional administrators who, Kashcheyev alleged, were behind a scheme of harassing him with threats of elimination.

### Moscow City Campaign Described

*MM1212155895 VYBORY-95 WWW in Russian 23-29 Nov 95*

[Unattributed report: "Moscow" — received via Internet]

[FBIS Translated Text]

**The Press**

The Moscow press continues to ignore single-seat district candidates. To make up for it, the federal press has started paying some attention to coverage of the election campaign in Moscow. For example, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 24 November published as advertisement a lengthy interview with Sergey Drogush, candidate from Central Electoral District. This interview went all out to emphasize the attributes of "the man from Chukotka" and laud the results of his activity as leader of the "International Association of People of the North." In his opinion, "a single commercial structure today is capable of elaborating and implementing programs of statewide importance and scale." One can draw the general conclusion that the candidate has quite a bit of money behind him, that he has "his own people" (but nobody knows who they are) in federal structures, but it is not altogether clear why Muscovites should vote for "the man from Chukotka."

VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA continues to publish material about candidate S. Kurochkin (No. 195 Lyublinskiy Electoral District). Its 22 November issue reported in particular that the "Moscow Yabloko" movement's southeastern organization had decided to support S. Kurochkin at the elections. This topic was pursued again the next day. The newspaper published a detailed report about the candidate's visit to a meeting of the "Yabloko" organization, emphasizing that "S. Kurochkin is a man of real actions." The selfsame issue cast some light on the reason why the Moscow mass media are paying such great attention to S. Kurochkin. It was reported that he was wearing the badge of the "New World — 500" [Novyy Svet — 500] fund on his lapel. This fund was founded by Moscow Mayor Yu. Luzhkov. It was emphasized that S. Kurochkin has been cooperating for many years with this fund on housing and other issues. It can thus be concluded that Sergey Kurochkin enjoys the support of Moscow's authorities, specifically taking the form of support for his election campaign by the capital's mass media.

On 22 November VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA published an election campaign statement by candidate P. Bunich (Central Electoral District). The candidate noted in his statement that a deputy's main place of work should be not the Duma but the electoral district, where he should utilize his status to solve local problems and satisfy his voters' needs. The candidate referred to the Western experience which, in his opinion, is useful in this regard.

The capital's press continues to show its party allegiances. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, for example, carries in every issue program statements by leaders of the "My Fatherland" bloc, while VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA is showing active interest in the KRO [Congress of Russian Communities]. The newspaper carries statements by KRO leaders (S. Glazyev appears with special frequency in its pages), program documents, and the editorial office has published many reports on reactions by different political and social movements to the referendum proposed by the KRO. Furthermore, the newspaper itself obviously favors this idea by the KRO.

**Campaign Posters and Literature**

The quantity of campaign posters and literature is gradually building up in the city. Large KRO posters have appeared next to the large NDR [Russia Is Our Home] and "Yabloko" posters. It must be said that the KRO poster is much more successful than that of its rivals. The KRO leaders have been photographed against the face of a "Pobeda" [Victory] watch, and the poster slogan reads: "Our Time Has Come." The colors that have been used are gray, blue, and pink, making the poster really stand out against the background of ordinary street advertising.

Leaflets of candidates in single-seat districts continue to appear. Candidate N.G. Khvorostylev's leaflets have appeared in No. 197 Preobrazhenskiy Electoral District. The A-4 size leaflets are either printed or Xeroxed and contain the candidate's program. The leaflets are hard to read because of the small (newspaper-size) print, and give no imprint.

Candidate Krasnov's leaflets continue to appear in Central Electoral District. Municipal workers continue to ignore them like before, but someone's solicitous hand is removing the private advertisements pasted on top of them.

Candidate V.P. Mironov's (incumbent State Duma deputy from the district) have appeared in the mailboxes of voters in No. 196 Medvedkovskiy Electoral District. The leaflet is in black and white, half A-4 size, and the headline which reads "Vote for Mironov" is set in stylized typeface reminiscent of the Slavonic script. The leaflet's main content consists of a narrative of what the candidate has done during his two years as deputy and of promises about what he intends to do. There is no imprint.

Candidate G. Boos' leaflets have appeared in the same district, using the same distribution method. The leaflet is printed on the reverse side of a postcard advertising the "SvetoServis" enterprise which the candidate heads. The leaflet lauds the achievements of this enterprise and of its leader personally, as well as their future plans. As usual, there is no imprint.

KRO stickers, very similar to the recognition markings of Russian aircraft in World War I, continue to appear in the Moscow subway.

Apple-shaped stickers depicting an apple [from the Russian meaning of "Yabloko" — apple] and carrying the slogan "We'll Deliver You From Poverty" have also appeared there.

Large square stickers with "LDPR" [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] inscribed in black have appeared in the subway and the streets. True enough, persons unknown have erased the first letter in some places, making them read "DPR" [Democratic Party of Russia].

## Moscow Oblast Campaign Developments Detailed

*MM1212163395 VYBORY-95 WWW in Russian 23-29 Nov 95*

[Unattributed report: "Moscow Oblast" — received via Internet]

[FBIS Translated Text]

**Mass Media's Role in Election Campaign**

The stance taken by the mass media, and by television and radio in particular, will no doubt be a factor directly affecting the outcome of the election campaign in the Moscow region.

A most serious factor affecting the election campaign of contenders for the governor's seat and of candidate State Duma deputies was the refusal by a series of mass media, primarily the "Podmoskovye" television channel, to heed the instructions of the Central Electoral Commission and give candidates free newspaper space and airtime. At present the Oblast Electoral Commission and judges at all levels are literally drowning in appeals by candidates to have their electoral rights protected against arbitrary rule by the mass media. The outcome of these cases may be different, but they certainly are of great importance when analyzing the dynamics of the current electoral process since the lost-time factor is acquiring decisive importance at this stage. In these conditions, even greater advantage is enjoyed by candidates and associations that have effectively resolved the problem of financing their campaigns.

Disregarding the representatives of power structures within the "Russia Is Our Home" association, who enjoy unquestioned priority in mass media under the administration's control, the leaders in displaying unlimited financial potential are the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] and — and this is to a certain extent the surprise of this election campaign — the "My Fatherland" sociopolitical association. The election campaign of the Congress of Russian Communities appears somewhat more modest. The CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] is conducting its election campaign by definitely modest but effective means, which is certainly not a sign of any shortage of finance for the Communists. In the liberal camp, the most lavish investment of funds in the election campaign is effected by Boris Fedorov's "Forward, Russia!" movement and Konstantin Borovoy's Economic Freedom Party. Considerably more modest efforts are applied by Svyatoslav Fedorov's Party of Working People's Self-Management and the Yabloko Public Association.

A whole series of election campaign sociological studies are being conducted at present, commissioned by state organs, public associations, and individual candidates. They are being conducted both in the Moscow region as a whole and in all single-seat districts. Unfortunately, preliminary and current results from the most objective among them will be prepared only by the time our next review is completed.

That will be the time when (on the basis of the aforementioned studies) we will learn the preliminary results of the intensive process of negotiations about the withdrawal of certain candidates which, as we have learned, are now under way between electoral associations and individual candidates.

## Tatarstan Election Campaign Scene Reviewed

*MM1312122495 VYBORY-95 WWW in Russian 29 Nov 95*

[Unattributed report: "Republic of Tatarstan" — received via Internet]

[FBIS Translated Text]

### Visits by Bloc Leaders

The activity of leaders of Russian blocs is intensifying with the start of campaigning. On 16 November Artem Tarasov, State Duma deputy and chairman of the "KEDR" electoral association, held a news conference in Kazan. Every single visitor pays compliments to our republic. Tarasov also honored this tradition, stating that Tatarstan with its powerful industrial potential is capable of becoming the most highly developed area of Russia.

Next week Gavriil Popov is expected to visit at the invitation of the local branch of the social democratic bloc, and early December (5 December) Kazan will host a "roundtable" in which V. Lipitskiy is scheduled to participate.

### Media Coverage of the Election Campaign

The republic's mass media have started covering the election campaign in greater detail.

### Charges for Political Advertising in the Republic's Main Mass Media

IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA [Tatarstan News] — a full page costs 16 million rubles [R] and a square centimeter, R3,200 (no difference between normal and political advertising).

VECHERNYAYA KAZAN [Evening Kazan] is one of the most expensive newspapers: R3 million per double-spaced typewritten page [mashinopisnyy list cherez 2 intervala]. Normal advertising: R12,000 per square centimeter.

RESPUBLIKA TATARSTANA [Republic of Tatarstan] is evidently going to be the official mouthpiece of "Russia Is Our Home"; some advertising for candidates from this bloc will be free.

One minute of air time on radio "Tatarstan" — the official radio station — costs R50,000, while one minute on "Kazan" nonstate radio costs R80,000. A six-minute slot on the former has been booked for a statement by Ildus Sultanov, a candidate for the Moscow No. 6 single-seat district.

The amount of free air time on Tatarstan television has been extended. Blocs and movements will fight for voters' votes on 22 November, 30 November, and 13 December at 1945.

Candidates in single-seat districts will be able to campaign on 15, 16, 23, and 29 November and 6, 7, and 14 December also at 1945 (after the "Tatarstan" news program).

Pozner's "We" program on central television (Channel 1), in which Mintimer Shaymiyev participated and representatives of the republic, including Ildus Sultanov, were present in the studio, was aired 16 November. Shortly before the broadcast the newspaper VECHERNYAYA KAZAN (on 14 November) published an interview about this program with Ildus Sultanov. Considering that VECHERNYAYA KAZAN has always been only a mouthpiece for democrats and "RIZovtsy" [expansion unknown], this interview could be described as soft political advertising.

IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA is also engaged in political advertising in the shape of an interview with Viktor Chernomyrdin (by Artem Karapetyan). The same issue also carries a detailed account by Galina Grigoroyenko of a Yuriy Skokov news conference and an item by the same correspondent from an Artem Tarasov news conference.

The "furor" unleashed in the Russian press around candidate Sergey Shashurin in connection with his being stripped of his deputy's mandate is reflected in the local press: On 15 November VECHERNYAYA KAZAN ran an item signed "Tatar-inform" under the headline "Sergey Shashurin Could Be Stripped of Mandate." There is information from unofficial sources that S. Shashurin is supported by official structures. The motives are not yet clear; it is possibly an attempt by the leadership to get rid of a notorious businessman in the republic by repeating the scenario applied to the election of Ivan Grachev and Valentin Mikhaylov.

Valentin Mikhaylov, who is running for the DVR-OD [Russia's Democratic Choice-Common Cause] in Privolzhskiy District, "bought up" the "Persona" program on radio "Kazan." The program lasts 40 minutes. In this program listeners are acquainted with well-known people in the republic.

On 18 November the city newspaper KAZANSKIY VEDOMOSTI [Kazan Record] announced a fun competition among its readers for the best topical couplet, joke, or witticism linked with the elections. The prize is a free subscription to the newspaper.

**Street advertising**

The first leaflets are starting to appear in the streets of Kazan. One of the first to appear was a leaflet for Fatikh Saubanovich Sibagatullin, who has been nominated by the "Agrarian Party of Russia" electoral bloc.

**Unofficial Information and Comment**

The problem of who will receive support from the republic's leadership in the elections is being discussed in media circles. The hypothesis that the ruling circles will support the "Congress of Russian Communities" bloc is the most probable. Taking account of the complex position of the "Russia Is Our Home" bloc, President Shaymiyev is evidently looking for a contingency option should the Chernomyrdin bloc be defeated. The president's candidates — Russian State Duma deputies — have been presented in all single-seat districts, but they are not running for blocs but as independents nominated by voters. Representatives of the "Congress of Russian Communities" bloc are being supported for the party lists and single-seat districts, but as yet the authorities' encouragement for them is behind the scenes. President Shaymiyev will promote victory for certain candidates depending on these blocs' chances of success.

The first orders for sociological studies from electoral blocs have also appeared. In particular, "Russia Is Our Home" has commissioned an election poll from a group of Kazan State University sociologists.

## Nizhniy Election Group's 'Civic Altruism' Doubted

*MM1312113195 VYBORY-95 WWW in Russian 23-29 Nov 95*

[Unattributed report: "Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast" — received via Internet]

[FBIS Translated Text]

**Deputy Bulavinov's Scandalous Initiative**

The popular RTV program "Details" 22 November was devoted to the activity of the "Spring" [Vesna] union led by Vadim Bulavinov, a State Duma deputy from Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast. The latter eloquently depicted the activity of Vesna as an organization selflessly working for itself on nontraditional means of boosting voter activity, in particular by holding noncash lotteries among voting citizens. Program presenter N. Svanidze spoke approvingly in his closing remarks of V. Bulavinov's initiative. However, it is worth saying that the latter did not tell the Russian viewer everything that the people of Nizhniy Novgorod know. First, the fact that in November 1994, during the elections of deputies to the local legislature, the Spring union held lotteries only in those district precincts where its own candidates were running, that it is the main sponsor of the lottery, and that the oblast electoral commission at that point voiced serious doubts as to the legal propriety of such methods.

Second, the fact that Bulavinov himself is once again running for the State Duma in No. 121 District and his fortunate appearance on the national channels' popular program are a plus in the election campaign. This casts doubt on the claim regarding the civic altruism of the Spring union's current projects.

**Visits by Leaders of Electoral Associations**

In the week of 20-27 November the following paid visits: B. Gromov ("My Fatherland"); N. Ryzhkov ("Power to the People!"); and V. Polevanov ("For the Motherland").

All three received lengthy "prime-time" airtime and the print media provided extensive coverage of the visits.

Boris Gromov had a meeting with Governor Nemtsov, the details of which were not reported. He also told journalists: "We have normal relations with G. Zyuganov and much in common with N. Ryzhkov. We have a complex attitude to the Congress of Russian Communities, where there are a lot of things we do not like. General Lebed is a very good man, only he should spend less time banging his fists. Rutskoy was an excellent pilot, but I do not view him as a politician, and he flits from one group to another. Grachev was a good division commander, but his current 'buoyancy' is the result of his personal devotion to the president rather than to the interests of the state." Nikolay Ryzhkov (whose visit was openly organized by Communist Party of the Russian Federation structures) was absolutely traditional in his statements and answers. When asked "Why have you not joined forces with kindred blocs during the election campaign?" he replied artlessly: "I would be pleased to join forces with the Agrarians and Zyuganov's party, but they want to do that after the elections, therefore our bloc intends to win the votes that will not be given to those two parties."

## Forecasts & Commentary

### Yeltsin Aides, Others Predict Lineup in New Duma

*MK1312061895 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 9 Dec 95 p 1*

[Report by Aleksandr Bugberg: "Gaydar To Be in the Duma. The Future Parliament Through the Eyes of Professionals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The closer election day gets, the more sociological surveys are being offered to the general public. Many of them are clearly biased, which is only natural: After all, any survey not only studies public opinion but also affects it. Who, for example, will vote for a party that has no chance of passing the 5-percent barrier?

Therefore your MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS correspondent sought the view on the future lineup in parliament from professional politicians who are to work with the new Duma and who by virtue of their position have access to various sources of information.

It needs to be said that all of them quoted similar figures and agreed that the new Duma will be "rather difficult." Thus, according to V. Volkov, deputy chief of the presidential staff, the Communists and the agrarians, including the results in single-seat constituencies, may get up to 40 percent of the seats. But even if the agrarians make it past the 5-percent barrier, they will just barely do so.

Yu. Baturin, the president's national security adviser, believes that the Communists may get up to 30 percent of deputies' seats. He also thinks that the agrarians will hover around the 5-percent mark. Ye. Gaydar was even more specific on this subject, observing that Lapshin and company may get between 4.8 and 5.1 percent of the vote.

Russia Is Our Home [NDR], according to various estimates, will get between 10 percent and 15 percent (according to Baturin, 11-13 percent). Recently the NDR has been obviously picking up support, but it took too long to get going and straighten things out at election campaign headquarters.

It is generally believed that failure, predicted by some interested "experts," does not at all await Russia's Democratic Choice. Gaydar and his team will get fewer seats in the next Duma than in the present one but will get into parliament quite confidently. According to Yegor Timurovich [Gaydar] himself, Russia's Democratic Choice will swap places with Yabloko, i.e., the Yavlinskiy movement will be supported by 15-17 percent of the electorate and Russia's Democratic Choice by 7-9 percent.

The LDPR will fall considerably. Even the utmost optimists cite the figure of 6 percent. Part of Zh.'s [Zhirinovskiy's] electorate will move to his worthy successor General Lebed and the bunch hiding behind his back — Skokov, Glazyev, and Zatulin [leaders of the Congress of Russian Communities, KRO] (who, incidentally in his time was EXPELLED from Shakhray's party for his extreme rudeness with respect to the CIS countries). Nobody dared say exactly how many points the KROcodiles will be able to score. Yuriy Baturin summed up the general mood: "KRO will get something, but it is difficult to say how much."

Women of Russia, if professionals are to be trusted, will have no problem retaining their faction's position in the Duma. "They do not need even a small piece of anyone else's turf, but neither will they yield an inch of their own."

The fate of other parties and blocs is rather blurry and uncertain. Hardly any of them can hope for a major success. Although it is difficult to make predictions in Russia and the most unexpected "leaps" by the electorate are possible. Therefore even political old hands are sometimes powerless to say what will happen tomorrow. To say nothing about various centers for political and strategic studies.

### Zyuganov 'Absolutely Confident' of Success

*LD1212211695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2020 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Dec 12 (INTERFAX) — Chairman of the Communist Party of Russia Gennadiy Zyuganov said at a meeting with his supporters in Moscow today that he was absolutely confident of his party's success in the coming parliamentary elections.

"From 10 percent to 35 percent of voters will vote for candidates proposed by the Communist Party in the December 17 elections," Zyuganov said.

Nevertheless, Zyuganov urged his supporters to intensify the election campaign in the days left before the elections to the State Duma, parliament's lower chamber. He said it was necessary to circulate more leaflets which "could be copied by hand writing, if necessary."

Zyuganov said he planned to create a "wide coalition" of "healthy forces" in the new State Duma. He said the coalition could really influence the state policy and make it "truly social." Zyuganov said an agreement "on all key issues" had been reached with the Power to the People electoral bloc led by former USSR prime minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and the Agrarian Party of Russia led by Mikhail Lapshin.

Zyuganov said he doubted that Russian President Boris Yeltsin would dismiss the State Duma if "it turns out to be too leftist." He said he believed Yeltsin "would not have enough strength or opportunities." Even if he had enough strength to do that, "the Kremlin's powers would not then go beyond Moscow and its outskirts," Zyuganov said.

When asked if the Communist Party planned to return to Russia the Communist symbols if the Communist influence rose, Zyuganov told INTERFAX the Communist Party "will definitely seek that."

### Chernomyrdin Outlines Election Stance

*BR1212144795 Rome L'UNITA in Italian 9 Dec 95 p 15*

[Interview with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin by Maddalena Tulanti in Moscow; date not given: "'Capitalism With a Human Face'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Tulanti] For what Russia will the people who opt for your party be voting, Mr. Chernomyrdin?

[Chernomyrdin] First of all, for the Russia that has had and always will have a future. We will survive the difficulties that we are going through. Yes, we are having a hard time of it, it is tough, and we do not hide the fact, but we have always resolved our problems. We have resolved them on our own, although without declining cooperation, and in this connection I have to say that we are working very well with Italy (the largest Russian privatization, telecommunications, won by Italy's STET [Turin Telephone Corporation] against French and German competition, went through just the other day — L'UNITA editor's note). I must stress, however, that the difficulties we are facing are our own difficulties, and nobody can overcome them for us. But we also see our country's potential. We see a strong, stable Russia that loves its neighbors and wants to live in peace with them. There you have it: This is the "home" that Chernomyrdin's voters will be choosing.

[Tulanti] Why did the reformist forces pursue a separate patch to the election?

[Chernomyrdin] It makes me sad. When the "Russia Is Our Home" movement came into being last spring, all those who had the prospect of reform and the country's prospects at heart were invited to join. Even now, we do not turn down alliances with those who have the same strategic reference points of the democratic refoundation of Russia. However, the fact remains that, instead of the three or four large associations that express the major trends and main colors in the Russian political spectrum, over 40 parties and blocs have taken the field to compete for the electorate's votes. And even the forces normally referred to as reformist have emerged disunited: As far as I know, all attempts at unification have been in vain. It is probably Russia's fate to go through a specific period of political fragmentation. Nevertheless, I am sure that it is a temporary phenomenon from the historical point of view, and even in the medium term. The future belongs to strong political associations reflecting the fundamental interests of the Russian electorate.

[Tulanti] What difference is there between your "Russia Is Our Home" movement and Gaydar's?

[Chernomyrdin] There are no basic differences, and our goals are the same: to create an efficient market economy and build a democratic state of law. We differ over the pace and the measures to be adopted to build this new economy and over the very notion of the state: "small and cheap," as Gaydar says, or strong and capable of resolving a whole range of pressing social problems, as we say? I am sure, however, that, despite the disagreements, we have every reason to work fruitfully together in the new Duma.

[Tulanti] The opposition continues to paint a gloomy picture of the postelection situation: If the Communists win it, they will do their best to annul it. What do you think?

[Chernomyrdin] The law must not depend on anybody's political tastes and preferences. That is the essence of democracy, and Russia has set out resolutely along the road to democratic development. The Russians will not follow anyone who attempts to establish an authoritarian regime.

[Tulanti] Is Russia still a country "at risk"?

[Chernomyrdin] You know, "at risk" is a description with which we Russians and former Soviets are all too familiar. The USSR once used to be described as a country whose "agriculture was at risk." What is more, on account of its climate, a considerable part of our country must still be classified as a zone where "agriculture is at risk." For example, this year, 1995, European Russia was hit by a drought, with the result that the grain harvest has been smaller than usual, while sufficient grain has been harvested in Siberia and the Altay. It is this instability, when no year is the same as another, that gives rise to talk of a "zone at risk." So it is easy to apply the term to the Russian economy — easy, but wrong. At least I do not agree with the definition. The level of risk — both economic and political — is definitely higher in Russia, according to Western standards, than in the prosperous European countries, but the situation changes literally day by day. The radical difference between the situation now and even two or three years ago lies in the very fact that we have now reached an extremely important juncture in the Russian economy: The fall in production has practically come to an end, and industry is not only surviving but is beginning to pick itself up. To give you an example, a 2-percent growth in production compared with July 1994 was recorded in July this year. Of course these figures do not make much impression on some people, but as I see it, we always have to bear it in mind that even slight growth is far preferable to any recession. And above all, it must be pointed out that industrial stabilization goes hand in hand with slower price increases. Behind all this there is the emergence of a new economic organization of society. Unlike our critics and opponents, we do not promise that it will be roses all the way, immediate prosperity as soon as we come to power. Universal well-being cannot be achieved in 500, or even 550, days. Meanwhile, the task of setting the economic and financial levers and triggering market mechanisms that will boost national industry and give it stable development has already been performed to a considerable extent by our government. It would be a real shame if the machine that has already been set in motion and proven effective were to be recklessly consigned to the scrapheap by someone else. In this connection, indeed, new experiments will create not just "risks," but real threats, and not only to Russia.

[Tulanti] You are regarded as the "pacifier" of Chechnya, but peace has not yet returned to the republic...

[Chernomyrdin] Chechnya is truly a sorrow, our great sorrow. Those who think that a war to the death should be carried on until victory is won do not know what they are saying. I am no supporter of the war, and nor is Yeltsin. I am convinced that the outstanding issues must be settled by negotiation and on no account by fighting. It has been soon forgotten that our losses numbered hundreds a day, hundreds of lives lost. I know, some people have itchy palms, but we have to act through talks. This does not mean that we want to back out. Not at all: Chechnya is Russia, and we will resolve the problem with grat circumspection and patience in Russia.

[Tulanti] There has been talk for some time of the Communists winning. If it were to happen, would Russia change course?

[Chernomyrdin] Russia will not change course. Those who conduct these opinion polls question the wrong people.

[Tulanti] So you do not think the Communists will win?

[Chernomyrdin] No, no way.

### Lebed: 'I Would Not Even Dream' of Rebuilding USSR

*BR1212133295 Rome IL MESSAGGERO in Italian 12 Dec 95 p 13*

[Interview with Russian General Aleksandr Lebed by Roberto Livi in Moscow; date not given: "'I, General Lebed, Will Be Russia's De Gaulle'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Livi] Why have you chosen to stand as a candidate in an opposition party?

[Lebed] Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's and President Yeltsin's record in running the country is disastrous: poverty-line salaries; all the wealth in the hands of 5 to 7 percent of the population, while the rest of the Russians are baying at the moon; the criminal destruction of the state; the erosion of natural resources; ecological devastation; low life expectancy... and I could continue.

[Livi] Is your solution to send the corrupt to jail?

[Lebed] Our capitalism is a capitalism of th nomenklatura. It was formed when the USSR nomenklatura's high-ranking bureaucrats took over the state's wealth. Hence the need to start again: Every corrupt functionary must be declared a state criminal, starting with the police. Our platform does not envision a review of privatization but the punishment of those guilty of error.

[Livi] You do not include President Yeltsin in your list of those who must be sent to jail. Why?

[Lebed] Putting the blame on only one person would be a very serious political error. National pacification is needed at this stage. What is needed is common sense and levelheaded judgment in all things. I am prepared to provide anybody with safeguards. Our party is patriotic but not violent.

[Livi] You want a strong Russia with forceful authoritativeness, maybe even too much so in view of the fact that people accuse you of admiring Pinochet.

[Lebed] That is true; strong authoritativeness is needed to strengthen Russia. But I look to the work of General De Gaulle rather than to the Chilean general.

[Livi] You have been tasked by your party with preparing a project for reforming the Army. What is this project?

[Lebed] First and foremost, to restore to the Army both able leaders and an efficient structure designed to provide modern weaponry and above all to ensure that military personnel have a dignified standard of living. As things stand today, we can rely only on a small, elite Army of professional volunteers, and this despite military service still being in force.

[Livi] Are you nostalgic for the USSR? Are you in favor of rebuilding it, as the Communists want to do?

[Lebed] I would not even dream of it. The breakup of the USSR is past history. I am fighting for a strong Russia. Anyway, those who do not mourn the USSR have no heart, but those who dream of rebuilding it have no brain.

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### KRO's Glazyev Writes on Political AIDS Syndrome

*MM1112164595 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Dec 95 p 5*

[Article by Sergey Glazyev, chairman of the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy and chairman of the National Committee of the Democratic Party of Russia ("Congress of Russian Communities" electoral association), under the "Let the Opposition Speak" rubric: "There Is a Chance of Avoiding Political AIDS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no sure medicine against AIDS, and if the virus becomes active in the organism, a fatal outcome is inevitable. This analogy springs to mind when you think about the diseases of our society.

In only four years: a reduction by half in production activity and living standards, a fourfold increase in the proportion of foreign goods on the domestic market, snowballing unemployment, the ousting of national culture from the mass media, the impoverishment of a significant proportion of the population.... Plus the rapid rise of alcoholism in society, an explosion in drug abuse and prostitution, and, as a result, epidemics of diphtheria, tuberculosis, and syphilis, and a disastrous fall in the birth rate and the population's life expectancy. The Russian social organism is infected with several deadly diseases.

In the human organism, when pathogenic microbes appear, the immune system goes into action. In the social organism there are also systems that protect it against death and decay. In prerevolutionary times society's health was watched over by the church and the traditions of social self-organization, and later, after 1917, by party control; in a democratic system, society's health depends on the authorities being subject to monitoring by social organizations that express the citizens' will. If, in czarist Russia, age-old social traditions and the influence of the church had not been undermined by the degeneracy of the ruling clique and the rapid development of capitalist accumulation, the Russian Empire would not have perished because of a victorious war and a hunger riot in the capital. If it had not been for the degeneracy of the ruling CPSU nomenklatura and the spread of the cult of consumerism, the USSR would not have disintegrated because of an unsuccessful "palace" coup and a social gathering in the Belovezhskaya Forest.

Obviously the immune system of our social organism is extremely weak. That is why all kinds of ills of contemporary society which can be successfully overcome in other countries metastasize rapidly here. This year there has once again been a sharp fall in the population's income and in investment activity; and the government's plans for next year leave no doubt about the continuation of the trend of rapid degeneration of the economy and society.

In the conditions of democracy and freedom, the destruction of pathogenic microbes in the social organism is carried out through the operation of the legal and political system. The law ensures the sifting out of criminals and the development of those forms of activity that are most valuable and effective for society and the citizen. The political system, in turn, ensures the rejection of incompetent and unscrupulous politicians and state figures, and the advance of the worthiest to power. Naturally, if this political system works properly, there are well-oiled mechanisms of broad public monitoring of the activity of persons entrusted with power, real equality for everyone before the law and the strict separation of powers, reliable monitoring of observance of the rule of law, a high standard of morality and exactingness in society, and highly professional mass media which are independent of the authorities and of money.

Clearly we have none of this; in other words, without special and consistent efforts by the whole of society to strengthen the defense system, we are doomed to further degeneration.

The question arises: Who should organize the work of protecting our society from self-destruction? Clearly the ruling plutocracy will not do it — it is entirely satisfied with the present situation and sees its future more in foreign oases than in our native land. There is nobody to fulfill this task except the opposition. But it is only a very narrow layer and is infected with a great many metastases of the "party of power."

Attempts to unite the forces of constructive opposition have thus far been unsuccessful because of personal ambitions and a failure to understand the real situation. But we have no alternative to unification around a program for our society's recovery.

A realistic socioeconomic program for overcoming the crisis and ensuring stable growth has already been formulated and is being discussed widely; experience in joint work by various parliamentary factions demonstrates the possibility of pooling efforts to implement it. But it is necessary to master the technique of political work while remaining clearly aware of the kind of political system we are living under today.

After the coup of September 1993, political power in the country was usurped by a narrow group of individuals with close connections to big foreign capital and, in part, Russian capital. Having urged the president to the coup, they were able to take full advantage of its consequences, seizing control over state finances and property.

The main political struggle in the country has broken out around the redistribution of state property and money — well out of the way of the noisy theatricality of parliament. The vast legacy of the Soviet era, worth many thousands of billions of dollars, has become the subject of this struggle. It was shared out on the quiet by a handful of people who used power to manipulate state property and budget resources. Today this struggle is nearing its end: The final scene in the biggest swindle not only this century, but probably in the economic history of the world, is being played out before our very eyes.

Foreign capital has secured an undoubted victory in this battle for the Soviet legacy. Not only through greater purchasing power, but also largely thanks to the actual method of privatization of state property. From the outset the privatization process took place under the direct and indirect control of foreign capital — through Mr. Chubays' numerous Western experts and consultants. They were reckoned to be "independent," until the smell of big money hit the air. When it became clear that "things were moving," big foreign banks sprang up behind them and began the mass buy-up of shares in Russian enterprises undergoing privatization, through front companies and intermediary companies. These shares were then resold to interested "investors," which often turned out to be foreign companies seeking to gain control over their Russian competitors. Profits from the resale of these shares amounted to several thousand percent — in skilled hands the "voucher" really did turn to gold. Thus, many enterprises (and even sectors) of Russian industry, including metallurgy, science-intensive machine building, and the chemical industry, are already under the control of interested foreign companies.

The fledgling Russian business circles were unable to offer resistance to foreign capital. Not having significant accumulations of their own, many of them had grown up on the basis of manipulating state resources, and were highly dependent on the whim of the powers that be. Russian capital had acquired a parasitic tendency and was soon drawn into the orbit of influence of foreign companies. For many major Russian financial structures the resale of shares in Russian enterprises to foreign clients became a profitable business. Russian banks, coming to their senses, started thinking about investments of their own in industry, sufficient to control it. But it was too late.

The redistribution of property that has taken shape on the basis of the results of privatization carries a tremendous danger of the loss of Russia's economic independence. The foreign "investor," having gained control of his Russian rival at no great cost, is not, as a rule, in a hurry to invest money in it. And even if the enterprise is ruined, that will still be to his advantage, since it will be compensated for by easy access to part of the vast Russian market. And the more cheaply a foreign company gets hold of an enterprise, the less incentive it has to invest money in its development. The new foreign boss prefers to divert the Russian rival into servicing his own main production unit abroad.

While the small group of people who had seized power were sharing out the Soviet legacy in which the labor of hundreds of millions of people — several generations of Russia's people — had been invested, public attention was focused on public politics as embodied in the State Duma. With the help of the mass media, an illusion was created among public opinion that the main content of the political struggle lies in the confrontation between communists and democrats, which supposedly determines the fate of reform and the country's future. It should be admitted that the camouflage was patently a success. Not only the broad public, but also the country's business circles and even opposition leaders seriously thought — and many still think to this day — that the country's fate depends on the outcome of the confrontation between democrats and communists.

In fact — and it is high time we all saw the light — Russia's fate is controlled by adventurists who were appointed by no one and are accountable to no one, who seized power through a coup d'etat and who use battles on the political stage as a kind of smokescreen.

Unfortunately, on the basis of the results of the work of the fifth State Duma, it must be admitted that the opposition also "swallowed the bait," and danced to someone else's tune. Not only the paid opposition in disguise, but even the principled and patriotic opposition. The latter was led astray by false or unattainable goals, wearing itself out tilting at windmills and quarreling over secondary matters. In particular, the Communists, the strongest opposition party, took the radical stance of rejecting legislation on privatization, thereby giving Chubays a free hand to continue to hand out state property without any legal curbs. Believing in Mr. Chubays' promises to help agriculture, the Agrarian Party faction three times gave its support to the budget submitted by the government, a budget that is suicidal for the country's education, health care, culture, and scientific and industrial potential. Endless tactical maneuverings over minor matters enabled the head of government safely to cover up the share-out of property and the squandering of budget funds, in effect blocking the Duma's influence on real politics.

The "bait" was also swallowed by the mass media. Many journalists, even the smart and educated ones, were so willing to believe in the myth about the war between the communists and the democrats that they did not see in the faces of those who are now recognized leaders of the "democrats" yesterday's party bosses, people who exchanged their places as CPSU Central Committee Politburo members and secretaries for political roles and places in the government and the Presidential Staff and demonstrated their political changeability in the fall of 1993 when they seized power by brute force. Nor did they see that a large proportion of leaders of the present communists are committed to democracy and the rule-of-law state, while many of them suffered in the struggle for the rule of law and democracy, defending the Constitution in October 1993.

No doubt there are many reasons for the weakening of our society's defense mechanisms. This is no time to seek to identify who is to blame: the present plutocracy, yesterday's nomenklatura, or the ineffectual opposition. **Everyone who really values our home must realize that this home is mortgaged, the property has been sold, and the money has been stolen.** This happened because all of us together failed to do in time what we should have done: to stop this drunken frenzy and grab hold of the thief. Now it turns out that our country's economic area has been shared out among foreign companies, its spiritual area is cluttered with other people's rubbish, and the political arena has been seized by impostors who have been planted. Next thing you know, we will become strangers in our own once mighty country, where only the shadow of its past greatness will remain.

It is high time the opposition came to its senses. It is no use going on pursing self-destruction on the political stage. While we play out a spectacle between political parties plunged into mutual recriminations, the handful of adventurists who have usurped power are continuing to rule the country's fate, exchanging for "greenbacks" and foreign patronage not only the property accumulated earlier, but even our future. We must unite to defend our common interests — the interests of the people and the state.

Let us define our position on the key questions of the state of society today, in our attitude to the socioeconomic course and the government that is implementing it, and also in joint actions to extricate the country from the systemic crisis. The basis for this has already been created by our common work over recent years. It is necessary to work out the details and eliminate contradictions, gathering together authoritative and trusted specialists, scientists, and practitioners. To clarify goals and tasks and define priorities — get down to work, comrades, as they used to say.

We have no one to blame but ourselves for unfulfilled intentions and lost opportunities.

We will be to blame if as a result of political immunodeficiency syndrome one of our society's numerous diseases becomes fatal.

### APR's Mikhaylov Views Land Ownership, Economy

*MM1312112095 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Dec 95 p 2*

[Interview with Aleksandr Mikhaylov, deputy chairman of the Agrarian Party of Russia, by Yuriy Naumov; place and date not given: "Reformers' Dance to U.S. Saxophone" — first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Who is in a hurry to open up the free trade in Russian land is the subject discussed by Aleksandr Mikhaylov, deputy chairman of the Agrarian Party of Russia [APR] and State Duma deputy.

[Naumov] Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, recently disputes have been drastically aggravated over private ownership of land and its free buying and selling. The tone was set by Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin, who stated at the farmers' fair in St. Petersburg that without a land market the reforms in Russia would not be successful. Then the idea was taken up by S. Shakhray, leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord. The newspapers and television as though following an order are raising this problem to the level of the most urgent tasks. In your opinion what is the reason for this activity by the supporters of the land market?

[Mikhaylov] Force of circumstances. On the one hand there is the obvious failure of the reforms that have been declared, a crisis of the economy, the people's dissatisfaction with method of carrying out radical transformations. And on the other there is dissatisfaction expressed by the IMF and Russia's other foreign "friends": Why are you delaying the reforms, they are saying. Moreover, the elections are not far off. It is necessary urgently to consolidate the forces of the supporters of a land market and to try to addle the brains of ordinary people far removed from the problems of the countryside and to weaken the influence of the Agrarian Party, delaying it on the path of progress. Through the Duma, where our positions are strong, they cannot succeed in achieving their end, so they have decided to bypass it by submitting the land question to a referendum.

The Association of Russian Peasant (Private) Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives [AKKOR], the Union of Landowners, and radically minded government officials have put forward a whole series of arguments in favor of immediately opening up the land market. They say that the reforms in Russia have stopped because the land ownership question has not been resolved. Foreign investors and Russian producers do not want to invest capital in the development of enterprises on land that does not belong to them.

I want to stress immediately that the Agrarian Party of Russia's stance on the land question proceeds not from dogmatic convictions regarding the eternal unshakability of a particular order of things. We are not seeking to speak for our children, still less for our grandchildren. Concerned for the fate of the countryside and the effective use of land, we are convinced that the movement of land from a negligent owner (user) to a skilled owner, to the person who will work on the land, is better and more effective and is essential. With time a reliable mechanism for this transition will be developed. But right now there is no such mechanism ruling out the snatching of land from the peasant. Just as the main thing — public agreement on this very important decision — is lacking. So the draft land code elaborated by the Agrarian Party deputies provides for a long-term moratorium on the buying and selling of land plots.

[Naumov] They say that the peasant will work well only on his own land...

[Mikhaylov] I think that no sane politician or economic leader would deny the importance of personal interest in the results of labor. But to absolutize that incentive while belittling the importance of others is naive to say the least. Modern equipment and technology now determine the effectiveness of production but they can only be used on a large farm.

[Naumov] But on this score, too, the supporters of the land market have their own arguments: The private farmer will "buy up" small plots of land and optimize his production....

[Mikhaylov] This "trump card" has once again been taken from a "dummy." The Agrarian Party of Russia electoral association's list of top candidates includes Vladimir Akatyev, a private farmer from the Moscow region. A real, natural peasant, but not some kind of "townie." He believes that private farmers are suffering more not from the shortage of land but from the general economic troubles.

And in general, without going into details, I want to say that the problem of buying and selling land cannot be resolved merely on the basis of pragmatic considerations as to what is advantageous and what is not. Ultimately this is the main, determining question: Along which path should Russia develop — along the path indicated by the sated but merciless West or along its own Russian path?

[Naumov] Let us return to the economy. Now and in the very near future there is no problem more urgent for Russia than the food problem. So the supporters of private ownership of land say that over half of agricultural output is produced by private farmers which means that this sector is more effective.

[Mikhaylov] These calculations were first published by AKKOR President V. Bashmachnikov and they pleased him so much that now the "reformers" use them for their own propaganda purposes. Logic, scientific correctness, respect for listeners and readers — all that is by the way! Mr. Bashmachnikov simply speaking has "privatized" all rural inhabitants with an auxiliary farm, including collective farm members, workers on other collective farms, city dwellers who cultivate gardens, kitchen gardeners, and dacha owners. He has added their output to the private farmers' 4-5 percent and come up with a scientific "discovery": Russia is allegedly fed by the private sector!

[Naumov] You predict great upheavals for the country if the free buying and selling of land is finally permitted. But opponents do not share your fears. Here is what they write about the land mandates to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly deputies: "For the period before a civilized land market takes shape in the country tough rules for the buying and selling of land should be introduced. We cannot allow land to be misused, to be sold to foreigners, or for the formation of landed estates."

[Mikhaylov] It would be strange if such a mandate did not appear. Although the actual text of the mandate gives rise to many questions: "tough rules" are introduced only "for a period" — what after that? We cannot allow the sale of land to foreigners at all or the sale for the formation of landed estates and so forth. What is important is something else — all this is no more than rhetoric mobilized for the sake of observing proprieties.

And the upheavals? They have already begun. As G. Shmelev, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and, incidentally, a man of reformist convictions, writes in TRUD, in the Moscow region the squandering of suburban land is in full swing. Good arable land is being allocated for villas with land attached for wealthy people while local inhabitants no longer have room to graze their cattle or procure feed. And the robbed people are beginning to unite to struggle for their interests. For instance, in Odintsovskiy Rayon 450 families belong to a partnership of private auxiliary farms. It is true that their potential so far is not great because those who are eager to own land are operating by different methods. If the territory they want is occupied the "aborigines" are approached by several young thugs in a jeep and asked to sell the plot. If they refuse the thugs go away and a little while later there is a sudden fire....

The land problem is no less acute in the city. So at the rural rallies held throughout Russia recently the idea was voiced that the city dwellers should decide the fate of urban land. There is some point to this. But in any case the city dwellers must know, it must be explained to them, what awaits them if land in the city is sold off freely. They should not be surprised then that payment for housing suddenly climbs steeply again, that the land on which their garages or houses are standing suddenly becomes privately owned and they are "requested" to vacate it....

[Naumov] Your opponents say that the ban on the allocation of land plots in kind if someone leaves a "commune" — a collective farm — will lead to the point where land is concentrated in the hands of "red landowners," farm leaders, and land estates are formed. Surely the Agrarian Party is also against land estates?

[Mikhaylov] We believe that granting owners of land plots (and their list is very long) the right to take their land in kind if they leave the collective farm or agricultural cooperative will soon destroy all farms of any size. That means the collapse of large-scale agricultural production which has fed and continues to feed Russia.

AKKOR figures are stoking the atmosphere surrounding the leaders of rural joint-stock companies, presenting them as evil rulers of the countryside who are grabbing the land plots of pensioners yet meanwhile are indirectly preparing the legislative basis for land barons. Look at the evolution in the position of this private farmers' association recently. At the fourth AKKOR congress its president said: "Private farmers frankly fear becoming hostages to an open door policy for land trading. The slogan of all revolutions, 'Land to those who work it,' has not died." But just two years later, at the sixth congress, the delegates advocated the buying and selling of land. Obviously the slogan of "land to those who work it" had fallen into disuse. More likely it was buried by the AKKOR activists after animated debate. Instead they put forward the following demand: "The land owner must use the land plot... through the direct fulfillment of production processes or the management of the production process or the leasing of the plot."

And another thing about land barons. Yes, the Agrarian Party opposes the concentration of land in the same hands, whoever's hands they may be, a transient moneybags or a local dealer and former collective farm leader. But that is exactly how new landowners appear where the "Nizhniy Novgorod model" of land reform praised by the Chernichenkos [reference to leader of Peasant Party of Russia, affiliated to "Russia's Choice"] is introduced. Actually this "model" did not originate in the glorious Nizhniy Novgorod at all but far from the banks of the Volga — across the ocean, where it was elaborated by the World Bank and its subsidiary organizations. And here too our "reformers" are dancing to the American saxophone...

[Naumov] They say that there is world experience of the land being in private hands and being used effectively.

[Mikhaylov] Well, first, it is far from everywhere that land is in private hands. Countries with a highly developed agriculture and state ownership of the land are well known. Second, however paradoxical it may sound, negative world experience is of more use to us than positive experience. That is it is more important for us to know what not to do because it is extremely dangerous to make mistakes in such an enormous country. Positive foreign experience can be used only if the conditions — natural and climatic, historical, economic, and others — and the culture of the population and its mentality, as people put it nowadays, coincide or are close.

For instance, look at our great neighbor, China. It is recognized that it has resolved the food problem through agrarian transformations. But here is what was stated at the above-mentioned "the Peasants and Power" conference by sociology professor D. Muldzhavin [name as transliterated] (United States), who has studied the situation in China's agriculture.

The land of large farms here has been divided among families. Fields have been cut into strips like spaghetti. The owners of land plots where forest used to grow have immediately cut it down. As a result erosion processes have begun. It is impossible to use equipment on the strips of land and not every owner would be able to buy this equipment. The main tool of production is still the hoe and women are the main workforce. Land reclamation systems previously maintained by the communes have fallen into disuse and the stratification into rich and poor has begun in the countryside.

In developed capitalist countries to which people in our country anxious to own land refer there are all types of ownership depending on the conditions of each country. For instance, in Germany and Austria there is a form of land law making it possible to use land for agricultural purposes but not to sell it. In brief, the land is not private yet the German and Austrian farmers obtain excellent harvests on it.

[Naumov] You often here it said that Lapshin's Agrarian party cannot speak on behalf of all peasants. They say there are other expressers of the peasants' interests....

[Mikhaylov] Others — who does that mean? Chernichenko's Peasant Party? Forgive me, it is a party in someone's pocket. After its noisy inception confusion has arisen in it. At one congress the leader was dethroned. But the leader — Yuriy Dmitriyevich Chernichenko — is no fool to hand over the seal to a new chairman.

But Chernichenko is not drawn to the role of expresser of the interests of the peasants' mass although he is a master of picturesque speech. In an inflammatory speech at the recent meeting of landowners he called for the agrarian reform which is being carried out to be considered Chernomyrdin's reform, putting the present premier on a level with Stolypin which, naturally, pleased the vanity of the head of Russia Is Our Home. In response the latter noted that what Stolypin said about land and the peasants fully applies to the present situation in Russia and that there should be no superfluous talk but his ideas should just be implemented. Viktor Stepanovich firmly promised the gathering to resolve the land question but in which form, through a referendum or through the introduction of the 17th chapter of the first part of the Russian Civil Code, is not important.

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## Scenarios Linked to Big Communist Vote Examined

*MM1212150095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Dec 95 pp 1, 4*

[Article by Yuriy Levada of the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Social and Economic Questions under the "Elections '95" rubric: "Anxiousness and Fear Are Not the Same Thing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What was bound to have happened in the unimaginable commotion of preelection political scenarios has indeed happened: The real conflicts have been extremely simplified, and reduced to a single problem: Will they or won't they get in? Obviously, we are speaking of the prospects of the Communists.

### We Should Not Frighten Ourselves

People are speaking, if not howling, about the imminent "red revanche" on all sides today. Here justified concern, if not backed up by sober analysis, easily becomes a factor in the creation of confusion, and downright intimidation. And self-induced panic.

Of course, the election polemic forces even the most restrained politicians to highlight contrasts, overemphasize dangers, and so forth. Let us leave this aside. The same goes for the disingenuous complacency already characteristic of one section of our democratic public back in the summer: There is no reason to fear "their" revanche; we must sort things out amongst ourselves, especially as regards the current authorities. (It would appear that very little remains of these feelings today.)

It is time to examine as soberly as possible, and with the facts in hand, the alarming scenarios and assess the nature of the current fears, which, incidentally, themselves constitute a substantive factor in the current situation and influence its development.

According to all the data of opinion polls and simply careful observations, the Communists could collect 15 percent of the vote and receive (together with the APR [Agrarian Party of Russia], if the latter clears the entrance hurdle) between a quarter and a third of the seats in the "party" half of the Duma, depending on the distribution of the unfilled seats. This, in point of fact, is the entire "arithmetical" basis of the problem. What lies behind it?

### The Unlearned Lessons of December 1993

If you follow the trends in the mood of the masses over the past two years, there will be nothing unexpected in this arithmetic. In December 1993 the Communists received around 10 percent of the vote — about 5 percent less than current expectations. Incidentally, at that time the "implacable" opposition won a quarter of all votes; that is to say, the overall potential of dissatisfaction as revealed by the polls is virtually unchanged. But the correlation of the mouthpieces of this dissatisfaction has changed.

Two years ago everyone was shocked by the resounding success of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia]; today Zhirinovskiy has to a significant degree exhausted his potential. His party will perhaps manage, only with difficulty, to overcome the 5-percent barrier; possibly it will not even manage that. In principle, this is not so important, and can no longer frighten anyone in the way it did in 1993. Zhirinovskiy's supporters did not seize power, did not unite with the Communists or the patriots, and marked their presence in the Duma with nothing except sensational scandals. Moreover, as analysts have shown, their votes more often than not worked in favor of the government, rather than against it.

Of far greater importance, in my opinion, is the indirect — and still underrated — significance of what has happened. After all, for the first time in our post-Soviet history (not to mention the preceding period) that spontaneous grassroots protest which formerly expressed itself in silent indifference manifested itself in political forms. The LDPR was the first to succeed in providing this discontent with some kind of form of organization (something like an explosive mixture of national populism and social populism, but contained within a dummy grenade rather than a live grenade). The authorities have not managed to cope with this potential of mass protest in the past two years — purely preelection, emergency actions with regard to nonpayments, pensions, savings, and so forth can change nothing. The democratic and trade union movements have not managed to endow this protest with anything like a modern face. Therefore, a considerable proportion of those who supported Zhirinovskiy in 1993 today intend to vote for a more promising force — the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation]; thus, according to figures for the end of November, almost one-fourth of those who voted Liberal Democrat in 1993 have become Communist Party supporters.

The second important lesson of 1993 is the reaction of our democrats, our centrists — our powers-that-be, if you like — to what seems to all of them to be the general danger. It turned out that this sense of danger, actually heightened and exaggerated beyond all reasonable measure — and this was precisely the situation after the elections — *does not unite, but disunites; it splits apart and sets at loggerheads potential sympathizers or allies*. The entire history of internal relations in the democratic or pseudodemocratic camp, both after the previous elections and on the eve of the new elections, is a history of splits, of breaking off relations and fixing boundaries, of searches for people to blame, and so on and so forth. It is not a common fear, but a common hope, common responsibility, or at least a common outlook, that can unite. This is what the forces who considered, or who consider, themselves democratic and reformist have always lacked. (The ambitions of leaders great and small are of secondary importance in this instance.) Can this situation change in the foreseeable future? Let us leave this question open for the time being.

Another fundamental lesson is connected with the previous lesson. Those who cannot draw on the potential of allies look for support in the adversary's potential, trying to exploit "someone else's" slogans and exploit "someone else's" feelings. The Communists did not enter into a direct alliance with Zhirinovskiy and the patriots. But they actively exploit their slogans and endeavor to show that they themselves are the "real" patriots. On the other hand, this is nothing new for them: Throughout the last 70 years of its activity the CPSU was above all the strong-state party [partiya derzhavnaya]. The most important thing is that in recent years the strong-state/patriotic [derzhavno-patrioticheskiy] complex has begun to exert an ever stronger influence on both the politics and the rhetoric of power, and also on a considerable part of yesterday's democrats. The year of the inglorious Chechen war is the best, although not the only, example of this.

An extensive body of research shows that the main "working" part of the ideology of all the current actively oppositionist trends remains nevertheless not national populism but social populism. This is understandable: Prices, wages, and nonpayments concern people far more than the rights of Russian communities, the partition of Sevastopol Bay, or power in Groznyy. But only the opposition can take up the chorus of populist promises...

### Inside and Outside the Duma

Let us look a week ahead and assume that the 1995 elections are over, that the parties are taking their seats in the Duma and are getting themselves in shape to start their actions in the next, transitional six months.

Let us suppose that the CPRF does indeed achieve its rightful expectations, that is to say, between one-fourth and one-third of the seats (in both halves of the Duma). This looks inadequate as far as "seizing" power goes, especially under the existing presidential Constitution.

But in order to create a strong opposition and recruit supporters both in the Duma and in society at large, it is perhaps sufficient. The question is, what situation will develop around the "red faction" in parliament? One scenario is that the centrists and democrats will manage to unite and oppose the common threat, blocking the Communists' revanche. Another is that these same forces will concentrate their efforts on forcing a showdown amongst themselves, and wavering deputies on various sides will rush toward the victors. The situation will also be partly affected by the possible tactics of the Communists themselves, who in the runup to the decisive phase of the political choice may demonstrate either calm restraint, or deliberate aggressiveness; most likely there will be some combination of these masks. In any case, it is not the Duma, but society that will be the principal battlefield in the next six months.

The Communist Party's own electorate is fairly stable, and hence well known to sociologists. Not more than 20 percent of this electorate are younger than 40, around one-fourth are in the 40-54 age bracket, and almost half are over 55. More than half have an incomplete secondary education; less than 8 percent have higher education. Of course, in parties of the "new" (Leninist) type the electorate counted for little; policy was carried out by the leaders and the party apparatus. In the electoral situations of 1995-1996 the elderly, traditional constituency of the Communists' mass support impedes, in the first place, the "social democratic" evolution of the party which some desire, and, in the second, does not create the basis for a new power structure. All radical movements which have come to power, including by parliamentary means, have drawn on young, active forces and brought with them a ready-made schema for the party-state administration of society. The CPRF has none of this today; hence analogies with 1917 or 1932-1933 should be treated with caution.

In principle, the CPRF is trying to find wider support over the next six months in the "kindred" electorates of the APR and the KRO [Congress of Russian Communities], in the groups centered around Ryzhkov and Anpilov, in various social populist currents, and, most importantly, in the mass nostalgia for an undefined, happy, or at least stable, past. (Incidentally, the result of one recent poll was somewhat unexpected: Approximately one-third of the Communist electorate would prefer to return to the perestroyka period of 1985-1991.) Will the party be able to exploit this unorganized potential for a subsequent leap to power, or will it show that it can offer the country nothing and no one? This depends on what the current opponents of the Communists manage to do or offer the same people.

### ...In Power?

Let us make another, fairly strong assumption: Let us suppose that in the six months of the "inter-election" struggle the Communists' opponents are able to oppose to them neither a convincing program, nor an influential candidate (or one or two candidates) for the presidency, thereby giving the Reds the green light to supreme power in the country. Let us suppose that the Communists not only do not discredit themselves in these six months, but acquire new supporters, and pick a sufficiently popular candidate, perhaps from among their allies, or even certain centrists. It cannot be ruled out that then we would have not only a parliamentary, but also a presidential authority with a "red" slant. This assumes large numbers of defectors to the camp of the victors in all branches and forms of power — up to one-third or one-fourth of other party members. But could this really happen?

A return to the old symbolism — in the Belarusian manner — is quite possible. An attempt to regulate prices, introduce coupons, and so forth is highly likely. Patriotic, isolationist rhetoric in foreign policy? There is more than enough of this already, although it could have real consequences in the same isolationist direction. It is not so difficult to worsen and confuse the economic situation. But they would be unable to satisfy populist demands (such as "paying back money owed to the people"), however hard they tried. They would not succeed in carrying out a new nationalization, if only because the middle link in the apparatus chain is now thoroughly embedded in commercial interests. It would be simply impossible to restore the planned distribution system without a totalitarian political regime. Nor would it be possible to restore the atmosphere of universal fear and beleaguerment. (I am basing my judgments not on the declarations or intentions of the party leaders, but exclusively on the real possibilities of their being carried into effect.) All sorts of disasters and messes could occur, but there will be no revanche — if this term is treated seriously, i.e., the recreation of the party-soviet system.

If history had the right to experiment, perhaps the new attempt by the CPSU's successors to take Russian under their wing would be extremely instructive: After all, our society has still not yet mastered the lessons of 1917-1991. But the price of such lessons is too high.

### UNSC Chairman, 'Aziz Meet; Iraq Ready To Cooperate

*LD1312092395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0823 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[By Boris Sitnikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] UNITED NATIONS, December 13 (ITAR-TASS) — "Iraq has confirmed its readiness to fully cooperate with the United Nations in disarmament and in the effort to clarify the fate of missing Kuwaitis. It expects the Community of Nations to respond to this by lifting the embargo on Iraqi petroleum deliveries," Chairman of the U.N. Security Council Sergey Lavrov (Russia) said after his Tuesday meeting with Iraqi Deputy Premier Tariq 'Aziz, who heads the Iraqi delegation, which has arrived in New York.

"However, the Iraqi leadership," Lavrov stated, "deems unacceptable the offered 'petroleum for food' deal, according to which Baghdad must sell two billion U.S. dollars worth of oil to pay for U.N. deliveries of food and medicines to the Iraqi population."

"'Aziz has asked me to inform the Security Council that the Iraqi government had exerted serious efforts to improve cooperation with the U.N. Special Commission for Scrapping Iraqi Mass Destruction Weapons and Missiles after it was provided with new materials and new information last August. Instructions were issued to all the government agencies to fully cooperate with the Special Commission, and this will be the Iraqi government's future policy. He also asked me to tell the Security Council about the Iraqi government's expectation that such cooperation will evoke an adequate reaction of the Security Council members, which I, of course, will do," Lavrov said.

"I have informed Tariq 'Aziz," he noted, "that the Security Council members raised two questions after hearing the December 5 report, delivered by Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission Rolf Ekeus. One of them was related to the 986 resolution. They expressed the hope that Iraq would agree to that resolution in order to improve the humanitarian situation in the country. The second question was that of the fate of missing people in Iraq. Security Council members expressed the hope during that briefing that the work of the Technical Committee, set up under the International Red Cross Committee, to find the missing people would be stepped up."

"Tariq 'Aziz confirmed that the Security Council resolution 986 was unacceptable for the Iraqi government. As to the missing Kuwaitis, he said that the Iraqi government was closely cooperating with the Technical Committee and would continue its efforts to settle this question as quickly as possible," Lavrov stated.

Asked by journalists whether the problem of missile parts allegedly sent to Iraq from Russia and confiscated in Jordan, was raised during his meeting with 'Aziz, Lavrov said: "This question was not raised. I have heard about such reports, but they were denied by the Russian government."

### Russia Ready for 'Active' Role in Balkans Peace

*LD1312075195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0713 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[By Igor Shchegolev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PARIS, December 13 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia will confirm its readiness for further active participation in restoring peace on the Balkans at the coming peace conference on a Bosnian settlement in Paris, said here on Wednesday Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov who will represent Russia on the first day of the forum.

According to the Russian diplomat, the signing of the agreements in Paris on December 14, which were initialed in Dayton, will not crown the peace process but will only open it.

Russia clearly understands how difficult it will be to implement the Dayton agreements, Ivanov said in an interview with ITAR-TASS. However, seeing clearly their weak sides, Moscow suggests paying more attention to their stronger aspects.

The main thing now is to prevent any pauses in the starting dialogue in former Yugoslavia, since pauses can be filled with warfare, the diplomat stressed.

The Budapest, London and Paris conferences and meetings on specific aspects of a settlement serve the interests of an uninterrupted dialogue. Then, a Bonn meeting will discuss a range of military issues as well as measures to ensure stability and trust.

Ivanov expressed confidence that such meetings will continue the next year, and one of them will be held in Moscow. Its agenda and composition will depend on specific circumstances and problems which will come to the foreground at that time.

The deputy minister noted at the same time that the invitation to visit Moscow sent to the Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian presidents and accepted by them remains in force.

Speaking of the coming dispatch of international forces to Bosnia to implement the peace agreement, the diplomat noted that Moscow, as well as other capitals, will take the final decision on this issue only after the U.N. Security Council adopts an appropriate resolution.

### Paratroops in Pskov Form Bosnia Mission Task Force

*LD1212210795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2014 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[By Boris Vlasov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PSKOV, December 12 (ITAR-TASS) — The Pskov 76th airborne division has formed from its companies a task force which is to join the Russian peacekeeping force to be sent to Bosnia.

The Pskov paratroopers are waiting for orders to march off, likely to come after December 14, when the Russian leadership is to decide on size of Russia's contingent in Bosnia.

In the meantime, paratroopers are being lectured on the political situation in the region whose peace they are to police.

### Bosnian Crisis, U.S.-Russia Ties Viewed

*964E0310A Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No. 11, Nov 95 pp 59-64*

[Article by Professor Viktor Aleksandrovich Kremenyuk, doctor of historical sciences and deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute: "United States-Russia: Conflict or Cooperation in the Former Yugoslavia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There have been considerable movements in the development of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia: Croatian troops have virtually eliminated the so-called Serb Republic in Krajina and, altogether, Serb Krajina as such; the more than 170,000 Serbs who used to live there became refugees overnight and are concentrating in Serbia and the Serb areas of Bosnia. Resistance continues on the territory of Croatia only in Eastern Slavonia, which abuts directly onto the borders of Serbia. A real prospect of a conflict between Croatia and Serbia has arisen. These movements have had serious external repercussions also: As a surprise to many, NATO, availing itself as an excuse of the shelling from an unknown source of the marketplace in Sarajevo and the killing of peaceful citizens, essentially began an air war against the Serbs in Bosnia. Important Serb military targets were destroyed, and the peaceful population suffered. The Muslims and the Croats took advantage of the results of the bombing, and their joint offensive, bolstered by the Croatian Army, against Serb positions in Bosnia began.

All this was pronounced in Washington to be a huge step forward in the establishment of peace in the Balkans. It was considered that the Serbs could be brought to the negotiating table and that a peace treaty could be dictated to them with the aid of bombing and Croatian tanks.

It is as yet too soon to say whether the "bombs plus the Holbrooke plan" will produce any stable results. People in the Balkans have lived through times worse than the present. But another question arises: Was this highly dubious success worth the real danger of a break with Russia? After all, Russia has from the very outset of the present crisis occupied a definite and quite firm position: It deemed it necessary not only to warn Croatia about possible consequences and actions but also took long-awaited steps to strengthen ties to Serbia. Simultaneously Russia proposed the convening of an international conference on the former Yugoslavia composed of countries of the Contact Group (Russia, the United States, Britain, France, and the FRG) and the leaders of the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and in the former Yugoslavia as a whole.

The issue now is this: Can the interested parties draw from these changes the conclusions necessary for a political settlement or will things move in the direction of a polarization of positions fraught with the danger of an escalation of the conflict? The Russian proposals are on the table. The response to them has consisted of the use of force against the Serbs and threats to continue the bombing if the Serbs attempt to resist the enemy offensive. Having mapped out its paths of a settlement, the United States is declaring its readiness to confer with Russia. What is very important in this context is whether there are opportunities for Russia and the United States to bring their positions closer together in such a way as to formulate a joint approach acceptable to all the other interested parties as the basis of a settlement.

It is perfectly natural that there is no simple and unequivocal solution of these questions inasmuch as the degree of their interdependence is too great. But much will depend also on the diplomatic flexibility of Russia and the United States and on the actual events on the spot. The search for acceptable solutions is being complicated all the more by the fact that the development of events is involuntarily compelling a return to the measures adopted several years ago, to the UN Security Council Resolution of 1992, for example, concerning an economic blockade of Serbia, and once again calling in question their justification, expediency, and, simply, wisdom.

Let us begin with the fact that for not entirely comprehensible reasons the UN Security Council formerly disarticulated a settlement in Yugoslavia into several mutually isolated problems and attempted to handle them individually: the conflict in Serb Krajina (Croatia), the conflict in Bosnia, the prospect of conflict in Macedonia. The crown of this approach was the decision to isolate Serbia and Montenegro (that is, the present Yugoslavia), considering them "aggressors," and to thereby sideline them from diplomatic participation in the search for peace in neighboring countries, where hundreds of thousands of their compatriots live.

The sole "achievement" of this approach (from the West's viewpoint) was the fact that it was possible to persuade Russia to support the dubious UN Security Council resolution condemning Serbia and to thereby tie its hands in independent quests for peace in the Balkans. In addition, the influence and potential possibilities of Moscow were considerably undermined, and the objective of squeezing it out of Europe (being tackled in another direction by NATO's expansion eastward) had, seemingly, been achieved. But all subsequent events showed that Russia's ouster was by no means leading to an increase in the West's opportunities in control of the Yugoslav conflict. It was in this connection that Western countries had to agree to Russia's participation, albeit limited, in the work of the Contact Group. Any attempts of ours to perform an independent role in the search for peace here like the "Churkin mission," for example, were torpedoed by the recurrent and unwarranted bombing of Serb positions by NATO aviation or diplomatic maneuvers.

The fall offensive of the Croatian forces and its results and also the extremely one-sided, anti-Serb, policy of the West have clarified the situation to a large extent.

First, it is clear that it is not only the Serbs who are the "aggressors." It was quite clear even earlier that there are no "good" and "bad" sides in conflicts of the Yugoslav type. For this reason the charges of "aggression" and "chauvinism" heard periodically in the West against the Serb side (whether of Serbia itself, the Bosnian Serbs, or the Serbs of Croatia is immaterial) engendered a kind of double standard, whereby everything that is done by the Serbs is declared a "crime," "murder," and "violence," and what is done by their adversaries—Croats or Muslims—is either ignored altogether or declared a "defensive response." Although there have been no fewer atrocities and killings on the part of both Muslims and Croats than on the part of the Serbs. The offensive of the Croatian forces in Krajina and also of the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia, ethnic purges of unprecedented proportions—all this prevents, practically, any possibility of the continued pursuit of a double-standard policy. Although who knows how far a policy based on partiality and a desire to call black white may go.

Second, it is no less clear that the Yugoslav conflict cannot be chopped up into pieces and handled individually at one's own discretion. This is a single multicomplex and multiaspectual problem, rather, clutch of problems created over the years and even centuries of the bloody history of the Southern Slavs born of their different historical experience and different position in the modern world, a desire for exclusiveness which has come to replace integration, a reluctance of some ethnic groups to live together with others, and many other factors. This is characteristic not only of the former Yugoslavia, but it is here that the said tendency has undergone so dramatic a development. On the whole, however, this conflict is an integral phenomenon, which does not make it more difficult for settlement and does not permit its fragmentation into Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian, Macedonian, and other problems but requires merely more serious analysis and understanding as to its driving forces, what depends here on whom, and with whom a conversation should be conducted primarily and whether it should be underpinned by humiliating ultimatums. If people truly aspire to a settlement of the conflict here, of course, not to garb in the toga of a settlement an elementary desire to place the region under control and perform in it the role of supreme arbiter.

Third, if account is taken of the fact that the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is something whole, not a set of diverse phenomena, the main question of a settlement is the attitude toward Serbia. And it is not only a question of the traditional Russian love for the Serbs, although it, as a powerful factor of policy in the Balkans, cannot be forgotten either. It simply needs to be understood that without the participation of Serbia (and Montenegro) not a single question of the Yugoslav conflict will be resolved. Only the sophisticated logic of Western experts and their Russian colleagues putting up no resistance to them could have given birth to the idea that something may be achieved in the Balkans by isolating Serbia by an economic blockade and excluding it from the search for a peaceful settlement. It is perhaps possible in this way merely to create the illusion in Croatian President Tudjman or the Bosnian Izetbegovic that they can achieve something as long as the West intimidates Serbia and deters it from active operations. Sooner or later everything in this region will find its place, and all the temporary successes of all who are playing on the anti-Serb mood of the West will appear to them too high a price for good-neighbor relations with Serbia [sentence as published]. And this provided that the West is not thinking seriously, as under Napoleon or Hitler, of occupying the region and of creating its own quasi-institutions in it. But it is the examples of both which caution against such solutions.

Fourth, they have shown the true, not truncated, role of Russia in the region. The West understands full well that Russia and Serbia are bound by long-standing and established ties of mutual affection and love even. It was the strength and stability of these ties which engendered, among other factors, the strong anti-Serb trend in the policy of the West, for the latter understands that an alliance between Russia and Serbia would strengthen immeasurably the European positions of both countries and the Slavonic peoples as a whole and that the preservation of peace in Europe would cease to be the exclusive privilege of NATO. All efforts have for this reason in recent years been applied to ensuring that Russia be inclined with the aid of promises of tremendous economic assistance and "strategic partnership" toward support of the West and that NATO be accorded carte-blanche, virtually, in the Yugoslav conflict. This has succeeded, unfortunately, although not fully. There is some consolation in the fact that the West has obtained in return a wholly uncontrollable conflict which is threatening to develop into a big war, for which the West is not prepared.

As far as Russia is concerned, it has learned a good lesson: It can preserve its international importance and authority not if it submissively demonstrates its pliability and "readiness for solidarity" but, on the contrary, if it upholds firmly and resolutely, although with the preservation of diplomatic tact, legitimate historical and geopolitical interests and is prepared to begin a multilateral settlement of the conflict, not dragging along in the rear of the Contact Group but boldly taking advantage of its specific opportunities. Ultimately, if we abstract ourselves from the bustle of current diplomacy, the West needs a settlement of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia even more than Russia. And if the latter, using its assets, finds paths of such a settlement, the West also will have no choice but to recognize even more distinctly its international authority. Then other questions of European politics: preventing the spread of NATO eastward, joining the Council of Europe, and others, would be settled more easily.

The September events served as a boost to the pronounced evolution of Russia's policy. It is hard for it to condemn Croatia for its operation in Krajina, considering its own operations in Chechnya. But it became it, and none other, to propose an immediate meeting of the Croatian and Serbian presidents in Moscow in order to avert a further exacerbation of the situation. Tudjman did not come, evidently having heeded the advice of those who are not well disposed toward such a Russian role in the Balkans. But his refusal only emphasized all the more the importance of the second part of the event—the visit to Moscow in the summer of 1995 of the Serbian president. Had the leaders of Serbia and Croatia met here, Russia would involuntarily have had to have played the part of "honest broker" between them and to have maintained, outwardly, at least, an equal distance from both. Tudjman's refusal, however, untied Moscow's hands, and the Serbian president was accorded the warmest and friendliest reception. Russia openly demonstrated a readiness to go very far in the restoration of the historical relations with the fraternal people and to contribute as much as possible to their security and prosperity. This was stated absolutely unequivocally in Moscow—for the first time since the start of the Balkan conflict, perhaps—by President of Russia B. Yeltsin at his news conference on 8 September.

This diplomatic breakthrough is of great significance. Within the current situation it changes things both in Croatia and in Bosnia. There is no doubt that prior to the start of the Croatian forces' operation there were some contacts between Belgrade and Zagreb. Judging by how calmly and confidently the Serbs retreated and the refugees left Krajina, the Serbian Parliament, to all appearances, gave Zagreb the go-ahead (of which the Serbian jingo patriots are accusing it) and was the winner twice here: it removed a painful thorn in its relations with Croatia and the West as a whole (with the very important exception of Eastern Slavonia, which has remained Serbian) for the price of a demonstration of the aggressiveness of the Croats and received approximately 170,000 Serbian refugees in Yugoslavia and Bosnia. The demographic situation in Bosnia changed at a stroke in favor of the Serbs. It will now occur to hardly anyone to censure Karadzic for controlling "too much" Bosnian territory. The refugees have to be put somewhere!

At the same time it engendered the hysterical reaction of the West. The use of armed forces against the Serbs by the NATO troops [as published] by no means testifies to confidence in victory. The West cannot fail to understand that today's bombs dropped on Serb positions will tomorrow inevitably result in political losses: No people ever forget in a period of crisis who is their friend and who is their enemy. From the viewpoint of long-term prospects, therefore, the use of NATO military force against the Serbs is evidence of the weakness of its diplomatic position, and it is now important to prevent this weakness resulting in an attempt to forcibly drag the Serbs into an agreement that does not suit them.

Despite the temporary military setbacks, the Serbs may believe that they have scored an important success: The question of recognition of a Serb state on part of the territory of Bosnia, which is formally either a part of or not a part of Greater Serbia, is real. Those who all these years had been setting Tudjman and Izetbegovic against the Serbs have come up against, as they say, what they were fighting for. Things are turning, to all appearances, toward some final phases of the conflict, but not at all as the West had envisaged. The question arises: Will Russia understand this and be able to construct a correct and competent policy? And, further, is there a chance of explaining all this to Washington and persuading it to support Russia, not continue to beat its head against a wall of untenable hopes? Both questions concern both the general context of Russian-American relations and the actual situation in the United States, where two opposite positions on Yugoslavia are emerging.

The positions of the so-called "anti-Serb" grouping in the United States, which includes congressional figures and many members of the administration, are strong. The group is united by several features:

—anti-Russianism or a reluctance to accord Russia any opportunity to exert a decisive influence on a settlement of the conflict;

—a reluctance to see Serbia for what it is in the Balkans—the biggest and most powerful country capable of assuming the burden of the maintenance of stability in the region;

—reliance on force and an unjustified faith in the fact that NATO can change the political situation with threats of aerial bombing;

—a readiness to open channels of military assistance to both the Croats and the Muslims.

Both the weak and strong aspects of this grouping are its evolved anti-Serb stereotypes in the United States: They make it easier to champion anti-Serb measures in the eyes of public opinion and simultaneously make the politicians hostages to their own declarations. The influence of this grouping is quite great, and it has managed to overcome the legacy of the more cautious President G. Bush, who, reluctant to drag the United States into the most involved drama in the Balkans, considered in 1991 that a solution of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be a matter for the West European allies.

This bloc of anti-Serb forces has been opposed thus far by President Clinton himself (which is no small consideration, of course) and the more cautious and thoughtful politicians, from the ranks of the military leadership included. They understand that if a conclusion is drawn from the failure of the gamble on "European" efforts in favor of the unilateral involvement of the United States, this could be a major military and political error. From the military viewpoint, the possibility of a clash with the most powerful Yugoslav Army, which remains the third biggest in Europe, should always be borne in mind when intervening in the Balkans. In addition, this army has at its disposal quite strong air defenses capable of forestalling any threats of bombing attacks. It is better not even to think about a clash on the ground: No administration could permit itself the level of anticipated losses among the invasion forces. On the political side, an unsuccessful U.S. intervention in the Balkans would increase the doubts about NATO even more, wound the Russians' pride, and lead Washington into the camp of the allies of the Islamic fundamentalists, which are already rendering Izetbegovic enormous assistance. But the resistance of the more cautious politicians, which is part of the context of the opposition of the president and Congress, could be broken in the course in the course of Bill Clinton's election campaign in 1996.

Under these conditions the president of Russia's initiative was a Godsend, it would seem, to the American President. It affords new opportunities for a settlement, in which the United States could perform an active and honorable role of peacemaker (together with Russia), which would produce both deserved laurels for President Clinton and reassurance for all who are seriously worried by the Yugoslav conflict. There's just one little matter left to be settled: It is necessary to overcome the doubts regarding Russia as an international partner that have taken shape in the United States and, particularly, in the U.S. Administration, and take a step toward its proposals.

It is here that the difficulties arise: Russian policy 1992-1995 could confuse anyone. It was prepared so often to go so far to accommodate the United States (although there has been no particular need for this) that American policymakers were of the perfectly natural opinion that it was not prepared generally for any independent role or for any independent actions. At each meeting the Americans were for several years assured that Russia had practically no questions which could complicate its relations with the United States (this applied even to so delicate a sphere as the CIS or the "near abroad"), and now it is suddenly ascertained that Russia is speaking about some special interests that it has in Europe, in the Balkans, in the Persian Gulf, in North Korea, and so forth.

The puzzlement of the American President and the secretary of state, who cannot, evidently, fully understand whether this is some sudden recovery of sight which has enabled the Russians to see their own interests where yesterday there seemingly were none, or simply a tribute to the mood in Russian political circles, which changes by the minute, is perfectly understandable. An answer to this question is essential not only for making the right decision but also for convincingly substantiating it, considering both the influence of the opposed grouping and the inevitable astonishment, at least, of the West European allies were the United States to venture upon interaction with Russia. Such interaction is not only a way out for the U.S. president from the situation in which American policy in the Balkans has found itself. It is a clear opportunity for finding the correct way toward a peaceful settlement, which would, on the whole, reassure both the United States' allies and other European countries concerned at the threat of escalation of the Yugoslav conflict.

But the fee for such a solution is recognition of Russia's independent and quite strong role in the Balkans. This would inevitably influence the situation in NATO and the United States' relations with Greece and Turkey. Russia would in this case be playing the part of great power, with whose interests the West would have to reckon to an immeasurably greater extent than that to which it has been accustomed in recent years. Is this in the interests of the United States? Could it agree to this? The answer to these questions is far from clear.

In turn, the vagueness and unsteadiness of Russia's relations with the leading powers of the West have begun to play the part of stimulant of domestic opposition in Russia on foreign policy problems. In the election campaign for seats in the Duma and, particularly, with the approach of the presidential elections, questions of foreign policy will, most likely, become a point of disputation and disagreement. A more clear-cut attitude on the part of the United States and recognition for Russia both of its legitimate interests and more substantial international role would make it possible to remove many foreign policy questions from the spectrum of the campaign battles, which, as a rule, are capable of complicating our relations with the United States, but cannot bring anything positive to them.

The general dissatisfaction with the course of affairs in the international arena heard so frequently in the speeches of politicians and diplomats reflects the actual state of affairs. The end of the cold war did not bring about the harmonious "new world order" about which G. Bush and M. Gorbachev dreamed. On the contrary, all the sores and misfortunes that were in a frozen state while the superpowers were contending between themselves have been revealed. The regions are being shaken by wars and conflicts. There is a patent need for a strengthening of the mechanisms supporting international peace and security. But neither an unreformed United Nations nor a "renewed" NATO bloc can accomplish this task.

As always, the accord of the great powers and of all who can really contribute to a strengthening of peace and security is required. And there is absolutely no doubt that neither bombing attacks nor rapid-deployment forces can be seen as an adequate means. Under modern conditions they may, rather, only contribute to an intensification of conflicts and a growth of the threat of confrontation on a regional scale, in the relations of the great powers included.

### Russia Urges UN to Retain Observers in Tajikistan

*LD1312093395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English*
*0737 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[By Boris Sitnikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] UNITED NATIONS, December 13 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia moved a draft resolution at the U.N. Security Council to extend the mandate of the U.N. observer mission in Tajikistan for another six months, till June 15, 1996, ITAR-TASS learnt from Russian chief delegate to the U.N. Sergey Lavrov here on Tuesday. The Security Council will start discussing this document at its meeting on Wednesday.

Explaining the position of the Russian delegation on this issue, the diplomat stated that the start of the Ashgabat round of the inter-Tajik talks has not resulted, so far, in improving the situation in Tajikistan and on the Tajik-Afghan border.

On the contrary, the situation deteriorates in localities, which provokes concern of the international community and prompts the need for continuing the U.N. peace mission.

"To all appearances, the radical wing of the opposition planned several armed sallies in Tajik areas bordering Afghanistan and at some sections of the border before the opening of the inter-Tajik talks in order to demonstrate its force and possibilities as well as to exert influence in this way on the entire course of the talks," Lavrov continued.

"Military detachments of the Tajik Movement for Islamic Revival started, in real fact, combat operations against government troops, including the Tavildarinskiy, Garmskiy, Kulyabskiy and Shuroabadskiy districts," he added.

The chief delegate noted that mobile groups of rebels fired over 200 rockets on positions of border guards from Afghanistan, especially in the Shuroabadskiy district, from December 1.

In this connection, the Tajik government sent a statement to D. Silovic, head of the U.N. Mission in the republic, and to the co-chairman from the opposition of the Joint Commission on control over observation of the Tehran agreement on temporary ceasefire.

The statement demands that the situation that developed at the above section of the border be immediately examined and that the U.N. secretary-general and the Security Council be informed of the results of investigation.

### Russian Servicemen Begin Voting in Tajikistan

*LD1312121095 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0800 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Elections to the Russian State Duma have already started in the far-off areas of Tajikistan where Russian soldiers are serving, in particular in Murgab, Khorog, and Ishkaim. This information was given by the Russian Ambassador to Tajikistan Mecheslav Senkevich in an interview to INTERFAX. He said that by 17 December ballot papers from all the polling stations in the republic would be brought to the Russian Embassy in Dushanbe.

### Kuwait Receives Delegation for Rocket Launcher Deal

*LD1212212995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1155 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Lebedev]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kuwait, 12 Dec (ITAR-TASS) — The Shaykh of Kuwait Jabir al-Sabah received in the al-Bayan palace today Boris Kuzyk, aide to the president of the Russian Federation for military and technical cooperation, and Aleksandr Kotelkin, general director of the state "Rosvooruzheniye" company. They are in Kuwait with a delegation which has arrived for the launch of the "Smerch" multiple rocket launcher, which Kuwait has purchased in Russia.

"After Russia, Kuwait is the first country in the world to be armed with this state-of-the-art, unique, and promising piece of military technology. The 'Smerch' system may be used to suppress major units of ground troops, tank groups, and individual facilities such as rocket launching pads and aerodromes in the rear," Colonel General Nikolay Dimidyuk, commander of rocket troops and artillery of the Russian ground troops, told the ITAR-TASS correspondent. The general, who is the commander of the Russian units armed with the "Smerch," pointed to "a very wide spectrum" of possible combat uses of this "missile system which has no equal in the world."

The launch of this unique weapon, the most modern successor of the legendary Soviet "Katyushas" developed during World War II, which arrived in Kuwait at the end of November, will take place on Wednesday. It will consist of a static demonstration of its machinery and equipment and of combat firing. Kuwaiti crews who were trained in St. Petersburg and practiced in other regions of Russia will fire on preselected targets using several missile installations. [passage omitted]

Representatives of the Russian delegation visiting Kuwait were also received today by Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah, Kuwait's prime minister and heir apparent, and by Defense Minister Shaykh Ahmad al-Hamud. Russian-Kuwaiti cooperation, including in the military area, was discussed.

### Navy Aide: No Comment on U.S. Russian Submarine Reports

*MM1212142495 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Dec 95 p 3*

[Report by Konstantin Eggert: "The Point of 'Shchuka' Is To Keep 'Trident' Alert"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian admirals' complaints about the catastrophical decline in the combat readiness of the submarine fleet under their command have apparently proved slightly exaggerated.

A U.S. Navy spokesman has stated that our submarines have in recent months been displaying a level of activity unknown since the mid-eighties on both coasts of the United States.

The submarines, which are classified in the West as "Akula" and "Oscar-2" (the Russian names are "Shchuka-B" and "Antey"), pursued American aircraft carriers in the Atlantic and near the islands of Hawaii, and carried out observation of "Trident" nuclear submarine bases. U.S. naval officers hastily added that the Russian submarines were in international waters, and Defense Secretary William Perry said: "We have no grounds to suspect the Russians of hostile intentions."

Asked by IZVESTIYA to explain the heightened activeness of our submarine fleet, Navy Chief of Staff Valentin Selivanov replied: "We do not comment on our submarines' operations. As you know, secrecy is their main merit. The Americans can think what they like."

In private conversations, officials at the staff are more specific: According to them, submarines from the United States are constantly off our shores: "In the area of the Northern Fleet's bases alone, we observe them several times a month." Russian seamen claim that on at least two occasions in past years this could have led to serious accidents involving collisions with Russian ships.

## Deputy Foreign Minister Krylov Arrives in Athens

*LD1212191695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1845 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[By Yuriy Malinov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ATHENS, December 12 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Krylov arrived in Athens from Nicosia on Tuesday on a working visit to sign a programme on cultural and scientific cooperation between Russia and Greece in 1996-1998.

Krylov will meet Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias and other officials. The two sides will exchange on current international issues, including the Cyprus problem.

## Political Issues

### Premier Discusses Privatization, Land Issue

*LD1212210095 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1415 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[Interview with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin by Irina Lapina, in an office; from "A special edition of the 'How shall we live program'" — live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Lapina] Today the guest of our program is Prime Minister Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin. Hello, Viktor Stepanovich, I would like to have a chat with you, to watch some video tapes and to reminisce a little, since we have an occasion: You have led the government for the last three years. [passage omitted]

Since you came into office, things have become calmer. Is this calmness in your character? Is it your life creed or conviction?

[Chernomyrdin] Of course, I am a thorough person in some respects, particularly in work. I have never harbored the intention of starting something and then giving it up; of starting something without finishing it. I know what my duties are. But the main questions are agreed above all with the president. But no one has to stand over my shoulder in smaller things. I act as I have to, without having to look around. [passage omitted: Lapina asks Chernomyrdin to talk about the video tapes she is to show him. She plays a recording of Chernomyrdin visiting a carpet factory in Moscow on 10 August 1995, where he is shown talking to workers. Chernomyrdin talks about the visit.]

[Lapina] Are you happy at present over the progress of privatization, the Chubays privatization, as it is now known?

[Chernomyrdin] You know I would not go to such lengths as to describe it as the Chubays privatization. I think that Anatoliy Borisovich [Chubays] has already entered history as the one who initiated it. I think that history will make its own assessments. That privatization is necessary and that it was needed is no longer a matter of controversy today. It is another matter that it could have been done differently. But who could have known in those days how to go ahead with it?

[Lapina] And yet the class of people in small and medium-sized businesses has not emerged. Are you sure that privatization was necessary?

[Chernomyrdin] Yes I am sure even now that it was necessary. Do you really think that a social class or entrepreneurs could appear in one year, smoothly, like a hot knife through butter? That is not possible. [passage omitted] At the moment the second — monetary — stage of privatization is under way. That is really serious as money is involved. And we can now say that the class of businessmen is emerging somewhere. [passage omitted: recording played of Chernomyrdin speaking at a Duma sitting on 7 March 1994, denying that he wanted to be president]

A pre-election campaign is now under way, of course. I do not want to go into detail about all this. The foam is bubbling as the situation is stormy. But I cannot help mentioning one thing. Every day either a new prime minister or a president is born in our country.

[Lapina] There are about 30 of them now.

[Chernomyrdin] About 30 now? Thank God, some things escape my attention. Look, I say that again. I have been a prime minister for three years. I have never thought that the work of a leader at any level is easy. I have never thought that. Because I have always worked and worked hard. Working at this level, in government, or being a president is an enormous responsibility, an enormous responsibility for the whole country before all people and the whole world. Yet, what are some people thinking? If I cannot be a prime minister, as it were, I will then be a president. Look, that is not serious. Look at that person. He is healthy, at least 130 kg in weight probably. What is he thinking when he says things like that? What is he hoping for?

[Lapina] Do you accept the idea of lying in the name of good?

[Chernomyrdin] God forbid that any incidental people should get to such high posts. That would be the greatest misfortune. Surely, we are the last people to forget what it was like. We cannot be that forgetful, surely? Look at this very century. How much have we experienced in our times, in 70 years? Can we really forget what happened? That was not done by the people. The people paid for everything. They have paid for everything and are still paying. It was the fathers of the people. That is what we have done. We have not been taught to think. God forbid. [passage omitted; recording is played of Chernomyrdin visiting Kizhi in Karelia in April 1993; Chernomyrdin shown watching ethnic dancing. Commenting on the video, Chernomyrdin says to Lapina how much good has been created by previous generations of Russians. There have been many good things in Russian history. Russia is a very special country]

[Lapina] What is your attitude to the progress of current reforms? To put it very mildly, they are proceeding with difficulty. [passage omitted; recording is played showing

Chernomyrdin speaking on need to press ahead with reforms at meeting with journalists in 1994]

[Chernomyrdin] At present the whole of our national economy is being fundamentally restructured. We are a country in which 60 percent of industry used to work for the military-industrial complex. I understand that we should not take these things so seriously. But we can no longer carry on as we used to. The world is going through historic times. The situation in the world now is such that we in Russia should take advantage of it. We should make use of it, make use of it. We have a historic chance. Do you understand, a historic chance. If we fail to take it, and God forbid that we should move once again toward confrontation, then all this will have to work possibly twice as hard. But God forbid. God forbid. Therefore, we must try to get it all working for the people now, for the civilian sphere. Surely, it is not difficult to grasp that we are reduced to importing small factories, small bakeries from abroad. We, who have such powerful industry, have to bring pieces of iron from abroad. Yet, everyone is moaning: Why, what for. Because we used to produce something completely different. And did a good job into the bargain. That is why.

But these things we must do ourselves: We must produce clothes that we can wear, cars that we can drive rather than crawl under on the first day of purchase. That is why. Why are we like this? Are we really so poverty-stricken? Are we sick or disabled? In what way are we inferior? Why does an Austrian — I mean no offense — live normally? Why is he protected by the state? Why can he travel around, have a holiday without any rush? Why does he not need to build anything from one anniversary of victory to another? Why are these things so different in Russia? What about us?

That is what we need to do: We need to be able to produce these things ourselves. And we will produce them. But in order to do that, we must first change and restructure everything. I am far from the thought that everything must be privatized today. Nothing of the kind. There has always been a state sector in Russia, and always will be. But we must sort it out: What is to stay in the state sector, and how the state is to manage it, and what must be transferred to private hands or cooperatives.

For me, for the government, all types of ownership are acceptable if they work, if there are jobs, if people can earn their living, if wages are paid, if incomes rise. Incomes must be rising so as to enable people to have a normal independent life, without having to line up and to be humiliated by officials. We must create normal market conditions. Yes, normal and civilized, like in Austria, Germany and all other countries. If a person works, he has a normal life. There are unemployed people there, too. People idle in those countries as well. In our country people are hardworking. So, why do they have to live badly? That is what I am talking about. That is what I am talking about now. Yes, reforms are proceeding with difficulty. We have made mistakes. But the only thing I want to beg of you: God forbid that we should stop at this point. God forbid. It is better to correct our mistakes as we go along, in privatization, for instance, but every day we must try to produce more, to increase our output of goods. That means that every day we must have wage and pension increases. That is what we need. The country must find peace. When I talk of stability, I mean by it, a stable normal situation in the country. But at the same time mechanisms must be worked out, laws drawn up, a legal basis created. We have no laws.

Let us talk about crime, the crime rise. Yes, there is a rise in crime. That is problem number one. But come on, speed up with the adoption of laws. That is why we have to talk about parliament's work, too. We must work together with parliament, not instead of parliament. Then we will have results. I will say more about that.

[Lapina] Many questions arise in this connection. Could it have been made simpler and less painful? Because many people have lost the comfort and the warmth. You have spoken about it yourself.

[Chernomyrdin] Yes, that is a good question. Thank you. God forbid that this suffering should be prolonged for decades. God forbid. We have been working for the last three years, and the fourth year, 1995, is taking us out, has taken us out on to the path of stability, when industry is beginning to work. But to prolong this process is fatal.

[Lapina] Viktor Stepanovich, do you believe in the success of what you have begun?

[Chernomyrdin] Absolutely. How can you ask such a question? Why am I doing all this? Do you really think that I would sit here, in this building, and in fact in this chair? God forbid. Not only do I believe in success, I am convinced that there is no other way. There is no other way. We have had enough of humiliations and insults. Enough. I do not want to go back to the past. I can remind you of certain things. It is easy to recall them.

[Lapina] It would be beneficial to trigger people's memory more frequently, as there are too many nostalgic sentiments around nowadays.

[Chernomyrdin] Yes, true. Especially when we speak [word indistinct] agrarian sector, Agrarian party. Considering that I come from the provinces myself, that I was born, raised, and went to school for 10 years in the countryside, country life is not a mystery to me. In fact, I know it quite well, perhaps even better than some who are trying to pretend to be country folk. I can say things about it, as I come from that environment. I will say that again: I was brought up, or at least my ancestors lived in the country. They wanted to get things better but they — normal hardworking people — were condemned as kulaks. All these working farmers were destroyed, destroyed. Those who were not destroyed were exiled to Siberia. They created things there too, however. But even in those parts they were pursued until they died. Do you understand? Yet, now all this is forgotten. You have forgotten how many programs we used to have. But in the end we have failed to give roads to people in the countryside. We have failed to build them

At present gas is supplied only to 14 percent of households in village areas. We have forgotten. Has it happened in the last three years? Some villages still have no electricity? Is this also a result of the three years? Nothing of the kind. We must no longer treat the countryside and people there like that. We must not treat them this way. And we will not. I am not in favor of the methods used during collectivization. I do not think the same methods should be used to destroy collective farms. No. That is not necessary. People will now decide their own future. Farmers will sort things out themselves. Where there are collective farms, for goodness sake, let them have their collective farms. If they wish to have a sovkhoz, God bless them. If a person have the right conditions for farming, let him be a farmer. If there are conditions for a cooperative, let there be a cooperative. This is another process which will develop.

We can no longer treat land the way we used to. I do not wish to use any banal phrases on the subject. I have not invented them and they do not belong to me. Yes, there was great Stolypin. He is highly praised nowadays. And he deserves the honors. But one thing about him is not mentioned: What he had to suffer. He said it in his time: What belongs to a community belongs to no one. Today everyone understands that, thank God. We used to say it ourselves: Everything around is owned by a collective farm, everything around is mine. That is, nobody's. That is what it means. I do not want things to work out that way.

But it will take time. One will have to go through certain stages. There are possibilities. We do not have to invent anything: Constitution says that land should belong to those who live or work on it. One cannot be on familiar terms with land. Land must be respected. It does not forgive. It will not forgive. It is offering no pardon to us now for having had no respect for it. [passage omitted; recording is played, showing Chernomyrdin pledging stability for Russia at a Duma sitting in 1995. Chernomyrdin tells Lapina how proud he is of that fact that the 1996 budget has been adopted. Another recording is played, showing Chernomyrdin fraternizing with a puppet in his likeness from Russian version of "Spitting Image" UK TV satire program. Chernomyrdin shown laughing]

### Filatov Condemns Reds' Designs on Constitution

*MM1312095895 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 10 Dec 95 pp 1,2*

[Article by Sergey Filatov, leader of the Russian Federation President's Staff: "Basic Law Becomes the Norm for Russia's Life"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of Constitution Day it is useful to remember the history of the creation of the Constitution. Following the spring 1993 referendum, when the president received the confidence of the people and the economic reform received support, there were two directions in which it was possible to act. The first direction was to dissolve the parliament, the Supreme Soviet, and the Congress, and set new elections.

The second direction was to adopt a new Constitution. The second path was chosen — to prepare a new Constitution and submit this Constitution to a referendum in order for it to be adopted by a nationwide ballot. Irrespective of the disputes that are going on today, it seems to me that that was the correct path, because electing a new parliament on the basis of the old Constitution would have provided no guarantees that the 1992-1993 political crisis — when the two power structures were in confrontation with each other — would not be repeated. On 29 April 1993, practically straight after the referendum, at a meeting with leaders of republics and heads of administration, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin raised the question of the new Constitution for the first time and in this connection gave the floor to Sergey Sergeyevich Alekseyev, one of the authors of the basic draft of the Basic Law, which lay at the heart of the future Constitution, and on which a enormous number of people subsequently worked within the Constitutional Conference. Furthermore, a significant part of the constitutional draft which a commission headed by the Russian Federation president prepared for the congress of peoples deputies, went into the final text of the Draft Law. This concerned questions of the protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual and the citizen, which were taken into account almost in their entirety in the final text, as well as a number of other provisions. The biggest arguments were generated by the principles of building the state structure, local self-government, and other questions which came to be resolved in a completely different way, taking experience into account.

I think that we have traveled a path which has been very difficult, partly because when work on the Constitution finished (approximately 800 people took part in it if you take into consideration the Constitutional Conference alone), discussions about it did not finish. Many assessments have been expressed over the past two years, but they have mainly been of an abstract nature. No one can say specifically that a particular provision of the Constitution is incorrect or is not in line with some world standards or international human rights agreement.

It seems to me that the Constitution is carrying out the main task: It is a basic document regulating mutual relations in society, ensuring the protection of human rights in all spheres of its activity. At the same time, it gives a clear idea about the state structure. In the space of two years, the activity of all institutions of power at federal level has been resumed, the Constitutional Court has started working, and the two-chamber parliament is working. Of course, we are dissatisfied with the fact that we still have few laws, we are not always pleased with their quality, but the main thing is that we have seen that the power structures in the form in which they are enshrined in the Russian Federation Constitution, are efficient and effective.

As for the criticism that is being expressed today, this mainly concerns problems of the country's socioeconomic development. Market ideas naturally generate criticism primarily among the communist-oriented section of society, because for many years we lived in a completely different system, in an economy which was not free, under the state's strong influence on the economy and the social sphere. But we know how these main tasks were resolved — or to be more precise, not resolved. We inherited a crisis-ridden, seriously ailing economy in its death throes and unsolved social problems.

Incidentally, it is specifically from the point of view of the alleged poor social protection that the Constitution is criticized most of all. In actual fact that is not true: Social protection is closely linked with the development of the free market economy, and these problems will be solved on the basis of the state's opportunities and the development of legislation in the social sphere. The Constitution incorporates all the basic principles, while the regulating mechanisms should be elaborated in legislative acts which are adopted by the Federal Assembly. Legislation may respond flexibly to a change in the situation, without affecting the basic principles of the Constitution.

Much more dangerous are attempts — mainly on the part of the communists — to revise the Constitution's basic political aspects. To return to soviets, reestablish a parliamentary republic, and abolish the institution of presidential power. That is, put the government and executive back under the control of the soviets, which would lead to a loss in the efficiency of running the state. The second thesis we hear very frequently is that the right of ownership should be restricted, primarily the right to own land. Attempts are being made to leave us just with domestic property, ownership of housing at best. They want to return everything else to the state. But after all, restricting the right of ownership is restricting human rights and freedoms.

Attempts are also being made to bring down local self-government and put everything under the state's control again, that is, destroy the new society's most important democratic institution.

I must say that of course today not all provisions of the Constitution are working effectively, first and foremost because there is insufficient legislative backup for them. But it is important that the Constitution has a direct effect; the judicial-legal system is working insufficiently efficiently, but it is working. On a great many issues, courts are already applying provisions in defense of human rights both from the Constitution itself and from legislation created on its basis. The Constitution is effective, it is becoming part of the life of every citizen, and the authorities are learning to be guided by it. We are gradually moving toward a normal rule-of-law state in which the Law is considered paramount.

### Yakovlev Not Worried About Constitution Revision

*LD1212214695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2020 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Dec 12 (INTERFAX) — President Yeltsin's envoy to the Federal Assembly Aleksandr Yakovlev has said he is not worried by the possibility that the nationalist forces will attempt to radically revise Russia's Constitution, if they win the upcoming parliamentary elections. "The Constitution can be improved only gradually, and only in the framework of our legislation," he told INTERFAX in connection with the anniversary of Russia's present Constitution marked on December 12.

A major difference between the present Constitution and the preceding ones is that it "guarantees freedom for all political forces in the framework of the law," Yakovlev pointed out.

Another essential provision of the present Constitution is that it provides for sharing power between the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, he said.

"After the tough resistance to the president on the part of the former Supreme Council we entered a new and extremely fruitful phase of mutual cooperation between the presidential and parliamentary structures," Yakovlev stressed.

The State Duma "has accumulated great experience in law making, and the presidential structures learned to reach compromises with it," he said.

In the past two years the new Constitution passed the test of time, Yakovlev said. Nevertheless he conceded that it has some imperfections. Some of its provisions, such as the method of forming the Federation Council, are worded not clearly enough in legal terms, Yakovlev said.

### Zyuganov Affirms Constitution 'Not Legitimate'

*LD1212134595 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1300 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted, on reactions to Constitution Day] Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov is one of those who do not see any reason for the festive mood, for a different reason however. Quoting U.S. special services, Zyuganov affirms that the Constitution adopted two years ago is not legitimate:

[begin Zyuganov recording] Today is not Constitution Day, it is a day of national tragedy, when the Constitution was pushed through with the help of gunshots. According to the information of the American electronic intelligence, which nobody has denied — and it is not easy to deny it, as it is impossible to check because all the documents have been destroyed — almost 9 million votes were illegally added. Any constitution should be written by the people for the power. This constitution was neither written nor even properly discussed by the people. Consequently, addenda and amendments to it are inevitable. [end recording]

### Shumeyko Said Bent on Extending Upper House Powers

*MK1312101095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 13 Dec 95 pp 1, 3*

[Commentary by Veronika Kutsyllo: "The Upper House Is Ready to Work, Work, and Work"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yesterday, on the second anniversary of the new Constitution, the two-year term of the first Federation Council expired. Today, the law "On Procedures for Forming the Federation Council," adopted by the State Duma and signed by the president, comes into force. However, last Saturday [9 December], the Federation Council did the job which the Constitutional Court refused to do: The Federation Council ruled that the house powers shall be deemed terminated only when a new Federation Council starts to work.

The deputies' decision was preceded by Boris Yeltsin's letter in which the president thanked the Federation Council members for their performance and asked them to work a little more — until the new Federation Council is convened. The letter also pointed out that the second Federation Council will meet in January 1996 (it is not indicated who will convene it, but this is clear as it is). Although Vladimir Shumeyko told a press conference that the Federation Council would have extended its powers even without the presidential letter, it is unlikely that the upper house would have made such a dubious decision (the Constitution is too contradictory in defining the duration of the deputies' mandates) without powerful support from the president. [passage omitted]

The situation with the query about the constitutionality of the law "On Procedures for Forming the Federation Council" is much more complex. As [Federation Council Speaker Vladimir] Shumeyko had promised, 92 Federation Council members voted for it. On one hand, the Constitutional Court has on several occasions displayed a strong tendency to evade political issues. On the other, the authorities believe that the law is indeed "unfinished." Shumeyko told the Saturday press conference, "We do not yet know that the Federation Council will be formed according to this law." Behind these words, there apparently is a strong conviction that the law will be revised no matter what. On Saturday Shumeyko proved that some of his ideas — he was the first to suggest extending the Federation Council term for a month — appear more valuable in the president's eyes than the opinion of people from the president's inner circle (in particular, Aleksandr Yakovlev, the president's representative in the Federal Assembly, who thought that after 12 December the first Federation Council would definitely terminate its activity).

There are ways for revising the law. First, amendments to the law can be made by the present Duma: Under the Constitution, it retains its powers until a new one beings to work. Second, if the Kremlin decides not to mess with the "elders," the Federation Council can be formed according to this law while amendments to it will be passed through the new Duma and approved by the new deputies. Third, if the law is still challenged, the amendments (or a new law), adopted by the new Duma, can be approved by the first Federation Council. The second path can result in dragging out the process again. True, this may be what Shumeyko actually wants:

In this event, powers can be extended to infinity, until a law is found which satisfies all and a new Federation Council is formed. Yet, it is unlikely that Yeltsin, who has already indicated the time frame for the convocation of the upper house — January — will want to have an additional problem on his hands before the presidential election. To all appearances, the new senators are also anxious and eager to take up their seats in the upper house.

### New Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Appointed

*MM1212133695 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 9 Dec 95 p 3*

[Unattributed report under the "Monitoring Government Decisions" rubric: "Transfers, Appointments, Dismissals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By a Russian Federation Government directive, Police Lieutenant General Valeriy Ivanovich Fedorov has been appointed Russian deputy internal affairs minister. At his own request Vladimir Nikolayevich Dostal has been relieved of his post as deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Cinematography Committee. Igor Stepanovich Shcherbakov has been approved as member of the Russian Federation Higher Degree Committee collegium.

### Lebed Interviewed on Politics, Grachev

*AU1312104895 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 12 Dec 95 p 10*

[Interview with Russian General Aleksandr Lebed by Miklos Kun in Moscow; date not given: "My Heart Is Aching for the Empire... — Exclusive Interview With the Outspoken General Lebed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If he came to meet me covered in a sack or in pajamas, I would still know from his walk and posture that he is a soldier. However, the now most popular Russian politician, a possible chief actor in — according to his opponents, a Bonapartist turn! — next year's presidential elections is wearing a uniform even on this sleepy Moscow Sunday afternoon. As he appears, gravely looking ahead, in the paint-smelling stairway to escort me to his office, people instinctively jump out of his way. On the telephone, he was reluctant about this interview and difficult to convince, but now, as he warms up to answering the questions while using one cigarette to light the next, his eyes flare up and he speaks with growing enthusiasm. He uses astonishingly tough and sternly honest expressions, and although he apparently has no intention to arouse sympathy toward himself, I can believe that he would be able to mobilize huge crowds in Russia. Apart from his views on the political future, I would like to find out where this general with a tame name (lebed means swan) comes from and who he actually is.

[Kun] From your book "My Heart Is Aching for the Empire," which appeared a few days ago, we can learn that your family was not keen on the system hallmarked by Stalin....

[Lebed] Look, for decades, in the newspapers and the radio, everyone rattled on here about the Soviet Union being a paradise of workers and peasants. In the meantime, my ordinary laborer father was imprisoned in 1937 for five years because he was late for work twice in two weeks. He was sent to the gulag for that! Is that what you mean?

[Kun] Precisely that.

[Lebed] But that was my father's life, not mine. I, who was born after the war, only understood as an adult that almost all people, not only our family, were made to go through all the cauldrons of hell. This system lacked any kind of logic. To remain with my father's biography, he went from the gulag straight to the war against Finland. As rather a lot of Soviet soldiers died in the first days of that unfortunate war, people from the camps were allowed to volunteer for the front. That was how he found himself in a penal battalion, where, thank God, he ended his service at the front unharmed. He expected to be made free again. However, his commanders told him that he could only regain his freedom if a war was started again and if he washed away his sin with his blood. It was a nice order in which no one was interested how brave my father had fought. Only those who had lost an arm or leg were released.

[Kun] Why are millions feeling nostalgia for that inhumane system now, on the threshold of the elections in Russia?

[Lebed] They are fond of their past because, actually with full justification, they reject the present. Already at the previous elections, in December 1993, people mostly put Yeltsin's opponents and, in fact, his enemies into lower house of parliament on the basis of "it does not matter who, as long as it is someone else." Many of the soldiers and officers for example, seeing that the ruling elite was methodically destroying the army's prestige, tended to vote for the communist candidates at the end of 1993, but mostly for Zhirinovskiy's party's list in revenge for the humiliation of themselves and their families.

[Kun] Did the same happen among the 14th Army stationed under your command in the Dniester area?

[Lebed] My officers and soldiers actually restrained themselves. According to the report I received, "only"

54 percent of them voted for Zhirinovskiy's party. This proportion was as high as 90 percent in some other units. However, thank God, it seems that Zhirinovskiy's triumphal march will not be repeated on 17 December this year. Our Fuehrer-nominee has completely discredited himself in recent years. On the other hand, in contrast with December 1993, several other choices exist this time in opposition to the government policy, for example, the Congress of Russian Communities movement, on whose list I will also run.

[Kun] In your passionate speeches throughout the country, you blame the current leaders for the Russian defense force's loss of prestige and power. However, in your book, you proved in long chapters that this process is rooted in the last third of the 19th century.

[Lebed] The two statements do not contradict each other. The troubles indeed started in 1874 when Defense Minister Dmitriy Milyutin made the czar sign a law according to which educated and even half-educated people were able to escape military service, which inevitably resulted in having to build the upper level of officers on less-well-trained men. In addition, the Russian intelligentsia, which was able to stay beyond the bastions of the civilian sphere, loudly criticized the terrible conditions in the army. This is one of the main reasons why we were defeated by Japan at the beginning of the century. Then came February 1917, and then October. And the old Russian Army fell to pieces. At that point, useless civilians and snobbish party representatives, like Stalin himself, did all they could to drive a wedge between the Russian officers and ordinary soldiers.

[Kun] Nevertheless, the Red Army defeated the Nazi military machine.

[Lebed] Because the Russian people defended their homeland, like in 1812! And they succeeded in spite of the fact that Stalin annihilated many of the officers in 1937. After the war, our leaders smeared the Army with political feces. Stupidly, we sent our soldiers to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afganistan. Our great ancestors had left us a huge empire. Those who were to blame for destroying the Army also squandered this. Look how low the once huge prestige of the career officer has sunk in Russia! The officers' dynasties are dying out. And how many young people are hiding from conscription! I was the happiest man in the world when I became a student at the paratroop commanders' military school in Ryazan that bore the Leninian Komsomol name and had twice been awarded the Red Banner order.

[Kun] The son of engine fitter Ivan Lebed did not come from an old Russian officers' dynasty, either.

[[Lebed] My ancestors were indeed common soldiers. However, like me, my brothers also became officers. In fact, we also thought our oldest son would be part of the Lebed dynasty, but his vision suddenly started to deteriorate at the age of 17. A blind soldier is not a soldier. My younger son is attending the Suvorov cadet academy and he wishes to be an officer. He is preparing to be an artillery man, although at his age I wanted to join the air force.

[Kun] Your younger son wears a uniform and so he cannot enter politics. I have not seen your wife, either, mentioned in reports on the election campaign meetings.

[lebed] Do not expect to see her, either. Am I a Gorbachev who drags along Raisa in a muskfur coat to poverty stricken mining villages in Siberia?! I also have to protect my family somehow. I want a home, a background, where no one can disturb me. Although my children have already left, I, my wife, and our dog have remained in our modest Moscow flat.

[Kun] However, since you left the Army along the Dniester and, according to the public opinion polls, became Russia's most popular politician, your private life has become part of public affairs. What are your views on the perspective that is outlined in the world press increasingly often according to which you might once be able to march into your country's history as De Gaulle did into France's?

[Lebed] I hate these stupid comparisons. "Russian Eisenhower," "promising Pinochet," and this De Gaulle parallel.... (A few days ago, General Pinochet wished his Russian colleague election success in a telegram — Miklos Kun). People should at last understand that I am called Lebed, that Russia is not the West, and that it will not follow the roads that have suited the West. A well-known, well-trodden Russian way also exists, although it has been covered in weeds recently.

[Kun] However, your political opponents do not see you marching in the vanguard along this road. It is also said about you that you were willing to make a compromise with the Russian leaders who turned against Yeltsin: In October 1993, thanks to Khasbulatov and Rutskoy, the post of defense minister was almost given to you, and that, in those bloody days of civil war, you planned to go to defend the Supreme Soviet that rebelled against the president.

[Lebed] I am not interested in these fairy tales. The post of defense minister did not even occur to me in the autumn of 1993. It is true that no one actually offered it to me, either. And I am not a dreamer to march with my troops into Moscow through the territory of Ukraine, an independent state, to defend Rutskoy, whom I deeply despise, and his associates.

[Kun] However, as a general of the Russian Army, you did not obey your superior, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, either....

[Lebed] Few people know the current Russian defense minister better than I do. When Grachev was a lieutenant, I served under him as a sergeant. One day, he became battalion commander, and I was promoted to company commander. This carried on for a long time, and I served under his command for a long time.

I know him as a not-very able, but cunning person who forced his subordinates to play cards with him for money. And he gradually fleeced them. Even then, I was able to order him to stop, and I frightened him so much that he never tried to play cards with me again.

In August 1991, I saw him up close in Moscow, when he hesitated for two whole days over whether to join the anti-Yeltsin Yazov and Kryuchkov, or Yeltsin. When he realized that the "junta" did not have much chance, he broke with its leaders and servilely, like a faithful dog, joined the president. I will never forgive him for leaving the 14th Army, which was under my command, in big trouble, although its task is still to defend the Russian and Ukrainian population, generally all civilians, living along the Dniester River. In December 1994, we again publicly confronted each other when, after the Chechen war was launched, he arrogantly stated that he would occupy Groznyy with a single regiment in two hours. Then, I sent him the message from Tiraspol that I would be happy to command a unit like this, but only if it consisted of cadre children. They did not fight in Afganistan, and are also hiding from the Chechens. The general staff of this select regiment will be made up from Yeltsin's combative environment. You can imagine the Kremlin's reactions to this!

[Kun] What are your views on the fact that, while Defense Minister Grachev is holding talks with NATO leaders and is visiting Israel, in military terms, he is getting closer to Cuba, North Korea, and Libya?

[Lebed] I am against this stupid trend. At one point, we lost many billions of dollars by taking bread away from Russian people to send modern weapons — often free of charge — to those many good-for-nothing people.

[Kun] Talking about the Chechnya campaign, Grachev claimed that it was possible to use the Army within the country if the situation required it.

[Lebed] This is a mad and criminal stupidity: The Army's task is to defend the country against foreign enemies. No such situation can arise when it is used for an internal showdown.

[Kun] Do you also condemn the Russian defense minister's obstinate protest against NATO's eastern expansion?

[Lebed] I am also against NATO's expansion along the former borders of the Soviet Union. If the Warsaw Pact no longer exists, then why does the North Atlantic Pact wish to expand?! The way NATO's leaders are working on creating a new enemy image is outrageous. Naturally, our answer to this should not be to embrace, for example, Fidel Castro.

[Kun] Then what is the answer? Will there be any cause for fear in Europe if Gen. Lebed moves into the Kremlin?

[Lebed] I am a Russian patriot. I would do all I could to ensure that my compatriots' lives were safe within and outside our country's borders. However, in my election campaign, I have never threatened other countries or nations. I do not see why anyone should be afraid of me.

[Kun] Are you not worried about being accused of greater Russian imperial nationalism?

[Lebed] Listen here, if the Ossetians, the Ukrainians in Russia, or your relatives, the Manyshies have the right to set up associations to exercise their cultural and national identity — and I am happy to recognize this right — then allow the 25 million Russians living outside Russia to also have these rights. The German ambassador to Moscow regularly visits the German villages in Russia and Kazakhstan and is opening cultural institutions. Fine. But why does our diplomacy do almost nothing for the Russians? This is the point, rather than some kind of offensive or, God forbid, xenophobic ideology.

[Kun] Not even an anti-Western attitude?

[Lebed] I have no problems whatsoever with the West — it does not actually impress me — and I sincerely hope that Russia will always maintain normnal relations with it. However, I do not think that we should servilely copy the Western patterns and implement their development course. It belongs to them. We should continue to go on our own way.

[Kun] Your number one ally at the moment is Yuriy Skokov, leader of the Congress of Russian Communities movement, a typical character of the former nomenclature, and he has been mentioned several times as a candidate for the prime ministerial position, although he has never been given it. As far as I know, you met him in August 1991 when you both turned against the hardline communist party leadership that wanted to reinstate the conservative state-party system.

[Lebed] I had met Skokov a little before that. In my view, he is an experienced statesman who considers the country's and the Russian nation's interests to be most important. This is the reason he broke with Yeltsin.

[Kun] At one point, Moscow analysts also connected you with the West-oriented reformer economist Grigoriy Yavlinskiy.

[Lebed] Much sound but little sense. My relationship with Yavlinskiy has always been characterized by keeping a safe distance. He was the one who, under Gorbachev, announced the "Five Hundred Days" economic program, from which Yegor Gaydar and his team copied many things, overtaking Yavlinskiy in a Stakhanovist way. In that way, they destroyed the Russian economy in barely 300 days.

[Kun] In your latest statement, I read that you think that Yeltsin will not allow the presidential elections to go ahead in summer 1996. What is the basis for your assumption?

[Lebed] I ask you in return: Why should I believe Yeltsin's administration, which would not have the slightest intention of handing over power legally, obeying the majority will of the nation, after a defeat in the presidential elections? The president's narrow environment — even those who command the extensive praetorian guard — is aware that, one day, Yeltsin and they will also be questioned about the destruction of the country, its plundering, and the shameful Belovezh agreement that exploded the empire from within. Only those who do not wish to kick the Russians living beyond the artificial new borders do not do so. Everyone is clear about how many people, from Yeltsin to Grachev, are guilty for the fact that, in October 1993, Russian tanks shot the legislation to pieces, watched by the whole world. And they are also responsible for the war in Chechnya, which even now is demanding young lives every day. Shall I continue?

If, in spite of the expected election frauds, the current opposition pushes back Yeltsin's hirelings at the 17 December State Duma elections, a panic will start in the Kremlin and, using our imperfect Constitution, they will try to postpone the presidential elections. Yeltsin's physical and mental deterioration also points in this direction: Even if he just powerlessly vegetates in the former Kremlin hospital, he will suffice for his advisers. In fact, that would do very well.

[Kun] In what kind of Russia would you like to live in?

[Lebed] A proud and successful empire whose citizens do not deny their country's past. I see Russia as a rich and educated country that recognizes the rights of national minorities, that cares for the Russians who have been swept beyond the border out of no fault of their own, and that its neighbors and the rest of the world have no reason whatsoever to fear. Believe me, we have quite enough to do within Russia!

## Zhirinovskiy Warns Against 'Attempts To Destroy Russia'

*LD1312094595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0824 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Dec 12 (INTERFAX) — Leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy today said his new book titled "The Last Blow On Russia" was a warning to the West against "the continuation of attempts to destroy Russia."

"If these attempts are not stopped an international catastrophe will inevitably follow," Zhirinovskiy said at his book's presentation in Moscow today.

With regard to the coming elections to the State Duma, Zhirinovskiy said his party would win them if the elections were not tricked.

"Russia will have only two large parties in the future: the LDPR and a party created on the basis of the Our Home is Russia electoral bloc," Zhirinovskiy said. He said that in British terms his party would be a Labor party and the party led by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin a Conservative party.

With regard to possible outcome of 1996 presidential elections, Zhirinovskiy said he believed that he would have to compete with present President Boris Yeltsin in the second round of the elections. Zhirinovskiy said he thought that Yeltsin would renounce his presidential powers in favor of "the younger and more dynamic leader."

Zhirinovskiy said he hoped to head the country until the year 2017 but then he would have a rest for a year or two and transfer the powers to the Conservative party. He said he was sure that in the two years the people would request his return to the presidential office.

Zhirinovskiy refused to answer questions asked in French. He said this was "the language of aggressors bombing innocent Serbians."

## Barkashov's 'Ultraright-Wing Extremists' Denounced

*MM1112135595*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 December 1995 front-pages a 300-word unattributed report entitled "Society Is in Danger Unless It Can Cope With Extremism." The report is accompanied by an ITAR-TASS-attributed photograph showing a line of some 45-50 men in military uniform making a fascist-style salute. The report reads as follows:

"A photojournalist snapped these arms raised in Nazi salute and overshadowed by Russian birch trees not just anywhere but in Terletskiy Park in Moscow's residential district of Novogireyevo.

"Russian National Unity activists, better known as 'Barkashovites,' assemble here perfectly openly every week. Not only do they fear no one and hide from no one but, on the contrary, they demonstrate their strength by noisily stepping out. They contrast their own 'Russian order' with public law and order.

"In the pages of the newspaper bearing the same name, which, incidentally, can be bought at almost any subway station, Muscovites and visitors to the capital 'wishing to join Russian National Unity' are urged to come to these Terletskiy Park rallies and are promised meetings with representatives of the Moscow regional organization, a review of battle formations, and a get-together.

"Everything is out in the open and in grand style. The newspaper, which preaches unbridled chauvinism, also comes out openly and has a print run, so it is indicated, of 500,000 copies. Before our eyes heavy soldiers' boots are trampling not only the principles of humanism but also the Russian Federation's laws. Moreover, these laws are being trampled before the eyes of the Russian Themis herself.

"The most terrible thing is that people have already begun to get accustomed to 'Russian order' and Russian Nazism. As to something customary in the streets and parks. As the norm in public ideology. Is this not what the Russian Nazis themselves want?

"Throughout the civilized world fascist, national socialist, racist, and other ultraright-wing extremists have been driven into a corner by tough legal restrictions, and it is only in the country of the people who defeated fascism that they strut around like mummers during days of noisy and merry wassailing, unaccompanied by glances from the guardians of public order.

"They proclaim from the television screen: 'Down with swarthy guys from Moscow!' They march through the streets. They are making their way into power perfectly legally."

## Scarce Money Imperils State Investment Projects

*MM1212134895 Moscow FINANSOVYYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Dec 95 p 1*

[Report by Yevgeniya Pismennaya: "Shortage of Funds Disrupts Government Investment Programs" — received via Internet]

[FBIS Translated Text] The second investment contest has ended at the Ministry of Economics. Some 612 projects with a total value of 34.4 trillion rubles [R] have already been received from contestants. More than R7 trillion is required for these projects. The majority of the projects presented do not meet the requirements set for the drawing up of business plans and the contest's basic conditions (especially with regard to the relationship of internal and borrowed funds and to the time limits for the repayment of capital investment and state credits). Therefore, 314 projects — that is more than half of them — have already been returned to the competing organizations at the first stage of their appraisal.

At the first session of the Commission for Investments Contests, a decision was adopted to provide state support for only 37 of 54 projects presented, for which R323.6 billion in state low-interest credit was allotted.

At the second session documentation on 104 investment projects was examined. The Commission decided to provide state support for the implementation of 75 projects worth R427.7 billion in the form of returnable federal budget funds.

The three largest projects involve development of capacity in the extraction of the rich copper pyrites and cuprous sulfide ores in deposits in the Urals and Bashkiria in order to maintain the Urals copper-smelting enterprises' raw-materials base. Projects for the extraction of nickel ore and for the development of a deposit of auriferous ore and gravel have been approved.

The automobile industry leads the way among the machine-building sectors' projects. In the commission's opinion, state support is essential to create the production capacities of large-scale steelcastings for wagons and crankshafts on the basis of progressive technology.

The construction complex is represented by projects involving the creation of new types of walling materials made from cement-sand mixtures and molded under high pressure using modern equipment.

Projects for the agro-industrial and the chemico-lumber complexes have also received support. Priority is being given to the projects of high-tech production facilities.

Deputy Economics Minister Vladimir Kossov is certain that by holding such contests, investment activities in Russia are being activated. The Economics Ministry's good intentions are understandable. But there is another problem — the problem of actually funding state support that has been legally ratified. Contestants who have themselves already been through the contest state that as yet only 10-15 percent of the pledged sums have been received. Many of the participants in the contest are afraid that the situation will not improve next year.

### 'Hidden' Unemployment Affects 4 Million in Russia

*LD1312120095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1102 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[By Lilya Kuznetsova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, December 13 (ITAR-TASS) — Hidden unemployment is now affecting four million people in Russia, Fedor Prokopov, head of the State Employment Service, told Tass today.

According to Prokopov, a trend towards the reduction of this category of the unemployed emerged in the second half of the current year, which is connected to some extent with the beginning of economic stabilization. He believes, however, that it is too early to speak about a radical change for the better.

So far as full-time unemployment is concerned, irrespective of whether or not the unemployed are registered in the employment services, it covers today six million people or 8.2 per cent of economically active population of Russia. He forecasts the annual average unemployment rate of 7 million (9.5 per cent) for 1996 and 8 million (10.8 per cent) for 1997. It should be mentioned for the sake of comparison, Prokopov continued, that full unemployment on labour markets of West and East European countries amounts to 14-16 per cent of the economically active population.

According to Prokopov, the officially registered unemployment rate is 2.9 per cent today, but the figure differs a great deal in various regions of Russia and in some depression-stricken areas it exceeds 10 per cent. In small towns and townships, built to provide workforce for the only industrial enterprise, unemployment rate reaches 28-30 per cent. According to forecasts of the employment service, stabilization should hardly be expected on the labour market in 1996, and unemployment will continue to grow.

## Media Issues

### Federation Council Passes Law on Radio and TV

*LD1212153995 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0927 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federation Council has approved a State Duma law on reorganization, privatization and liquidation of state television and radio broadcasting.

The law stipulates that this process be carried out in accordance with the federal law on preserving state TV and radio broadcasting, thereby ensuring equal access to the mass media by various public organizations.

Although the Committee of the Federation Council for Questions of Economic Reform recommended this law be rejected as a basis, deputies of the chamber nevertheless approved it.

Deputy of the Federation Council Yuriy Boldyrev argued it should be one way or another, radio and television must be either state or non-state. It all depended on specific conditions. If there is state TV and radio it must, naturally, be strictly regulated, he said, so that there is no monopoly of influence of executive power.

In the most developed European countries there are supervisory councils set over these state mass media, he added. These councils are composed of the representatives of the different political forces and public organizations.

In our country, he continued, it is assumed that state is bad but private is good. State is bad because it is considered a monopoly but private is good because there is no monopoly.

On the other hand, one can transform the state entity into a private monopoly, which is the worst of all options. It is a private monopoly but remains federally funded, the deputy adds.

The Duma proposes that there could be privatization of the mass media but strictly according to the law, he said.

Before such a law is passed, the reorganization of state TV and radio broadcasting muct be suspended. The law proposes that the government and the president of Russia bring legal enactments on the reorganization, privatization and liquidation of Gosteleradio organizations including those linked with the creation of a joint stock company Russian Public TV in accordance with the adopted law. The Russian President will now make the final decision in completion of this law.

## Military Issues

### Latest Developments in Army Manning Discussed

*MM1212131995 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 9 Dec 95 p 3*

[Unattributed "Commentary": "Not Enough Draftees, But We Cannot Afford Contract Servicemen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Problems regarding the military service obligation are again at the center of Russian society's political passions. As already reported, on 3 December the Russian president signed an edict "On Discharge From Military Service and Additional Social Protection Measures for Servicemen Who Are Taking (or Have Taken) a Direct Part in Combat Operations and Who Are Performing (or Have Performed) Tasks in Armed Conflict Conditions." It applies to soldiers and NCO's doing compulsory service who have served at least one month in Chechnya or Tajikistan, taken part in fighting there, or served less than one month but were wounded or concussed. They must all be discharged into the reserve on expiry of 18 months' service under the draft.

Yeltsin returned to the Duma the amendments it adopted 15 November to the Russian Federation Law "On Amending the Russian Federation Law 'On the Military Service Obligation and Military Service,'" which created a paradoxical situation whereby some spring draftees would have served 18 and others 24 months. In the Russian Federation president's opinion this could have led to unfortunate consequences in military collectives.

The decision made by the president has provoked an unequivocal reaction from certain politicians and mass media. In the opinion of Colonel Yuriy Mamchur, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Information Directorate, some commentaries and assessments are inflammatory and are clearly linked to concerns about the upcoming elections rather than about how to raise Russia's security to the required level.

In order for the Armed Forces to be in a state to perform their strategic tasks, their manning level must not drop below 70 percent. As of 1 September 1995 the Russian Armed Forces average manning level was 64 percent. The selection of contract servicemen is an alternative source of Armed Forces manpower acquisition. But the state's current socioeconomic situation does not allow the transition to this in practical terms. In the opinion of specialists a contract serviceman costs the state four-five times more than a serviceman appointed to the same post under the draft. His pay must be at least 2 million rubles [R] a month. When pay was R250,000-500,000, around 50,000 contract servicemen broke their contracts, considering the payment for their labor to be too low.

There is an opinion that the Armed Forces manpower shortfall could be reduced by cutting them. But cutting any army has certain limits. They depend, in particular, on the size of territory and the length of the state border. In China there are 123 servicemen for every kilometer of border, the figures being 99 in the United States, 56 in Turkey, 79 in France, 77 in the FRG, Poland, and Romania, 34 in Spain and Italy, and 47 in Belgium. In Russia there are only 28 servicemen for every kilometer of border.

Thus the Russian Federation president's edict not only saves the Army from collapse but also maintains the state's defense capability at least at the minimum level.

"There are around 55,000 soldiers subject to discharge under the president's edict," Major General Valeriy Astanin of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry General Staff, who is chief of the Direction [napravleniye] for Drafting Citizens and Armed Forces Manpower Acquisition, said in a conversation with ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI's correspondent. "The remaining 150,000 soldiers and NCO's, drafted into the Army in spring 1994, will serve until spring 1996 as envisaged by the amendments to the Law 'On the Military Service Obligation And Military Service.'"

On Friday [8 December] the State Duma in a separate law approved the provisions of the Russian president's edict which say that the military service period for those who are performing it under the draft and taking part in combat operations is reduced from 24 to 18 months. The deputies included practically the full text of the president's edict in the law, with the addition that the two-year service period is effective from 1 October 1995. The law prescribing that students attending higher educational establishments' military departments are to be put on the reserve list by the defense minister with the rank of officer was given its three readings at once. They must be drafted for military service in accordance with the Russian Federation president's edict and perform it in the manner prescribed for contract servicemen.

### Commander Denies Rumors of Pskov Troop Relocation

*LD1212172995 St. Petersburg Fifth Channel Television Network in Russian 1630 GMT 9 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] It was always considered to be prestigious to serve in the assault troops. Officers in the Chernigov or, as it is sometimes called because of where it is stationed, Pskov division, having served in Chechnya and losing more than 120 men, while preparing for a mission in Yugoslavia and despite receiving cash allowances far below world standards, are complaining less about financial problems today. According to unofficial information, the air assault troops are about to be disbanded. There is constant talk in official circles that the general staff is drawing up a scheme where air assault units would be transferred to come under the military districts. The hand over of the assault division stationed in Novorossiysk to North Caucasus Military District adds credence to this rumor. According to an official document signed back in the times of Mikhail Gorbachev, the mobile troops should be based 500 km from the state border, a fact that serves only further to heat passions in Pskov. The new political situation determined the status of the Pskov division as a border division.

[begin Popov recording] We have not been told we are to be transferred into the heart of the country. Of course, stationing an air assault division in the border region, as we are at present, may well not be expedient from the tactical or operational point of view. But we are not currently planning to relocate. [end recording]

Major-General Popov [the division commander] does not think the division will change its designation and will not be reformed into a motorized rifle division. On the other hand, however, nobody has yet annulled the directive on the stationing of mobile troops. [passage omitted]

## Federal Assembly

### Composition of Future Federation Council Considered

*MK1312061795 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 9 Dec 95 p 2*

[Article by Yelena Tregubova: "Today Is 'Farewell' Session of Senate. New Federation Council Will Emphasize Interests of Regional Elites"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputies of the upper house of parliament are gathering today for their last legal session. Under a law adopted by the State Duma, the powers of nearly 60 percent of today's senators — those who are not heads of Federation components — come to an end after 12 December.

Despite the fact that factions were not provided for in the composition of the Federation Council, it can be stated that at least three rather clearly defined groups were formed by senators of the first convocation. The first one included about a score of "irreconcilables" led by GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] veteran Vasiliy Starodubtsev, Communist and Agrarian Party activist Vyacheslav Zvolinskiy, and the director of Krasnoyarsk's "Yenisey" chemical combine, Petr Romanov.

The second "faction" comprised exponents of the interests of the old prominent party-and-economic-management elite, which is pushing for more support for loss-making enterprises and for halting privatization so as to later carry it out to benefit the former masters of production. One can say that the nucleus of this group is formed by former Mossovet chairman Nikolay Gonchar; Yuriy Boldyrev, who recently quit "Yabloko" in a disagreement with a liberal version of the production-sharing law; as well as Anatoliy Dolgolaptev, former deputy head of the Moscow Oblast administration who, according to his own definition, is the "main lobbyist for the military-industrial complex's interests" in the Senate. Both of the above groups demonstrated complete mutual understanding in voting on most laws, the only noticeable difference between them being the intensity of their rejection of the country's current leadership. The "irreconcilables," who mainly comprise sidelined old petty functionaries, are even more frenzied in this regard. As for the second group, behind which one could sense the substantial financial backing of the old elite, it was seeking a more respectable image and even took the liberty of going along with the government on some matters, but it took every opportunity to stress that it was seriously planning to restore to power members of the old "house."

The third Senate "faction" can be characterized as relative supporters of the government, who back most of its decisions. They are Samara Governor Konstantin Titov, Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaymiyev, and so on.

Curiously, many regional heads who joined with the first two groups on particular issues often sought, however, to block their populist decisions calling for outlays not backed by hard cash.

Nevertheless, it was not the regional elites that until recently had a decisive influence on the outcome of a majority of voting sessions in the "regions' house," but deputies elected in line with the "transitional" norms of 1993 and in accordance with a majority system similar to that of the Duma — the only difference being that they were elected in two-seat and slightly broader constituencies than in the one-seat constituencies. It is they, rather than representatives of the regional authorities, who headed all the Senate committees and, unlike the heads of regions, most of them have firmly settled down in Moscow. They also carefully prepared all voting sessions and simply attended them more often. Remarkably, it is they who formed the framework of the first of the above groups. Thus, now that they are going to lose their seats and the upper house will come to follow precisely the constitutional norms for regional representation, one can expect the Federation Council to significantly change the style of its work to stress the interests of the regional elites. Only the future can tell if a new Senate will be more loyal to the government, or if the new setup will provide Moscow new unforeseen problems in its relationship with the "regions' house."

### Duma Adopts Laws on Political Parties, Foreign Travel

*MK1312061495 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 9 Dec 95 p 1*

[Report by Yevgeniy Yuryev: "A Hundred People Get Together, and There Is a Party for You"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On the last day of its work deputies of the current State Duma had no chance to relax. Approximately 70 bills were submitted for discussion, many of which had more than once led the Duma to fruitless debates and were dubbed "unfeasible." To do their utmost and tie up at least half the loose ends, the deputies had to resort to shock-work tactics.

The hope that under time pressure the factions would be ready to compromise where they had earlier refused to budge was partially justified. At last the law "On Political Parties" was adopted, which had been a stumbling block throughout the two years of the Duma's activities. One issue in particular was what membership a party should have in order for it to be registered. The developers of the law proposed 10,000 members (according to the USSR law still in effect, 5,000 members are required). The question of a minimum party quota was settled in the course of a straw vote [reytingovoye golosovaniye]. After going through a number of options, the deputies finally agreed that 100 people is quite enough. The new law simplifies a number of conditions for party activity, but also establishes some limitations — in particular, in their financial activities. A party will have to present an annual financial statement indicating sources of income and expenditures. Both income and expenditures are strictly regulated. For instance, it may not use donations from charitable or religious organizations, state enterprises, foreign states or individuals, or those coming from anonymous persons. Such donations are to be ceded to the state within two weeks. Donations may be accepted from non-state enterprises, public associations and foundations, and physical persons, but their sum may not exceed that specified by the law — for a legal entity, not more than 1,000 times the official minimum wage within the space of one year; with respect to individuals, not more than 100 times the official minimum wage. [passage omitted]

A law on entering and leaving [the country] has also been adopted. Under the law, "exit by a citizen of the Russian Federation from the Russian Federation does entail any limitation of rights guaranteed by Russian Federation laws and international obligations with respect to him [her], his [her] spouse, or his [her] close relatives." There are several main documents that may be used for entering or leaving the country — a passport, a diplomatic passport, or a seaman's passport. A passport is issued upon written application to internal affairs agencies on the residential principle and is to be processed within a month and must be valid for five years. Exit can be temporarily limited only if a citizen had access to highly sensitive or top secret information classified as a state secret; has concluded an employment contract that provides for a temporary limitation of the right to leave [the country]; or has been called up for military service. [passage omitted]

### Duma To Consider Draft Law on Foreign Intelligence

*MK1312061595 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 9 Dec 95 p 2*

[Report by Petr Zhuravlev: "Intelligence Is a Humane Affair. SVR Will Communicate With Parliament via Special Committees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the last acts to be passed by the Fifth State Duma will perhaps be a law on foreign intelligence, the text of which was confirmed last night. In line with one of the provisions, intelligence activities (or "the procurement and processing of information on actual and potential possibilities, actions, plans, and intentions of other states, organizations, and persons affecting the vital interests of the Russian Federation") cannot be used for accomplishing inhumane goals.

For the first time, the law clearly defines the spheres of activity among the four Russian departments that have the right to engage in foreign intelligence. The SVR [Foreign Intelligence Service] will be responsible for "political, economic, military-strategic, science and technology, and ecological" information, the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] for "military, military-political, military-technical, military-economic, and ecological" information, and the foreign intelligence arm of FAPSI [Federal Government Communications and Information Agency] for "political, economic, military, science and technology" information obtained "through the use of electronic facilities." The foreign intelligence arm of the FPS [Federal Border Service] is assigned a sphere pertaining to the guarding of the borders and the Russian Federation's exclusive economic zone. After long debate, the FSB [Federal Security Service] was denied the right to have its own intelligence service.

The procedure for the use of "overt and covert methods" by the services, the law says, is to be defined by their internal documents. It specifies, however, that "methods and means" of intelligence activities are, in the first instance, not supposed to harm anyone's health and, secondly, cannot be "used in regard to Russian Federation citizens" on the country's territory. Foreign intelligence organs have the right to "place their regular personnel under cover, using for this purpose a different departmental affiliation."

A large separate article in the law is dedicated to "persons rendering confidential assistance" to foreign intelligence organs. Those can be, "on a paid or unpaid basis," competent adult citizens who have given their voluntary consent. Deputies, judges, prosecutors, and priests cannot be recruited. Information on "voluntary assistants" constitutes a state secret, which under no circumstances can be made public.

Journalist have not been forgotten either. Part 4 of Article 9 says "that with the aim of preventing possible use of the mass media for divulging information constituting a state secret, the authors of materials on foreign intelligence organs have the right to apply for an expert opinion" to them. It only remains to hope that in this instance the makers of the law did not mean to revive the well-known "come if you choose, and try not to come if you don't" principle.

Parliament is supposed to exercise control via the Counting Chamber, among others. The chambers of the Federal Assembly are to set up, for liaison with foreign intelligence organs, special committees whose members can begin work only after having been cleared for access to state secrets.

## Privatization Process Safeguards Outlined

*MM1312102395 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 Dec 95 p 3*

[Statement by Sergey Vasilyevich Burkov, chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma Committee on Ownership, Privatization, and Economic Activity "On the Need to Safeguard Russia's National Interests During Privatization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation that has developed regarding the holding of shares-for-loans auctions and investment tenders in respect of federally owned blocs of shares in strategically important enterprises is causing very serious concern from the viewpoint of safeguarding Russia's long-term economic interests and national security. Of the five major tenders so far held two have ended in scandal. It can be stated with complete certainty that the upcoming auctions and tenders could also lead to an exacerbation of the situation in the production and financial sectors of the economy.

The main reason for this very unfortunate turn of events is the lack of an adequately elaborated legislative base. The State Duma warned of this and promptly adopted the necessary decisions. Specifically, the State Duma and Federal Assembly adopted in its third reading the law "On the Disposal of Federally Owned Blocs of Shares in Joint-Stock Companies Set Up During the Privatization Process," which provides the necessary measures to safeguard the Russian Federation's strategic economic interests during the process whereby federal property is disposed of. Unfortunately the Russian Federation president vetoed this law 11 November this year.

The actual principle of assigning as surety blocs of shares in strategically important enterprises as a way of meeting commitments to creditors is essentially the direct sale of federal ownership. The funds which it is assumed will be obtained from shares-for-loans tenders already figure as state budget income from privatization, although the executive organs continue to claim that it is just a question of the use of shares-for-loans and not of selling federal ownership.

The situation that has developed contradicts the fundamental norms of Russian Federation legislation, namely:

— Articles 71 and 76 of the Russian Federation Constitution, which prescribe the need to pass federal laws on subjects under Russian Federation control, into which category federal property and its management fall,

— Article 217 of the Russian Federation Civil Code, which does not permit the ownership of state property to be transferred to citizens and legal persons otherwise than in the manner prescribed by laws on privatization,

— the Russian Federation Law "On the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation," which does not envisage such a method of privatization as the alienation of mortgaged state property to ~~a creditor~~'s benefit,

— Paragraph 1 of the Russian Federation President's Edict No. 478 of 11 May 1995 "On Measures To Ensure That the Federal Budget Receives Income From Privatization," which prohibits the early sale of federally owned blocs of shares in nationally important privatized enterprises,

— Russian Federation Government Decree No. 949 of 18 September 1995 "On the List of Joint-Stock Companies Set Up During the Privatization Process Which

Produce Products (Goods, Services) of Strategic Importance to the Safeguarding of the Country's National Security, Federally Owned Shares in Which Are Not Subject To Early Sale."

It should be clearly understood that the holding of shares-for-loans auctions and investment tenders in their present form will not lead to an increase in the necessary direct investment in production, especially as the assignment of shares as surety is being carried out at clearly reduced prices. Effectively federal ownership is being distributed among previously determined "purchasers" at knockdown prices suitable to them.

In the interests of safeguarding Russia's economic interests and national security it is necessary:

1. To defer the holding of shares-for-loans auctions and investment tenders until work on the legislative and normative bases has been completed.

2. To instruct the Russian Federation Security Council Interdepartmental Commission to hold a thorough audit of the investment commitments of commercial banks and other legal persons taken on during privatization, including with the aim of preventing the use of state budget funds in shares-for-loans auctions and investment tenders.

3. To pass a Russian Federation law prescribing uniform requirements regarding the rules, regulations, and procedure for shares-for-loans auctions and investment tenders, and regarding the content of informational reports about their holding. To exclude from participating in shares-for-loans auctions organizations directly concerned in their preparation and in accumulating the funds of participants in these events. To legislatively enshrine the need to hold auctions on the basis of the privatization plans for each specific enterprise which envisage the possibility of modernizing production, increasing labor productivity, and solving a range of social questions in the labor collective's interests.

I would like to stress specially that certain legal and private persons' hopes of taking advantage of the problems in legislation are at the very least naive. Objectively the formulation of this procedure for disposing of shares in strategically important enterprises which would be in Russia's interests is correct and inevitable. The sooner the necessary steps in this direction are taken the better.

## Regional Affairs

### Chechnya Reportage: Elections, Negotiations, Military

#### Groznyy Sealed Off for Elections

*LD1312101295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0945 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Sergey Trofimov, Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 13 Dec (ITAR-TASS) — From today the law enforcement bodies in the Republic of Chechnya have tightened up their operations. Roads in and out of Groznyy have been cut off. The main thoroughfares in the town itself have been closed to traffic. Because of this hundreds of people were unable to get to work on time today.

The voting in Chechnya opens on Thursday 14 December and will continue until 17 December from 0700 to 1500. This has been changed to take account of the difficult situation in the republic.

According to eye-witnesses, federal troops are massing to the south and southwest of Groznyy. Another big armored column moved toward Shali today. People coming from that town are saying that armed supporters of Dzhokhar Dudayev assembled in Shali continue to violently oppose the staging of the elections in Chechnya.

#### Troops Given Right To Vote in Elections

*AU1212154695 Paris AFP in English
1504 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Moscow, Dec 12 (AFP) — Chechen elections will now begin on Thursday [14 December] — three days ahead of their scheduled date — under a decision taken Tuesday by the Chechen parliament, ITAR-TASS news agency reported.

The poll had originally been scheduled to take place on Sunday to coincide with the December 17 Russian legislative elections. [passage omitted]

Russian administrative officials in Moscow told AFP they could not say precisely how many electors there were in Chechnya.

They said that Russian soldiers, to be stationed permanently in the republic under the terms of a July ceasefire accord between Russia and the separatist republic, had the right to vote.

Under the accord, some 5,000 to 6,000 troops will be stationed in Chechnya.

Separatist Chechens have condemned the holding of elections as long as Russian soldiers remain on Chechen territory and have threatened to do everything possible to prevent them taking place. [passage omitted]

There will be no foreign observers present during the poll. [passage omitted]

### Interior Ministry Prepares for Elections

*LD1212215295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2020 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Dec 12 (INTERFAX) — The staff of the Chechen Interior Ministry will be kept at the barracks as of Dec. 14. Under orders from minister Khamid Inalov all business trips and leaves for ministry employees have been cancelled.

Sources at the ministry account the orders to the beginning of elections in Chechnya on Dec. 14.

Routes of transporting ballots from the provinces to the capital have been worked out and armored vehicles assigned to escort members of electoral commissions.

The sources also say personal weapons are being distributed among Supreme Soviet deputies and members of electoral commissions for the time of the elections.

### Supreme Soviet Passes Election Law

*LD1212214095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2020 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Dec 12 (INTERFAX) — The Supreme Soviet in Chechnya passed a law Tuesday on the procedure of elections in the republic. It provides for the early beginning of voting on Dec. 14.

In keeping with the law the elections of the head of the republic will be held in one round. The valid turnout is not less than 25%. The candidate collecting a simple majority will win.

Elections to the State Duma will be held simultaneously.

Under the law Chechen citizens will be able to cast their ballots at any polling station irrespective of the place of their permanent registration. Any document confirming a person's identity will be sufficient.

### Dudayev: War 'Far From Over'

*AU1312094495 Paris AFP in English 0930 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[By Peter Graff]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Southern Chechnya, Russia, Dec 13 (AFP) — The war in Chechnya is "far from over", separatist Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev warned Wednesday [13 December] though he said he opposed terrorism as a weapon against the Russians.

In a rare interview, the former president of Chechnya denounced Russian-organised elections in the republic this week as a "farce".

The fighting is "far from over. It has only just begun," he told reporters at a secret location in southern Chechnya.

However, the leader of the Caucasus republic's independence movement, said he would not order terrorist acts, contradicting threats made by several of his top guerrilla army commanders.

"I am a professional soldier and I am opposed to terrorist warfare," he said.

"War is not a bomb on a train or an explosion in the subway.... War and terrorism are two separate things. War has its own rules and whoever breaks those rules has already lost," he said.

Dudayev, whose forces continue to battle Russian troops in pockets in mountainous southern Chechnya, said the Russian-organised local leadership elections, set for Thursday, were "a plain farce".

Dudayev, a former Soviet airforce general, who as president unilaterally proclaimed independence from Russia in 1991, has called for a boycott of the elections, in which the only well-known candidate is the Doku Zavgayev, the Russian-installed interim leader of Chechnya.

Former Russian Parliament Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov withdrew earlier this week claiming the vote was a sham, and the two other two candidates are unknowns who have been known to use their free television time to praise Zavgayev.

Dudayev also repeated that he rejected an accord signed Friday by Zavgayev and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin that recognises Chechnya as having a special status within the Russian Federation.

"We are not familiar with the text, and frankly, we don't plan to become familiar with it," he said.

"We are preparing the signing of a new agreement — on the status of Russia within Chechnya," he joked.

Russian troops stormed Chechnya on December 11 last year to crush Dudayev's independence movement.

Most tolls estimate that around 30,000 people have been killed in the fighting.

Dudayev, who been in hiding since being driven out of the Chechen capital earlier this year, appeared in fine health and good humour as he received reporters shortly after midnight Tuesday-Wednesday.

Future peace talks are necessary, he said, but "we will probably have to wait for a change in power in Russia, becuase the current regime is not qualified for anything."

Russia abandoned peace talks witht the rebels in October after a bomb that left the Russian military commander in a coma. Dudayev's forces have denied responsibility for that attack.

Dudayev said that Russian parliamentary elections on Sunday, in which communists and nationalists are expected to perform well, were unlikely to make peace talks any easier.

"The Democrats have all deserted.... There is only a tiny group left, desperately beating against the stones of the Kremlin walls to break open a hole in this totalitarian regime," he said.

Only two or three democratic parties are competing and "the rest are... fascists and rejects from other parts of the country that have washed up in Moscow," he said.

He blamed the "international community", for a series of wars in the former Soviet Republics.

Dudayev also said that after Russian troops were finished in Chechnya, they would "swoop down on Europe and slaughter you like chickens". [passage omitted]

### Dudayev Side Refuses To Meet With Russians

*LD1312121995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1134 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[By Sergey Trofimov and Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, December 13 (ITAR-TASS) — "Dudayev's side refuses to have contacts with the Russian delegation in order to resume peace talks," Commander of the Joint Federal Forces in Chechnya Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Shkirko told ITAR-TASS today. He noted that there was not a single meeting with representatives from Dudayev's side during the past eight days.

The general said that the Russian delegation had tried in October, November, and December to resume the talks at different levels, but Dudayev's side refused to resume contacts. While stressing that there should be peace in Chechnya and there is no other alternative, Shkirko noted that Dudayev's side was dodging the negotiations, speculating on its October 12 statement, in which it insists on the participation of international observers in the negotiations.

Describing the current situation on the eve of the elections, the Commander of the Joint Federal Forces in Chechnya said that bandit gangs were active in practically all the districts of the republic. "They are trying to be particularly active in Groznyy. However, the situation is under control and our troops are ready to retaliate at any moment," the general stressed.

### Agreement Said To Meet Russian Constitution

*LD1212141995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1326 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[By Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, December 12 (ITAR-TASS) — The agreement on the basic principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic "is in the framework of the Russian Federation's Constitution and the model of federalism," Vasiliy Tarasenko, Chairman of the Federation Council Committee for the Federation Affairs, the Federal Treaty and Regional Policy, stressed in an interview with ITAR-TASS here on Tuesday.

The agreement is in line with Article 72 of the Russian Constitution defining questions of joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and its subjects.

In the legislator's opinion, the special status of Chechnya "does not run counter to constitutional provisions either and is determined by the fact that the republic needs now great assistance from federal bodies."

As a follow-up to the agreement, the committee suggests political consultations between federal bodies of power and Chechen leaders who support a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The sides should discuss elections in Chechnya, an end to combat operations, economic aid to the republic and participation of the federation's subjects in rendering this aid, the chairman stressed.

The deputy noted that a constructive dialogue during preparations and at elections to Chechen bodies of power as well as to the Russian parliament will be "an important instrument of strengthening both Russian statehood and the prestige of political leaders in regions."

The agreement signed by Viktor Chernomyrdin and incumbent head of the Chechen Republic Doku Zavgayev may become "a sound basis for a comprehensive treaty between bodies of state power of the Russian Federation and Chechnya after the elections," Tarasenko claimed.

### Lysenko: Year of War Taught us 'Nothing'

*MM1212165995 Moscow TRUD in Russian*
*10 Dec 95 p 1*

[Article by Russian Federation State Duma Deputy Vladimir Lysenko: "What Has This Scorched Year Taught Us?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to official statistics, in one year of combat operations in Chechnya the Armed Forces alone have lost 1,928 men, with a further 5,487 servicemen injured. As for innocent civilians....

A year of war in Chechnya. Is this a long time or not? Not if you compare it to wars in days long gone, which sometimes lasted centuries. But it is a long time for the mothers of the 25,000 Chechen and Russian men who will never come home again. Also for the 400,000 refugees who have been forced to leave Chechnya and are now wandering all over Russia.

This war, on which the Kremlin pinned such great hopes, has not brought honor or glory to those who inspired it and carried it out. The blitzkrieg did not come off. The weakened Russian Army was simply not up to it. Instead, it has become bogged down in a guerrilla war with Chechen fighters. Federal troops hold sway in Chechnya by day, and Dudayev's men by night. It would be impossible to control these fighters without the Army. But, as long as the Army remains, its disintegration is visible to all, a source of growing dissatisfaction not only among Dudayev's supporters, but among everyone else as well.

You would have thought that, with Chechnya being so small, it would be easy to "instill order." But this is an illusion, mere self-deception. The Chechens are waging war on home territory, where they have the help of "their own kind," so to speak. Whereas villages from where shots were fired were burned to the ground in Afghanistan, a "foreign" country, "scorched earth" tactics cannot be used in one's own country.

Now that peace talks have failed, calls for radical solutions are becoming louder on both sides. Some propose withdrawing all troops from Chechnya and allowing the Chechens to "sort things out for themselves," at the same time holding the mountainous republic in a vice-like grip. I am convinced that it is too late for this (we proposed introducing tough sanctions against Chechnya instead of sending in tanks, but our words went unheeded at the time on the grounds that it would be too expensive). However, tens of millions of rubles have already been "lost" in Chechnya: They have disappeared into a bottomless pit. If we were to "leave," we would have to remove from Chechnya 200,000 Russians, many of whose families have been living in this region for more than 100 years. It is quite obvious that civil war would break out in Chechnya, from which it would be impossible to shut ourselves off. Especially as the Chechen diaspora in Russia is almost the same size as the indigenous population of Chechnya itself.

Others propose "piling on the pressure," "crushing underfoot," and "destroying." I think even this is unrealistic in the present situation. Both because of the feeling of demoralization among federal troops, their war-weariness, and their wish to return home as soon as possible; and because of the indestructibility of Dudayev's "Hydra," which regrows its "severed heads" at the expense of the Chechen population — a population which Zavgayev's new regime, like Khadzhiyev's old one, has so far done little to hearten. If war breaks out again, the already shaky authority of the present authorities will collapse completely both in Russia and abroad.

So what is left?

Neither peace nor war, but the Army must be retained.

If we want to avoid any further bloodshed and loss of human life, there is no other way. I think the Army will have to stay there until parliamentary and presidential elections are held in Russia and until a regime which everyone can trust appears in Chechnya. But I would gladly be proved wrong, even if only for a few months or days, because it would mean lives saved.

Meanwhile, the center of Groznyy is still enclosed by a two-meter steel fence, concealing not only the ruins of this devastated city, but also the Turkish construction workers who have come to rebuild the Chechen capital. Rumors are already flying around Chechnya that the Russians came in tanks and destroyed everything and that the Turks are going to rebuild it all....

I saw Boris Yeltsin in September, told him about the growing Muslim influence in Chechnya, and asked him to send our own construction workers to Groznyy to replace the Turks. Unfortunately, nothing has been done.

A year of war has taught us absolutely nothing.

### Zakayev Not Killed in Attack

*LD1212102395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0920 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Sergey Trofimov and Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Groznyy, 12 December (ITAR-TASS) — The military press service in Chechnya today reported that the well-known field Commander Akhmed Zakayev "is not among those killed in an incident near a federal troop road-block or among those detained after it, according to updated reports."

However, the military claim that at the scene of the incident which took place on the way to Urus-Martan "there were really killed, wounded and detained militants" from among Zakayev's guards, who had been taking part in the peace talks in Groznyy. The incident is being investigated. [passage omitted]

### Migration Body Closes Temporarily

*LD1212180495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1735 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[By Konstantin Pribytkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GENEVA, December 12 (ITAR-TASS) — The International Migration Organisation (IMO) has decided to temporarily close its mission in Groznyy.

This action is caused by the aggravation of the situation in connection with the upcoming elections, the official representative of the Geneva headquarters of the IMO, Regina Buko, told ITAR-TASS on Tuesday.

She said that the mission left Groznyy in accordance with the recommendations of the Chechen authorities with which the mission closely cooperates in rendering assistance to refugees and displaced persons. The IMO will coordinate its activity in Chechnya, including the monitoring of the situation, from the village of Sleptsovskaya located on the Chechen-Ingush border.

Other humanitarian organisations, including the International Red Cross Committee, left the Chechen capital Groznyy earlier, Buko said. "We hope to return to Groznyy and resume our activity rendering assistance to migrants as soon as the situation stabilises," she added.

### Wreckage of Missing Tu-154 Plane Found in Far East

*LD1312063195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0615 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[By Yevgeniya Lents]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK, December 13 (ITAR-TASS) — The wreckage of the Tu-154 airliner missing since December 7 has been found on Tuesday, ITAR-TASS learnt from Lieutenant-Colonel Artur Afanasyev, head of the press service of the Far Eastern District, here today. The place of the disaster is situated 120 kilometers north-east of the Sukpay railway station in the Khabarovsk territory, Russian Far East.

Afanasyev claimed that several helicopters with rescuers and experts are working at the place of the air crash. The plane broke into two parts. Its tail lies 120 meters from the fuselage. The Tu-154 wreckage is severely scorched and covered with snow.

Not a single passenger or crew member was found at the place of the air crash.

ITAR-TASS learnt at the headquarters of the Far Eastern District that preparations are now underway to transport the wrechage by rail to Khabarovsk for examination.

According to information received by ITAR-TASS from the Far Eastern rescue centre, all civil ships and planes were recalled from the area of search today.

### More Details on Located Tu-154 Plane

*LD1212182595 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] As reported from the Far East regional center for emergency situations, an interpretation of the results of air-space photographs has made it possible to trace the area where the Tu-154 of the Khabarovsk aviation detachment, lost on 7 December, came down. Details from our correspondent Yelena Tamarova:

[Tamarova] This was 120 km northeast of the Sukpay railway station. The front part of the fuselage and the wings are undamaged. The rear part of the fuselage has been damaged and the tail unit is lying approximately 120-150 meters away.

The plane caught fire; its wreckage is now covered by snow. At dawn rescue workers will leave by helicopter to the crash site to prepare a base camp where experts will be working and the removal of the wreckage will begin.

### Border Violation Cases Increasing in Primorye

*LD1312080595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0800 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[By Yevgeniy Lents]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK, December 13 (ITAR-TASS) — The forthcoming New Year festivities are sure to bring a lot of trouble to Russian frontier guards in the Primorye Region. Usually the number of illegal immigrants from China, trying to get home illegally and celebrate the New Year with their families, grows dramatically on those days.

Most Chinese live in the Primorye Region with expired visas and are sure to be fined heavily after returning home for the violation of the passport regime, Lieutenant Colonel Valery Ponomarev, head of the press centre of the Pacific Frontier District, told TASS. Trying to save money, they resort to all kinds of tricks, ranging from the forging of documents to breakthroughs through several rows of barbed wire on the border. Two frontier intruders were arrested on December 11. One of them was trying to pass the passport control at the Pogranichny check point with other person's documents, while the second one chose a more dangerous way and was arrested by frontier guards near one of the frontier guard posts of the Grodekovo frontier guard detachment, when he was trying to cross the neutral line on his way to China.

On the whole, Ponomarev continued, the number of frontier intruders on the Russian-Chinese border goes up by several times every year on the days of New Year festivities. Last year 18 Chinese frontier intruders were arrested in the Pacific Frontier District between January 5 and 9. The New Year is celebrated in China a month later than in Russia.

### Siberian Leader on Region's Economy, Politics

*MM1312103895 Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Dec 95 p 4*

[Interview with Leonid Polezhayev, leader of the "Siberian Accord" Association and head of the Omsk Oblast Administration, by Political Observer Yuriy Lepskiy, date and place not given: "Siberian Accord Better Than Siberian Discord"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lepskiy] There is much discussion about the "Siberian Accord" association today. But you will agree, Leonid Konstantinovich, that a regional association like this would hardly have been possible 7-10 years ago. In your view, does this association attest to the democratic changes which have begun in the country or is it simply the consequence of the obvious weakness of the central authorities?

[Polezhayev] We seemed to have learned by heart Lomonosov's maxim that Russia's might grows as Siberia grows. The only problem was that for a long time it was interpreted differently in Siberia itself and in Moscow. Here people though that it meant the full participation of the Siberian regions in Russia's national economic and political life, whereas in Moscow the view was often that Siberia was supposed to increase the wealth of the departments pumping oil and gas out of it. In other words, the center regarded the local regions as an internal colony. To be honest, that kind of attitude has still not been entirely eradicated today. Whereas three years ago 75-80 percent of the Tyumen Oblast budget came from oil company revenues, that figure is down to just 40 percent now that those companies have flown the Siberian nest for Moscow's rooftops. If Siberia extracts 90 percent of Russia's gas but at the same time has the lowest percentage of mains gas supply of the country's territories, sooner or later the logical question must be: "Why is this happening?" But why that question was not asked until five years ago is a different matter....

[Lepskiy] I wonder — why?

[Polezhayev] Let us rewind the tape, as it were, and look at what happened five years ago. That was the time of the disintegration of the CPSU and the USSR, the disintegration of the single economic area, the breakdown of ties that took decades to build up, the collapse of the all-union division of labor.... For Siberia this was particularly painful because our region had a high concentration of military-industrial complex enterprises, which operated the most extensive system of production-sharing and proved most vulnerable when the conventional ties broke down. In these circumstances the duty and desire of the leaders of the Siberian territories was to hinder these processes in some way, or at least mitigate them and reduce their impact. At that time most Siberian territories were headed by economists who were very well aware of all the consequences of the breakdown of economic ties — job losses, unemployment, and enterprise closures, with the resultant wholesale growth in social tension. What was to be done in those conditions? Try to preserve economic ties at all costs.

That was when the idea of "Siberian Accord" emerged. The idea was that we would be able to do just that on such a vast territory as Siberia with its concentration of self-contained production cycles (from the extraction of raw materials to the production of finished output based on them). We knew that if each oblast individually was to knock at the door of a feeble government incapable of resolving anything, we would all simply perish together. It was necessary to unite in order to survive. So we united our territories into a single economic complex.

[Lepskiy] Have events shown that this was the right decision?

[Polezhayev] It was entirely right. I will go further and say that as an economic and administrative structure "Siberian Accord" has acquired great prestige in the country, including in the corridors of power. For example, the country's budget is currently undergoing preliminary expert appraisal by "Siberian Accord." Today we are examining problems connected not only with the economic situation but also with the demographic situation and the state of the population's health. In July we worked together with the Russian Government to examine the question of the state of the Siberian fuel and energy complex, and we are now preparing a session of the association which will examine the problem of the conversion of defense enterprises.

[Lepskiy] Some people say that "Siberian Accord" is like a state within a state. In any event, what you have been saying does suggest that idea. Does it not seem to you that your association is increasingly becoming an autonomous political-administrative unit?

[Polezhayev] No, it does not. I was talking to you about the conditions in which "Siberian Accord" emerged. Our association is a product of the natural logic of the economic survival of neighboring regions and of their effective self-management. We do not devise norms which contravene Russian legislation or its Constitution. Furthermore, as a subject of legislative initiative we take part actively in Russia's norm creation. We have neither an office nor an administrative apparatus. We have a small management mainly engaged in the preparation of the association's documents. All the work of "Siberian Accord" is based on the principles of the activity of coordinating councils which, as a rule, are headed by the territorial leaders most closely connected with the particular sphere of interest. For example, the agrarian policy council is led by the head of the Altay Kray Administration, the fuel and energy complex council is headed by the governor of Tyumen Oblast, the transport council is headed by the governor of Novosibirsk Oblast, the budget and finance council is led by the head of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Administration.... We have coordinating councils on the use of mineral resources, the fight against crime, industry and conversion, foreign economic activity, and norm creation.

These councils do thorough, skillful work. For example, we worked for six months on the question of Siberia's fuel and energy complex together with scientists from the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences and specialists from various sectors. When we placed all this work in front of the government they gasped — they had never seen an analysis like it before.

[Lepskiy] Are there contradictions within the association? And if there are, can they be exploited by those people who want to split or weaken your association?

[Polezhayev] There are no serious contradictions. There are differences of opinion. Sometimes interests do not coincide. We engage in conciliation work within the association when that happens....

[Lepskiy] Nevertheless, what differences of opinion are there?

[Polezhayev] Well, for example, Irkutsk Oblast sells its energy and sets its charges below those in Novosibirsk or Omsk oblasts. It is the same situation with variations in rail charges in various parts of Siberia. We try to make these charges mutually acceptable to all the members of "Siberian Accord." As for anyone wanting to split us or set us against one another, I do not understand who stands to gain from that: A gigantic self-managing region is a huge weight off the shoulders of the central authorities, which have enough problems at the federal level as it is.

[Lepskiy] People say that relations between the association and the central authorities worsened sharply when there was talk of creating a Siberian oil company. Is Moscow categorically opposed to the redistribution of the revenue from the oil produced in Siberia?

[Polezhayev] The question of creating such a company first arose in 1994 when we learned about the imminent reorganization of "Rosneft." Moscow decided that "Rosneft" should include the Omsk Oil Refinery and "Noyabrskneftegaz," one of the largest oil producing enterprises, with the result that both subunits would lose their economic autonomy and become cogs in the system of the centralized Ministry of Fuel and Energy. But the question is this: Why does Siberia not have the right to form its own oil company on its own territory? After all, the production, refining, and sale of oil have been organized here. Why should the taxes from all this work be transferred to the Moscow Oblast treasury and not remain here? There are many questions of that kind. So we elaborated a concept for the formation of such a company and submitted the relevant proposals to the president and government of Russia. This problem was under discussion for a whole year, but the stumbling block was the categorical refusal of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy.

[Lepskiy] Do you think that it is only Fuel Minister Shafranik who is opposing the formation of the Siberian oil company? Many of my colleagues believe that certain influential people in the president's staff are also unhappy with such initiatives....

[Polezhayev] I do not know.... In any event, we are not aware of that. Furthermore, there is a presidential edict on the creation of the Siberian oil company, there is the recent corresponding government decision, and now the latest news that the company has been registered.

[Lepskiy] Where is it based?

[Polezhayev] In Omsk.

[Lepskiy] Does the governor of Tyumen Oblast agree with that?

[Polezhayev] Well, I have not heard any objections from him on this score at any rate. Ultimately it does not really matter which territory the company is based in, the important thing is that it is in Siberia.

[Lepskiy] Leonid Konstantinovich, let us address a different topic. I want to ask you what chances you think the Communists, the Russia Is Our Home [NDR] bloc, Zhirinovskiy's party, and "Russia's Choice" will have here in Siberia in the forthcoming elections?

[Polezhayev] I cannot answer for the whole of Siberia but it is quite easy to make a prediction for Omsk Oblast, in my view. The situation here, it seems to me, will be clear cut. Political forces in the oblast are polarized between two blocs. The first bloc consists of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF], the rural Communists, who call themselves the Agrarian Party, some veterans' organizations, and some independent trade unions. The second bloc consists of centrist forces. They will ultimately be joined by the radical democrats, who have no chance as an autonomous political unit in Omsk Oblast. As for Zhirinovskiy's people....

[Lepskiy] Do you think that an alliance of centrists and Zhirinovskiyites is possible in your region?

[Polezhayev] I do not think that it will come to an alliance, although a rapprochement is possible. NDR will be a consolidating force. The centrist bloc can count on 20 percent and the Communists and their comrades can expect to poll roughly the same figure.

[Lepskiy] You are head of NDR's regional branch in Omsk Oblast. Unless I am mistaken, none of the Siberian governors has so openly declared his political preferences. Why have you done that?

[Polezhayev] This was my conscious and considered choice. Perhaps this declaration of my personal view will place me at a disadvantage compared to most heads of administrations, but there is no alternative.... You see, I believe that in these elections the opposition will have one real and **last** chance. A real chance because the reforms have still not produced fundamental changes for the better in people's lives; a last chance because we have already begun clambering from the pit into which we fell. In subsequent elections the situation will be fundamentally different, in subsequent elections they will no longer have a realistic chance. Forces are needed which can realistically and worthily resist the opposition's revolutionary onslaught. I am convinced that this force will be the centrist forces which have gathered around them levelheaded professionals who know how to work. Today's oppositionists and those who support them will not understand that there can never be a government that will suit everyone. Even if reasonable members of the opposition movements and blocs come to power, they will be forced to carry on with the reforms because there are economic laws and a logic of development which are not dependent on our will. We have already tried to subordinate them to our ideas and views. The result — you and all intelligent TRUD readers know that just as well as I do.

We have only one way out now — to go with the natural, evolutionary flow of life rather than to try to reverse that flow as they once tried to do with the Siberian rivers. We had enough sense not to do that then and we have enough sense now too.

## Economic Issues

### Chubays Predicts No Economic Slump for 7-8 Months

*LD1312082295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0543 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, December 13 (ITAR-TASS) — Preservation of the main spheres of the present economic policy "dooms" Russia to an economic growth, starting from the second half of 1996, claimed Russian first vice-premier Anatoly Chubays in an interview with the Expert journal on Wednesday.

"There will be no large-scale slump over the next seven-eight months. There can be some temporary shifts which will not swing the trend," he noted.

"Of principal importance for me is not the imminent growth but the fact that the country has created an economic medium encouraging the output of goods which enjoy objective demand," the vice-premier added.

Chubays noted that the growth of production in export industries in 1995 will not continue the next year. Export deliveries will not rise either. "Despite all problems of exporters, the volume of export in the country does not dwindle down. It is on the rise, but its rates are slower.

"I believe," Chubays said, "that we shall face an end to the export growth in the first half of the next year. In any case, we should be ready that the impetus to the economic growth thanks to export-oriented industries will be exhausted. Industries oriented on domestic demand will start growing."

In the opinion of Chubays, this will be promoted by a sharp slash of the inflation tax and confidence that Russian enterprises will get an access to the Russian credit market next year, which they did not have so far.

Absence of credits is a reason for many serious financial maladies, including non-payments, the vice-premier stressed.

**Controversial Loans-for-Shares Auctions Continue**

*MK1312061295 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 8 Dec 95 p 1*

[Report by Olga Romanova: "Big Creditors Are Bringing Their Last Savings to the Treasury. Only Civility Is Valued More Than Russian Enterprises"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "We have earned nearly 1.5 trillion rubles for the budget," Alfred Kokh, acting chairman of the State Property Committee, summed up the results of yesterday's loans-for-shares auctions, not without pride. The traditional accusations against the State Property Committee that it underrates federal stakes in strategic enterprises were categorically rejected: "In fact we are selling dearly, which can be seen from the absence or the small number of bidders."

Indeed, yesterday's bidding for the right to issue credits to the government against the collateral of federal stakes took place in an unruffled atmosphere, especially compared with the dramatic upheavals of previous such events. A 5-percent stake in Lukoil, 15 percent in the Novolipetsk metal plant, and 23.5 percent in the Murmansk Maritime Shipping Company were auctioned off virtually without a fight. The winners, the losers, and representatives of paper issuers were shaking each other's hands with pleasure, making no claims against the auction commission.

Lukoil's stake was sought by the Natsionalnyy rezervnyy bank, which offered $35 million (the lot's starting price), backed by a financial guarantee from Imperial Bank; and a consortium comprising Imperial and Lukoil itself, which won by a margin of $10,000. The successful bidder's guarantees were ensured by Imperial's subsidiary bank — Slavyanskiy. Lukoil Deputy President Leonid Fedun told SEGODNYA that he is "quite satisfied with the acquisition but it does not involve any revenues." It will be noted that the winner is obliged to retire Lukoil's debts to the budget to the tune of 500 billion rubles.

Credits to the government against the pledge of a stake in the Novolipetsk metal plant will be provided by the MFK [International Financial Company] bank (which offered $31 million with the starting price of $30 million, guaranteed by Oneksimbank, while the losing firm Mashservis, which provided the MFK with a guarantee [preceding six words as published], offered only $30.5 million). In the auction for a 23.5 percent stake in the Murmansk Maritime Shipping Company (third largest in Russia), Menatep Bank lived up to its reputation as the owner of "plants and ships," underwriting the closed joint-stock company Strateg ($4.125 million with the starting price of $4 million). The losing company Varyag, represented by the head of Menatep's mergers and acquisitions department, also had an analogous banking guarantee. Naturally, the capital of "pocket" companies proved insufficient, and obligations under the contract are bound to be gradually ceded to Menatep.

The peaceful atmosphere of trading ended with the offering of a 51-percent stake in the Sidanko joint-stock company (the starting price of a controlling stake in one of the largest oil companies was $125 million). A scandal was inevitable here, and nonaccredited watchers outside the closed doors of the auction room were actively betting on its outcome. On Monday evening it became clear that the ranks of the known auction participants (MFK and RTD ltd., both underwritten by Oneksimbank, and a "banking consortium" represented by the Konsul firm with a general guarantee from Alfabank and Inkombank) would be supplemented by the Rossiyskiy Kredit bank. After a rather emotional exchange between representatives of Oneksimbank, responsible for accepting the deposits, and Rossiyskiy Kredit over the exact time of the money's deposit in a special account, the auction commission went into a conference. Rossiyskiy Kredit intends to challenge the commission's decision in court: It was barred from the auction. As a result, the MFK was proclaimed the winner, with its $130 million offer. Incidentally, Alfred Kokh was very content with the behavior of "Banking Consortium 3": "They can afterall do things without a scandal: They lost quietly and went quietly, but Rossiyskiy Kredit had to come up with that money wiring story."

As of today the State Property Committee has sold eight lots through loans-for-shares auctions which in effect went to four banks — Oneksimbank, MFK, Imperial, and Menatep (not counting the Pension Fund's successful bid on Surgutneftegaz, guaranteed by Oneksimbank). The small number of bidders can hardly be attributed to high prices; according to Mr. Kokh, the investment tender on a 25-percent stake in Svyazinvest alone has brought the budget a sum exceeding the financial results of yesterday's auction by nearly half a billion rubles. So Mr. Kokh's call yesterday — "Come on, take your pick of the best in town" — can be interpreted in two different ways.

### Outcome Appears 'Determined Beforehand'

*MM1212164995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Dec 95 p 2*

[Report by Sergey Leskov: "The First Loans-for-Shares Auctions: Is Everything Sorted Out Beforehand?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the past two days alone, some $400 billion has come into the budget as a result of loans-for-shares [zalogovykh] auctions. Large state blocks of shares have been sold in such colossi of the national economy as the oil companies "YuKOS" and "SIDANKO" (a record here — a controlling block of 51 percent), the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine, and the Murmansk Maritime Shipping Line. Even citizens who are infinitely far removed from macroeconomic problems realize that at the end of the year such lavish injections into the budget will have a beneficial effect on the pocket of the voter wandering through the preelection haze.

However, a far more important question is how successfully the loans-for-shares auctions have been organized and whether the share-out of property will lead to economic prosperity for the giants of our national industry.

It is noteworthy that the majority of the competitions are reminiscent of rigged games. The guarantor banks and the actual participants cunningly change places and announce firms with different names which basically represent the same interests. Furthermore, in most cases the winner is the bank (or representative of its interests) that plays the innocent and apparently insignificant role of recipient of applications.

It was in this way that "ONEKSIMbank," "Menatep," and "Imperial" gained possession of major oil companies. In the actual banks that have gained such fat assets, they open their eyes wide: It just happened that way. But obviously there is some kind of subtle mechanism making it possible to see better than an x-ray device precisely what sums are indicated in the tightly sealed envelopes. It is simply mystifying: The "Lukoil" shares were obtained by the "Lukoil"-"Imperial" tandem, which added a symbolic $10,000 to the starting price, and shares in "Norilskiy Nikel," the Novolipetsk combine, and "SIDANKO" were transferred with a minimal increase in the starting price into the hands of the symbiotically linked "ONEKSIMbank" and International Financial Group. The same applies to "Menatep," which got hold of "YuKOS."

In short, at the Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee for the Management of State Property] you do not get the exciting kind of auction, with rivals gripped in an ardent clinch, that we know from the immortal [satirical novel] "The Twelve Chairs." The impression is that all the results are determined beforehand by the will of some invisible manipulator.

A strange impression is also produced by the activities of "Rossiyskiy Kredit," which on three occasions naively burned its fingers on the formal rules. The impression is that the bank does not want the enterprises or auctions so much as a lot of publicity for its name. It is hard to believe that a major bank that has all kinds of bookkeeping at its fingertips cannot cope with the paperwork. Maybe it simply lacks the money? After all, not long before the auctions "Rossiyskiy Kredit," without much publicity, sold shares in Russia's biggest and highly promising radio plant, "Vega" in Berdsk.

It is well known that foreign companies are not taking part in our auctions. And this negates the patriotic wailing over how the price of enterprises in our proud industry has been set at the level of kopeks. Another version of the story: The rules are such that Western business does not want to get involved in our auctions, which take place under the counter.

Be that as it may, it was because of the lack of contenders that the Russian Federation president, by a special directive, postponed some of the already scheduled auctions to a later date. Two more enterprises have been added to the earlier list of "unwanted" ones—"Kirovlesprom" and the Tuapse Sea Port.

### New Agrarian Program Based on Private, Foreign Loans

*MK1312061395 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 8 Dec 95 p 2*

[Report by Mikhail Lantsman: "Agrarian Sector as Financial Risk Zone. Ministry of Agriculture Has Approved New Investment Policy Concept"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a two-day "Investment Possibilities in the Russian Agricultural Sector" workshop, which opened in the Agricultural Products Ministry yesterday, the following figures were made public (statistical data rendered in pre-reform prices: In five years, starting from 1991, payments received by the agro-industrial complex from all sources of financing fell from 66 billion rubles [R] to R8 billion, capital investment from collective farms' own funds declined from R45.7 billion to R5.4 billion. Budget financing of agriculture currently amounts to 6 percent of the 1991 level, while state investment amounts to 8 percent.

However, Agricultural Ministry leaders in 1990 had totally different targets in mind. When making preparations for the next five-year agricultural plan, ministry planners budgeted for a 60 percent increase in capital investment by the end of 1995. Today we can only guess what would have happened if the agrarians had implemented their plans — either agriculture would be thriving or the domestic state debt would be even greater. Today the agrarian sector bosses are anxious to find alternative sources of financing.

According to First Deputy Agricultural Minister Vladimir Shcherbak, a new concept of investment policy up to 2000 was approved in the ministry. The planners expect an end to the production decline shortly and a 3 percent rise in the agricultural share of GDP in 1997. The new concept envisions: decentralization of investment programs, transition from nonrepayable budget subsidies to repayable loans, allocation of centralized investment loans on a tender basis, joint state and commercial financing. One of the main sources of finance for agriculture, Mr. Shcherbak forecasts, must be private investors, including foreign ones. Regrettably, the Russian agricultural sector is considered one of the most risky zones for attracting private investment. Full guarantees from the state are required by financiers. Payments from international financial institutions could be used to create insurance funds, Mr. Shcherbak thinks.

The Agricultural Products Ministry pins its hopes for a change in the investment climate in agriculture on aid from European Community experts, working in Russia within the TACIS program framework. According to Boris Yaroshevich, agricultural advisor with the EC Comission's Moscow office, 20 agricultural projects are being developed in 30 regions of Russia under the TACIS program. The projects are of a pre-investment nature, thus far. Currently, however, Western specialists jointly with the Russian Federation Government have embarked on the next stage — reproducing successful projects at the federal level.

### Oil Exports Rising Despite Declining Production

*MM1212100395 Moscow FINANSOVYYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 95 p 1*

[Report by Denis Kirillov: "Oil Production in Russia Falling, But Exports Still Rising" — received via Internet]

[FBIS Translated Text] An increase in oil exports to countries of the far abroad can be discerned today amid the decline in total Russian oil production. However, a joint analysis of the Russian oil and gas market carried out by the London Center for Global Energy Studies and the Russian Academy of Sciences shows that Russian oil pipelines' capacity will be exhausted within the next three years.

A number of early forecasts by both West European and Russian specialists have suggested that by the mid-1990's Russia will have no oil to export. These forecasts regard oil exports as a passive residual category dependent on the total level of extraction and consumption within the country. It was thought that oil consumption within the country would rise owing to the increase in economic activeness and acceptable oil prices. But in 1992 Russia's domestic oil consumption fell dramatically, as it did throughout the former USSR. This made it possible to increase exports. Russian oil exports outside the CIS rose by 17.2 percent in 1992 and by over 20.5 percent in 1993. Today over 90 million tonnes of oil per year are exported.

Many West European countries are buying oil from Russia although Russian oil represents no more than 10 percent of the oil consumption structure. The largest importers of Russian oil are Germany, Italy, France, Finland, and Britain. Exports to North European countries are mainly carried out via the Baltic port of Ventspils in Latvia. The Mediterranean oil market is mainly supplied via the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk, Tuapse, and Odessa.

Russian oil pipelines' maximum capacity may total 112 million tonnes per year. Increasing Russian oil supplies will promote a dramatic fall in world oil prices. But a reduction in oil consumption within Russia and the Russian Government's desire to raise prices of oil supplied to the near abroad to world prices is making it necessary to increase exports to the West. In order to increase capacity Russia is making efforts to build a new export pipeline system via the countries of the former USSR.

When assessing the overall situation on the Russian oil market, I can point out that oil production fell from 570 million tonnes in 1987 to 318 million tonnes in 1994. Investment in geological prospecting has also fallen dramatically and over 50,000 old wells are not being utilized.

According to preliminary estimates, Russia may produce around 400 million tonnes of oil per year in five to seven years given favorable circumstances and price movements. On that condition in 10-15 years oil production in Russia may rise to 450 million tonnes per year. But that is unlikely.

According to Western experts, a return to the planned economy would aggravate the economic crisis in Russia and reduce oil production to 200 million tonnes by the end of the century. If reforms are successful and oil production is regulated by market forces oil production will reach 350-370 million tonnes by the year 2010. According to the West, foreign investments, to which there are major obstacles right now, may play a tremendous role here.

## Gazprom Chief Explains Opposition to Division Plan

*MK1312062095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 9 Dec 95 p 3*

[Unattributed report: "Gazprom Will Oppose Its Division Into Smaller Companies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Gazprom will oppose its breaking-up into smaller units, Rem Vyakhirev, chairman of the Gazprom board, said at a meeting with chief editors of leading Russian mass media organizations in Moscow. According to Mr. Vyakhirev, Gazprom's present structure allows it to maintain the level of gas production, provide work, wages, and material benefits to hundreds of thousands of Russians, fulfill Russia's obligations before its Western partners, and ensure the safe transportation and processing of natural gas. "If Gazprom is divided," he stressed, "many small monopolists would appear, concerned with their own interests. The rest of the world fights monopolism but not natural monopolies, like us."

Commenting on the recent several-fold increase of gas prices in a number of Russian oblasts, Vyakhirev noted that these acts are being staged in the runup to elections to the State Duma and are "partly of a political character." Rem Vyakhirev explained that at present Gazprom's selling prices for oblast and rayon gas distributors are indexed to inflation. "The decision to raise prices for the household sector is made by governors who in effect control city and oblast gas distribution organizations," the Gazprom head stressed.

He confirmed that in the very near future Gazprom shares will be freely floated on the Russian market. According to him, this will proceed at an auction center created specially for that purpose. At the same time he did not disclose the securities' selling mechanism, saying: "Wait a few more days." Speaking on relations with CIS republics, Rem Vyakhirev said that the majority of them do not pay for current gas supplies in a timely manner. He noted that Ukraine transferred to Gazprom the first issue of state bonds in payment for its debt, and Gazprom "has begun to dispose of them."

## International Affairs

### Participation in 14 Dec Paris Conference on Bosnia

*LD1212174195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1550 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Ukraine has been invited to the Paris conference on 14 December during which it is expected that the Bosnian peace agreement, initialled in Dayton on 21 November, will be signed. The Ukrainian delegation will be headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Volodymyr Khandogy, UNIAN has learned from International Organizations Directorate Head Volodymyr Yelchenko, at a briefing at the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

He said that during the London conference on the implementation of the peace agreement, Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko made a speech in which he proposed that Ukraine's experience in resolving the problem of national minorities, namely in returning deported peoples to Crimea and in resolving the problems of refugees, should be studied and used.

### Priority Participation Requested

*LD1212162795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1454 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Melnik]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, December 12 — Ukraine will insist on a priority part in the economic rehabilitation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ukrainian First Deputy Foreign Minister Anton Buteiko [as received] said at a briefing today.

He said Ukraine suffered great economic losses by complying with the economic sanctions imposed on the former Yugoslavia by the U.N. Security Council.

Ukraine is also ready for direct part in the implementation of civilian aspects of the Bosnia peace accords, primarily in the creation of political institutions and assisting free and democratic elections in Bosnia.

Spelling out Ukraine's "priority" in the former Yugoslavia, Buteiko said Ukraine should be given the priority in international economic contracts with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

He said the Ukrainian delegation would raise this question at the Paris conference on the signing of the Bosnia accords ahead on Thursday.

### Subordination of Battalion in Bosnia

*LD1212174695 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1550 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Ukraine has given its preliminary agreement to subordinate the 240th Ukrainian battalion to French command in the operations of the multinational force on implementing the peace agreement in the former Yugoslavia, Volodymyr Yelchenko, head of the International Organizations Directorate, said at a briefing at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry.

According to a UNIAN correspondent, Volodymyr Yelchenko said that Ukraine is holding talks with NATO through its embassy in Brussels on the forms of participation of Ukrainian peacekeepers within the NATO forces. He recalled that in addition to the 240th battalion, which at the moment forms part of the UN peacekeeping forces, Ukraine can also offer military transport services, namely the Il-76.

### Danube Shippers Complain About Yugoslav Levies

*AU1312113795 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 8 Dec 95 p 5*

[Report by UKRINFORM correspondent Mykhaylo Romach: "Some of the Sanctions Have Been Lifted, Others — Not, or Punishment Instead of Reward" — first paragraph published in a box]

[FBIS Translated Text] When the United Nations imposed sanctions against Yugoslavia, Ukraine tried various ways to help the friendly country. A few days ago, after the sanctions were lifted, Belgrade started punishing the Ukrainian side instead of showing its appreciation. I mean the attitude by Yugoslav officials toward the joint-stock association "The Ukrainian Danube Shipping Company" (UDASCO), which had sustained great losses as a result of the sanctions.

Over three and a half years, Ukrainian ships that managed to get a license from the Sanctions Committee had to pay exorbitant sums to sail via Yugoslavia in accordance with the Yugoslav Government's unilateral decision. The tax was paid in hard currency, exclusively in cash that the Ukrainian river navigators had earned by their hard work. Payment was even levied on empty or passenger ships.

"As soon as the sanctions are lifted, this tax will be canceled," the Yugoslavs assured their Ukrainian partners. Well, the sanctions were lifted on 22 November. However, the Yugoslav side "forgot" to lift the sanctions it had imposed. On 25 November, eight UDASCO convoys — approximately 50 barges — were detained at the Yugoslav border. Despite promises by Yugoslav ministers, border guards demand money that Ukrainian river navigators do not have. They do not even have currency to buy food, because the detention in Yugoslavia was not anticipated.

As a result of this, the Ukrainian company is losing tens of thousands of dollars a day. Its representatives appealed to all Yugoslav bodies and got the same reply everywhere: It is a pity that your shipping company has found itself in such a situation; we are interested in developing cooperation with Ukraine, but we are now having a holiday and will not be able to help you until 4 December. Turn to us later, and we will consider your appeal and adopt a decision.

Let us recall that all Yugoslav ships that were detained as a result of the blockade were immediately "freed" from Ukrainian landing-stages on the Danube. They were allowed to return to Yugoslavia, even though, as is known, they had no money to repay their large debts. The Ukrainian side showed good will and understanding. For the Yugoslav side, hard currency is what matters most.

The UKRINFORM correspondent asked when the resolution on illogical taxes that are not stipulated by the Danube Convention will be canceled and was told that the government had other more important matters to attend to.

Protests on this occasion were also made by representatives of Hungarian, Slovak, Austrian, and German shipping companies. However, this does not bother either the Belgrade bureaucrats or politicians, who have always loved Ukraine in words, are grateful to it for support and assistance, and are ready to cooperate with it.

Strange gratitude, isn't it?

### Military Staff Exercises Planned With Germany, U.S.

*LD1212175595 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The first Ukrainian-German command and staff exercises in the history of bilateral relations will be held outside Odessa next March. As journalists were told at a briefing in Kiev on Monday, talks are currently being held on this question with a Bundeswehr delegation in the Ukrainian capital. In addition, a U.S. military delegation will be arriving in Lvov on 12 December to take part in talks on next year's joint Peace Shield-96 command and staff exercises within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace program. It is planned that these exercises will be held in Kansas.

### Space Agency Head in Vienna for U.S. Cooperation Talks

*WS1312111895 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0935 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna — On December 12, a delegation of the Ukrainian National Space Agency, headed by its general director Oleksandr Nehoda, arrived in Vienna. The delegation will participate in talks with representatives of the U.S. government regarding cooperation in space projects. It is expected that the talks will result in the signing of a bilateral memorandum which will allow the use of Ukrainian rockets for the launching of American commercial satellites.

The deputy general director of the Ukrainian National Space Agency, Valeriy Komarov, told an INFOBANK correspondent that he expects the talks to be difficult. He is convinced that, through their lobby in the U.S. Congress, American aerospace companies are opposing a memorandum between Kiev and Washington. The American WALL STREET JOURNAL, in its December 6, 1995, issue, claimed that after receiving official consent to cooperate in space projects from Clinton, Ukraine will be able to compete with leading American companies which deal with satellite launching. These are the companies McDonell Douglas and Lockheed Martin. McDonell Douglas, which has begun to manufacture a new rocket Delta, fears that Ukraine will become its competitor in the market of satellite carriers.

Further, the WALL STREET JOURNAL stated that debate in the White House is focused on the issue of losses to U.S. businesses after Ukraine is admitted to this branch. However, Vice President Al Gore supports the idea to allow Ukraine to carry American satellites. Those in favor of this idea agree that the admittance of Ukraine to the aerospace market may cause losses to certain American companies. However, they also emphasize the positive fact that Ukraine does not manufacture its own satellites and will carry American-made ones and thus promote the development of this sector of the American economy. In addition, it would be unfair to isolate the Ukrainian manufacturing sector after requiring Ukraine to privatize state-run businesses.

Valeriy Komarov expressed his surprise at fears of American companies, since the rocket carrier market can supply enough orders for all those interested until the year 2000. Ukraine's capacity to manufacture rocket carriers is not sufficient to compete with American companies. Komarov added that, at present, new space global communication systems are being created. This step requires the launching of a large number of satellites, and, as a result of this, production of rocket carriers. Functioning of aerospace companies in the U.S. is restricted, and for this reason the American market is very advantageous for Ukraine.

Permission for Ukraine to launch satellites may remove American government quotas from the Boeing company. Currently, this company is engaged in a joint space project with Ukraine, Russia and Norway. The Sea Start project foresees the launching of satellites from a moving platform in neutral waters of the Pacific Ocean.

### Russia, West Condemned for Ignoring Dissident Case

*MK1312061695 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 8 Dec 95 p 7*

[Analysis by Mikhail Leontyev: "The Taburyanskiy Indicator"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a neighboring state — Ukraine, in the city of Dnepropetrovsk — a court case is in progress. On trial is Leopold Taburyanskiy, former deputy, former candidate for Ukrainian president, and leader of the People's Party. It is not important how influential his party is or how consistent his four-year old claims to the presidency may be. Because he is charged with attempting "a nonviolent overthrow of the social system," the case is undoubtedly political. It is political also because today Ukraine is ruled by persons who are quite interested in removing Taburyanskiy. The "Dnepropetrovsk clan," against which Taburyanskiy took a stand, is represented not least by the republic's president, deputy premier, and general prosecutor.

If would be all right if Ukraine were — I will not say "law-based," but at least a semi-democratic state with some rudiments of freedom of expression and the related elementary diffidence of the ruling elite.

Yevgeniy Saburov, former deputy premier of Crimea, who was in the shoes of a "Ukrainian" politician, noted that we in Russia, while justly criticizing [our] authorities and [our] political system, cannot even imagine how far [we] have moved away from the state-police arbitrariness that holds sway in Ukraine. Ukraine, a country where reform has not spent even one night; a country which has preserved and consolidated the omnipresent police-state security apparat, renowned for its ruthlessness even in Soviet years. Ukraine's pro-Communist parliament is a firm guarantor against liberal reform. Its head, Mr. Moroz, once observed that the word "privatization" simply nauseates him.

But then Ukraine's "reforms" do not at all nauseate our Western brethren or their domestic supporters. Fervent Russian human rights activists are taking no interest in Taburyanskiy's fate. There is no reason: He is absolutely "non-convertible." Unlike pro-Chechen political hysterics, you cannot win a "peace prize" from this. Ukraine is a geopolitical trump in a U.S. deck whose main task is to stop Russian ambitions going outside the limits established by our new "partners." For the same reason neither official nor semi-official (primarily U.S.) emissaries who have recently inundated Kiev are taking an interest in human rights. Ukraine is footing the bills. Why, for instance, divide the Black Sea Fleet when everything that has been divided automatically turns into scrap metal? So that there is no Black Sea Fleet except Turkey's.

Here is the background to the whole story. Ukraine has been admitted to the Council of Europe, where Russia is not being allowed. It was admitted in spite of the fact that in none of the areas over which Russia was criticized, Ukraine, to put it mildly, has advanced farther than us. It was admitted immediately after Estonia and Latvia, which openly practice a "velvet apartheid."

The problem of Leopold Taburyanskiy and his public persecution is too small for the Russian and international "human rights community." But if Taburyanskiy dies in the process of the administration of the peculiar Ukrainian justice, this will be a precedent for defining our attitude to this community and the expediency of maintaining relations with it.

### Official Comments on Russian Strategic Bomber Talks

*WS1212135295 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0027 GMT 9 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Dec. 6. Transfer of a strategic bombers group from Ukraine to Russia was discussed by delegations of the two countries' air forces in Moscow on Wednesday [6 December].

According to a Russian Air Force command representative, draft documents on the matter will be prepared for the negotiations of military delegations of the two countries in Moscow scheduled for Dec. 25.

The official also said an approach to settlements for the transfer is fixed at the level of experts. "For 50 percent of the amount, Moscow will supply Kiev with aircraft-technical equipment, and the other half will go toward settling Ukraine's state debt to Russia," he said.

However, according to the official, the determination of the aircraft's' value is still unresolved. Kiev evaluated the aircraft group at $250 million, while Moscow proposed $180 million. An exchange of proposals on the matter will take place on Dec. 15 at the level of working groups.

The decision to transfer 19 Tu-160 and 25 Tu-95MS bombers from Ukraine to Russia was adopted in March. The Russian Air Forces representative said an intergovernmental agreement on the transfer is expected to be signed in early 1996.

### Black Sea Fleet Problems Described

*WS1212135095 Kiev INTELNEWS in English*
*0300 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sevastopol, Dec. 10. Individual ships of the Black Sea Fleet are manned at 25 to 30 percent of required levels, significantly increasing psychological and physical strain on sailors and causing problems in technical servicing of the craft, the fleet's Flag Rodiny reported.

According to the information, supplied by Rear Adm. Oleksandr Penkin, in charge of BSF training, the lack of personnel also forced an 82 percent cutback in planned military training exercises. In addition, shortages of fuel and electricity have forced 52 percent of the fleet's staff to perform menial tasks outside their areas of specialization.

As a result, according to Penkin, many career sailors are quitting. Of the 912 officers transferred to the reserve since the breakup of the Soviet Union, only 93 did so because of age.

Desertion is also increasing, the admiral said. Currently, 71 percent of the sailors are refusing to return from leave.

### Kiev Dismisses Romania's Appeal Over Zmeinyy Island

*LD1312095795 Moscow INTERFAX in English*
*2249 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, Dec 12 (Interfax - Ukraine) — Ukraine believes that there are no reasons for disputing who Zmeinyy Island in the Black Sea belongs to, or for Romania's appeal to the International Court of Justice in this connection, Ukraine's Deputy Foreign Minister Anton Buteiko said at a briefing in Kiev on Tuesday.

On December 4 Romania's Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu told his country's parliament Romania calls in question the fact that Zmeinyy Island belongs to Ukraine, and contemplates appealing to the International Court of Justice in this connection.

According to the Ukrainian diplomat, the Romanian foreign minister's statement is an extension of the policy pursued by his country's authorities, who had unilaterally proclaimed the protocol on border demarcation signed between Romania and the USSR in 1948, and the agreement on the Soviet-Romanian border signed in 1961 as invalid.

As Buteiko said, the border line was determined "in general terms" by the Peace Treaty signed in Paris in 1947. The 1948 protocol only added details to the borderline, which was finally stipulated by the 1961 agreement. The agreement was "ratified by Romania's parliament without reservations," Buteiko said.

According to him, Ukraine inherited the existing borderline and the demarcation of territorial waters from the USSR under Article 11 of the 1948 Vienna Convention, which provides for succession.

"Ukraine views the efforts to unilaterally proclaim the 1948 protocol and the 1961 agreement as invalid and seek to revise them as an attempt to make territorial claims to it," Buteiko said.

"Ukraine will never agree to alter the status of Zmeinyy Island," he pointed out.

As the diplomat said, "any attempt to revise the existing frontiers undermines the process of building a system of general security in Europe."

## National Affairs

### Marchuk on Legislative, Executive Coordination

*LD1212145895 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian*
*1315 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, [no date as received] — "The infrastructure of the Cabinet of Ministers and the president's administration must become more efficient," Ukrainian Prime Minister Yevheniy Marchuk said in an interview for the UNIAN news agency.

According to him, at this "fairly acute and difficult time" every structure should clearly understand its mission, and a means to coordinate between them should be worked out.

Yevheniy Marchuk stressed that at present there is an economics directorate in the Cabinet of Ministers, an economic service in the president's administration, presidential advisers for economic issues, and a Ukrainian Economy Ministry. In his opinion, coordination is necessary for these organizations to complement rather than obstruct each other.

The Ukrainian prime minister noted that this coordination needs to include executive and legislative document preparation.

### Defense Minister News Conference on Zaporizhzhya Trip

*WS1312114295 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0940 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As reported by UKRINFORM's Zaporizhzhya correspondent, Ukraine's Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov has addressed a press conference in Zaporizhzhya on the outcome of his working tour of the region. Speaking at the press conference, Mr. Shmarov said that his visit to the Zaporizhzhya region, the aim of which was to familiarize himself with the level of cooperation between the army and the local authorities, was a success. This was confirmed by the leader of the Zaporizhzhya regional administration, Vyacheslav Pokhvalskyy, and the chairman of the Zaporizhzhya City Rada [Council], Oleksandr Holovko.

Mr. Shmarov visited one of Ukraine's largest aircraft repair factories located in Zaporizhzhya. He later visited a division of the Zaporizhzhya garrison where he inspected training sessions. Mr. Shmarov also held meetings with senior officials of the region's military-industrial enterprises.

As he told journalists at the press conference, the main aim of his visit was to convene a joint meeting of the Defense Ministry's commissions and regional administrations in order to resolve any problems that may have arisen.

Answering questions from journalists as to whether Ukraine has a well defined military doctrine, who is regarded as Ukraine's potential enemy, and whether the Ukrainian Air Force is well prepared to repel attacks, Mr. Shmarov said that the Air Force is well prepared. He stressed that a military doctrine is a government policy which has been defined since 1992 and has not changed. According to him, there is no reason to change it today. He disclosed that according to the doctrine, Ukraine does not have any concrete enemies, but at the same time, it requires Ukraine's forces to always be ready to repel any infringement of its sovereignty.

### Downgrading of 'Top Secret' Nuclear Facility

*LD1212181395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1412 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Nekrasova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lvov, 12 Dec — Following the declaration by Ukraine of its nuclear-free status, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry has decided to declassify and to use only as a weapons arsenal facility "S," which was top secret in the Soviet era, the press center of the Carpathian military district told Itar-Tass today. The facility is located near the village of Delyatin in the Ivano-Frankovsk region. For decades nuclear warheads were installed on missiles there, in the depth of the Carpathian mountains.

The "S" facility was somewhat of a state within a state, and up to very recent times its garrison took orders directly from Moscow. It was completely self-contained, and even had its own passport office. It had a post office box address, and its schools and kindergartens bore numbers of ordinary child-care centers in Moscow. Officers qualified for a number of benefits, including the right to get an apartment in Moscow after having served at the facility for a certain number of years.

After the Soviet Union disintegrated, this privilege naturally vanished, although many families of servicemen had to bear the discomforts of everyday life, hoping to get apartments in Moscow. After Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov's recent visit to the facility, an instruction was issued to hand over a section of the territory to the Delyatin garrison for private development. The garrison itself has now received the status of a village.

### Russian Power Supply Loss May Last All Winter

*WS1312084495 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0126 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[By Ed Zwirn, INTELNEWS Staff Writer]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Dec. 12 — Ukraine may have to go without Russian power for the rest of the winter. The Russians disconnected their electric power systems from the grid they share with Ukraine on Dec. 4, following an accident in the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant.

A source in the American Embassy in Kiev quoted Energy Ministry Foreign Relations department chief Ihor Lapinin as saying that he was "pessimistic" that the Russian recconnection "would happen earlier than the spring."

Although earlier accounts had blamed the Russia's decision on the power drain it experienced following the accident at the plant, Ukrainian officials are now saying that this was only one of the factors.

"The main reason (for the shutdown of Russian power) is the current non-payments situation," according to State Nuclear Energy Committee spokesman Tetyana Yahich.

While Ukraine's energy debt to Russia had reached about $1.4 billion as of March, the current portion of this burden was substantially reduced that month when officials concluded a 12-year restructuring deal, Current estimates place this year's debt at $165 million, including $46 million to Turkmenistan.

In the meantime, concern continues over the safety and adequacy of Ukraine's energy system.

Zaporizhzhya, Europe's largest and Ukraine's most trouble-prone nuclear plant, has experienced a series of outages over the past week that have combined with the Russian energy cutbacks to produce dangerously low frequency levels in the country's nationwide power network.

According to experts, a drop below the level of 49.3 hertz would jeopardize the safe operation of Ukraine's nuclear plants and require their immediate shutdown.

An official in the state's Dnieper Hydroelectric complex reported that the level dipped below that mark for several hours Thursday evening as the Zaporizhzhya plant suffered from accident-induced outages at two of its six reactors.

Both accidents have been rated at zero on the seven-point international scale.

Although State Nuclear Energy Commitee officials said that the two reactors, number one and five, have since been put back on line, they reported Tuesday that the plant's first reactor has been shut down until Jan. 10 for what they called "planned repairs."

In addition, the country's hrydroelectric complex, which harnesses the waters of the Dnieper River to produce 10 percent of the country's power, were the suject of a series of dire warnings last week.

The Energy Ministry was forced to drain the Kharkovsk reservoir Thursday after engineers warned that the dam which created it was in imminent danger of bursting. The resulting catastrophe, they warned could claim 500,000 victims in Ukraine and set off an ecological catastrophe throughout neigboring countries.

### Crimean Government Condemns No-Confidence Vote

*LD1212154995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1453 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lev Ryabchikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SIMFEROPOL, December 12 — "The Crimean parliament once again surprised voters by its inconsistency, the absence of logic and disrespect for law," the Crimean government said in a press release issued on Tuesday.

The government affirms that by expressing non-confidence to Prime Minister Anatoliy Franchuk on December 8, deputies violated labour legislation as this was done at the time when the head of the government was on leave in connection with participation in the elections of people's deputies of Ukraine.

Secondly, under the law on elections such an action, two days before voting, "may be qualified as a direct and gross anti-advertising of candidates to deputies," the document says.

"Crimean deputies treat candidates to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine with specific jealousy. For instance, hardly had the Finance Minister Vilord Apananskiy advanced his candidacy when he was made to resign. Now the premier's turn has come," the press release runs. At present it is for Kiev to make a decision, the document stresses.

### Crimean Parliament To Consider Franchuk's Resignation

*LD1312114495 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 0945 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Simferopol [no date as received] — The Crimean Parliament plans to consider the resignation of Crimea's Prime Minister Anatoliy Franchuk during its third session, which ends on 23 December, Yevheniy Suprunyuk, the chairman of the republic's Supreme Council said. He recalled that under Ukrainian legislation, Franchuk should resign from the post of prime minister prior to being confirmed as a people's deputy by the credentials commission of the Ukrainian Parliament.

This was reported by Ukrainian television.

## Economic Issues

### Deputy Minister Comments on Trade Talks in London

*AU1212140895 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 7 Dec 95 p 5*

[Commentary by A. Honcharuk, deputy minister of external economic relations and trade: "A Prestigious and Reliable Partner"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **On the eve of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's visit to Great Britain, a delegation headed by S. Osyka, minister of external economic ties and trade, visited London. At the request of URYADOVYY KURYER, Deputy Minister A. Honcharuk, who was also a member of the delegation, commented on the results of the negotiations in London:**

Our interest in intensifying ties with Great Britain is due to the fact that it is primarily a G-7 country and, second, it is a member of the European Union. Apart from this, Great Britain is Ukraine's important external-trade partner. Last year, Ukraine had a negative balance there, and presently, as a result of the policy toward liberalization of external trade, our exports to Great Britain have considerably grown — by almost 50 percent. Imports have grown by approximately 15 percent.

Great Britain is also our fourth most important investment partner. The volume of capital investments in Ukraine constitutes almost $36 million. The Britons showed quite lively interest for our market even in the past; we already laid a strong contractual-legal foundation and signed accords on mutual protection of investments and on safeguarding against double taxation.

The talks conducted by the Ukrainian delegation, headed by Minister S. Osyka, at the British Defense Ministry, Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Treasury confirmed that Great Britain actively supports us on the issue of expanding Ukrainian export to countries of the European Union. We repeatedly heard from officials in Great Britain that antidumping measures against Ukraine must be reconsidered and our export quotas for export of textile and steel must be increased. I think that these points will become topics for President L. Kuchma's talks in London and will be reflected in joint documents that will be signed.

Our delegation had numerous meetings with heads of well known companies — "British Petroleum," "Shell," "British Gas," and others, and held two "round tables," where prospects for mutually advantageous cooperation were discussed. Our British partners are well aware of the state of affairs on the Ukrainian market and, even though some people occupy a wait-and-see position, they see good possibilities for their own development. This applies, in particular, to gas and oil prospecting. The lion's share of investments goes precisely there.

It is also expected that, during President L. Kuchma's visit, a number of accords will be signed with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on increasing sums of credits for Ukraine.

## Marchuk Addresses Energy Conservation Conference

*WS1312113095 Kiev UKRINFORM in English*
*0940 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] As reported by UKRINFORM's Kiev correspondent, the first international conference on management of energy utilization has opened in Kiev.

Speaking at the conference, Ukraine's Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk said that the use and conservation of energy is an issue of national importance to Ukraine. According to Mr. Marchuk, expenditures on energy in some sectors exceeded the cost of their products and this makes it difficult for them to break into the world market. Mr. Marchuk said the reasons behind such a situation include a high level of deterioration of basic production facilities and outdated technology. He disclosed that the government intends to implement a series of measures aimed at resolving issues of energy conservation. The four-day conference will discuss a wide range of issues, including a global energy conservation strategy for Ukraine.

Participants in the conference include scientists from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, senior officials of Ukrainian ministries and departments, and representatives of the European Union's Energy Center in Kiev.

## Coal Minister Suggests Establishment of Holding Companies

*WS1312111995 Lvov INFOBANK in English*
*0935 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Donetsk — On December 11, during a meeting of the management of coal mines and of coal-concentrating enterprises of Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts Minister of Coal Industry of Ukraine, Serhiy Polyakov, said that the most expedient way to restructure the Ukrainian coal industry is to set up holding companies. These holding companies are expected to include coal- extracting enterprises, concentrating plants, a number of machine- building businesses which supply mining equipment, as well as servicing firms. It is also planned to set up a coal exchange on the basis of UkrVuhleZbut Company (Ukrainian Coal Distribution).

Minister Polyakov is convinced that the government should keep a major part of shares of these holding companies. He believes that the structure of a holding company allows the government to keep control over the coal-mining sector and at the same time will make coal mines more independent.

### Kharkov Plant Prepares for T-84 Production

*WS1212134895 Kiev UKRINFORM in English
0810 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[From the "Business News Weekly" feature No. 49, 4-10 December 95]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Preparations for serial production of T-84 tanks have begun at the Kharkov-based Malyshev Factory production association. Barrels for the tanks are expected to be produced at a Ukrainian enterprise. At present, the factory is producing tanks with guns purchased from Russia. The factory has yet to receive funds from the state budget for production of T-84 tanks.

According to estimates, the Ukrainian Army requires 30 T-84 tanks per year.

### 'Ukrhazprom' Demands Privatization To Continue

*AU1212151195 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY
in Ukrainian 7 Dec 95 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "'Ukrhazprom' Demands Privatization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the INTERFAX-UKRAYINA Agency, the collective of the "Ukrhazprom" [Ukrainian Gas Industry] joint-stock association intends to carry out a protest action demanding that the process of privatization of their enterprise be continued.

This was the demand made public by representatives of the "Ukrhazprom" on 5 December at the first congress of Ukraine's oil and gas industry workers that is presently in progress in Kiev. The "Ukrhazprom" workers demand that Ukraine's Supreme Council decree of 19 September 1995 in which the parliament expanded the list of oil and gas industry enterprises that are not subject to privatization be canceled as well as the Ukrainian parliament decree of 2 November 1995 on checking the legitimacy of privatizing facilities in the branch.

## Belarus

### Foreign Minister on Relations, Integration With Russia

*WS1312094795 Minsk BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Dec 95 p 4*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko, by Pavel Sheremet; place and date not given: "Uladzimir Syanko: 'The Direction of Our Foreign Policy Has Not Changed'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sheremet] A year ago the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared the dominance of economic diplomacy over geopolitical issues. Looking at last year's results, do you not think that the economic orientation cannot produce any serious results without relevant political actions by our country's leadership?

[Syanko] It would be completely incorrect to speak only about a unilateral economic orientation in the foreign policy of any state, even such a small one as Belarus. If we try to give priority to economic issues, this means that we try to remember topic this every day, all the time, and in any situation. The most important thing in foreign policy is to proceed along a path toward something realistic. In this regard, I believe that we have exerted, and are still exerting a great deal of effort.

Foreign policy is an unprofitable thing. It is not always possible to achieve a concrete result within a month, year, or even five or 10 years. Most often what is done today will produce results much later. Nevertheless, there will be some results if we work purposefully and reasonably.

[Sheremet] How would you explain several statements by Alyaksandr Lukashenka — which were recently expressed in a quite critical tone — that Russia is not fulfilling its economic responsibilities to Belarus?

[Syanko] I am deeply convinced that Alyaksandr Ryhoravich's strategic orientation toward cooperation with Russia — toward a whole range of economic, political, military, and human relations — has not and will not change. Unfortunately, it proved to be a very difficult task to establish such relations. As it is, Belarus has acted as a leading link in these relations for a year and a half. Although I do not want to say that Russia is a passive element, as a rule it is Belarus that demonstrates initiative.

We understand that much has been caused by the imperfectness of Russia's state mechanism. What began in 1991 is to a certain degree still continuing there, particularly now that the election campaigns are beginning. Russia's current political spectrum is a peculiar layered pie. Sometimes you even ask yourself the following question: Who has more clout there? As it is, all links, all power branches are being adjusted to one another in this country as well. I thus believe that Russia's political mechanism is still far from being synchronized.

[Sheremet] In this regard, are the idea of a customs union and the talk about a confederation not premature, meaning that Russia is not yet ready for such serious integration either?

[Syanko] I have repeatedly heard such doubts. First of all, I would point to the viewpoint of [Ukrainian President] Leonid Kuchma, who thinks that free trade zones should be established first, and then we can gradually set up such a union, taking into account a number of factors. Although there are economists who think like Kuchma, I believe that our general line is correct.

I agree that Europe was proceeding toward union for decades. However, this is perhaps possible in our countries as well, because we have not yet parted completely. In any event, I support efforts aimed at achieving everything possible in the economy. Unfortunately, we often sign very important, global documents, which later are not efficient enough. The point is that our leaders' will is currently not enough. There is also a large chain from the bottom to the top.... I do not want to say that this chain is counteracting this, though it is very diverse.

[Sheremet] Another anniversary of the CIS has been celebrated. You mentioned the EU. Almost everybody worries about the dominating role of Germany there. There is talk that the interests of all countries must be balanced. In this regard, are you not concerned over Russia's position in the CIS?

[Syanko] I am of two minds about this. Taking into account Russia's actual economic potential, it cannot but play a central role. The point lies somewhere else: this central role should not become a leading, dominating one.

### Russian Army Vacates Missile Fuel Facilities

*WS1312103195 Minsk VO SLAVU RODINY in Russian 7 Dec 95 p 1*

[Report by Henadz Khudzinski from the press center of the Belarusian Defense Ministry: "Although Russian Missile Propellant Has Gone, Problems Remain"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **As everyone knows, in accordance to a protocol signed by a joint Russian-Belarusian commission on 14 July this year, tankers containing components of missile propellant belonging to the Russian Federation Army were to leave**

**our Republic this summer. As Colonel Valyantsin Novaw, chief of the Belarusian Armed Forces Rear Fuel Service, has reported, the Russians fulfilled their commitments. As of today, there is no missile fuel belonging to our neighbors in our country; only our own fuel remains.**

Certain problems, however, have not yet been resolved. These problems were addressed at a regular meeting of the commission. There are still some by-products of the neutralization process, but they are not particularly dangerous. It is still necessary to neutralize the storage containers, conduct an environmental study of storage sites, and reclaim the land. According to agreements, Russian Federation units should complete this by 1 January 1996, conducting inspections with the participation of the Belarusian side.

By the way, the Russians should hand over six such facilities to our Republic.

### Article Views Position on Arms Market

*WS1312085795 Minsk BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Nov 95 p 6*

[Article by Syarhey Aniska: "How Belarus Has Traded, and Is Trading in Weapons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **For the first time since becoming a sovregn state, Belarus has demonstrated that it is a potential arms exporter. The statements voiced by former Parliament Speaker Stanislaw Shushkevich and former Prime Minister Vyacheslaw Kebich, which contained alarming tones concerning the dangerous heritage left over by the Soviet Union in our country, to a considerable degree should be considered political slyness, all the more so since there was no particular reason for any chaos. After all, foreign partners promised to help destroy equipment coming under the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, recycle old ammunition, and reclaim nuclear facilities.**

The Belarusian military district, dubbed a "primary experimental" [cksperimentano-peredovoy] one in military circles, noticeably distinguished itself among similar territorial formations in the former USSR. In terms of its density of combined military units and supply of weapons, it only fell behind the Western Group of Forces in Germany and the Turkmen Military District, which in the past was a bridgehead for conducting military actions in Afghanistan. The presence of five armies in Belarus, including tank, combined, and air force divisions, Air Defense troops, three missile divisions, and dozens of depots and frontline bases, made politicians rub their hands together in anticipation of profits to be made from sales of military-technical property (VTI) on foreign markets.

To regulate this process and establish competition in the domestic market, the Council of Ministers issued state licenses to sell VTI to the Belintorg, Belvneshnepromservis, and Beltekheksport foreign trade companies. However, because of its financial capabilities, level of business activity and, to a certain degree, connections with government circles, it was Beltekheksport that was able to take the lead in our country.

Belvneshspetstekhnika, which, according to leaked rumors, has also been granted such rights at someone's instruction, is currently increasingly active in its attempts to do business. But the following quite logical question arises: Are there not too many dealers in Belarusian weapons? Will this competition not transform itself into confrontation, accompanied by an interdepartmental battle among the mighty of this world? In the Russian Federation, which has a powerful military-industrial complex, there are as few as two state-owned commercial companies selling VTI.

#### A Trump Card Which Can Hardly Be Turned Down

The "weapons" card was frequently played in the course of political battles in the Oval Room [parliament]. During the presidential elections, Alyaksandr Lukashenka did not fail to use it; moreover, he used it successfully. The report on a ship with Belarusian weapons apparently bound for Yugoslavia and detained in the Mediterranean Sea, which he revealed during a televised debate, had an impact on the ratings of his main opponent [Vyacheslaw Kebich]. The candidate pledged to scrupulously examine exports of Belarusian VTI and severely punish those guilty.

After he came to power, Alyaksandr Lukashenka instructed the Control Chamber and law enforcement agencies to audit the operations of Beltekheksport, whose leadership apparently displayed an excessively loyal attitude toward Vyacheslaw Kebich. As malicious people claim, however, the agencies did not manage to collect any compromising materials, and not because there such materials did not exist. The urgent need for unmasking simply ceased to exist, and there appeared a need to quickly increase arms exports to fill the big gap in the state coffers. Director General Uladzimir Peftiyew, who had the required experience, knowledge of the market situation, and connections with the Russian military-industrial complex, was the best man for this role.

Initially, the Defense Ministry also was granted the right to search for potential partners and concluded agreements. And this period is connected with the unexplainable initiative of the former first deputy defense minister, Alyaksandr Tushynski, to sell a consignment of collector's firearms to a British firm at a relatively low price, while at the same time U.S. partners offered a considerably higher price. Because law enforcement agencies stepped in during the negotiations, the first option was not concluded. It is not our goal to cast doubts at the honesty of high-ranking officials. Being preoccupied with military problems, the deputy minister could certainly not be unaware of the real price for SKS infantry rifles, cavalry carbines, or Walther pistols.

After a number of other "blunders" in trade, the Defense Ministry lost the right to independently conclude agreements. Currently, the aforementioned foreign trade organizations search for partners and carry out all technical operations aimed at concluding agreements, after coordinating a list of weapons to be sold abroad with state organizations. An export permission document is signed by representatives of the Security Council, KGB, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Foreign Economic Relations, and the Main Customs Committee must be informed about such deals.

By all appearances, something did not work in this chain last week, when Belarus was about to send another consignment of VTI. Customs officers, despite the presence of a Security Council employee, stubbornly refused to give a "go-ahead" for a Ukrainian plane with a special Belarusian cargo to take off from Vitsebsk airport for Bulgaria.

There are more serious problems as well. A company selling VTI is obliged to carefully examine all details of an agreement, including the financial possibilities of partners and the final destination of weapons, which, by the way, is the most vulnerable point of all concluded contracts. For example, how can Beltekhheksport quite confidently state that the AK-74 assault rifles sold to Sudan in November will not migrate to neighboring Libya at a higher price? Even the option of sending a Belarusian shipping clerk would not be a 100-percent guarantee. After all, military equipment may be stored for a while, and then traded again.

Companies with a shadowy past and even adventurers who want to reap profits are often involved in sales of weapons on the world market. For them it makes no difference where a Belarusian machine gun will be used — at a Cuban firing range or in Yugoslavia. By the way, an arms dealer visited Minsk last year to offer his brokerage. As a result, it was revealed that it was owing to this Russian businessmen that a number of high-ranking officials from the Kyrgyz Defense Ministry were entangled in suspicious scandals involving weapons, scandals investigated at the governmental level.

Belarus did not manage to avoid other underwater reefs either. The talk is about foreign officials' attempts to exert pressure on our foreign trade companies. High-ranking generals from Pavel Grachev's department have frequently visited Minsk and tried to discipline our companies. One of those "warlords" from Moscow, whom officers from the Belarusian military district knew in the past, was surprised why his advice to sell armored vehicles to one of the former Warsaw Pact countries at a price recommended by him had not been carried out. For the sake of justice it must be noted that after Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who reluctantly receives decisions thrust upon him, came to power, the number of Russian visitors decreased.

Nobody expected Belarus on the arms market. It entered this area, which has a strict hierarchy and relationships that developed over many yaers, like a tunnel at the end of which there was no light. It proved that the laws reigning in this area are far from civilized, and one should constantly be ready for dirty tricks, which may cause financial losses and, what is most important, undermine the prestige of potential buyers.

The media from countries of the near abroad published scandalous stories about the sales of components for the S-300 missile system, the Manevr automated troop control system, and two SU-27 planes. Similar reports make arms trade specialists laugh. As experience shows, businessmen are not particularly scrupulous when selecting methods of eliminating their competitors. Our companies, whether we like it or not, have to look to the east due to their dependence on the Russian military industrial complex.

What are the prospects for Belarus in the immediate future? A great deal of VTI has already been sold. The rest, because of its aging, natural wear, and decomposition (or rather "pilferage") will not yield the expected profits. Military equipment, including modern tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers, could be in demand anywhere in the Middle East or Asia. However, purchasers present their demands, and because of the lack of "tank complexes" it is hard for Belarus to meet them. There is talk is about providing tools and special accessories for equipment, and assuming the responsibility for technical service.

By all appearances, under the pressure from these circumstances, exports of dual-purpose products manufactured in our country will increase, all the more so since visiting foreign military delegations demonstrate genuine interest in the products of the BelOMO production amalgamation, electromechanical plants, etc.

More active steps aimed at bringing our domestic and Russian defense industries closer together, which would be based on sharing profits resulting from arms sales, have not been ruled out either.

Interested Belarusian institutions understand future difficulties connected with the arms trade, and are looking for alternative channels to fill the state coffers by using the Defense Ministry basis. The facts that Barysaw tank repair plant and the Baranovichi aircraft repair plant have entered foreign markets and the Belarusian Military Academy is ready to train personnel for the Chinese and Armenian national armies should be seen namely from this position.

## Moldova

### Parliament Adopts Appeal on Situation in Dniester

*AU1312081695 Chisinau INFOTAG in English
1930 GMT 11 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, December 11 [INFOTAG] — The Parliament has adopted the appeal to the population of the Republic of Moldova which substantiates the necessity to publish the draft law "On the Special Legal Status of Dniester."

The document classifies the Dniester conflict as "one of the most complicated political problems faced by the Republic of Moldova.

"The necessity to use for its solution only peaceful means, political dialogue and restoration of mutual trust — that is the lesson we all have learnt well during the past 2-3 years," stresses the appeal.

"Unfortunately, the draft still causes a multitude of political speculations. To unveil them, we consider it expedient to publish the document. We believe the draft publication will allow the population on both sides of the river to better learn our intentions, and to not yield to the speculations and misinformation," the appeal reads.

"We express hope that our compatriots living on the left side of the river will support those politicians who show concern about our common destiny, and who are able to promote the restoration of peace and harmony in the society, and the well-being of all Moldovan citizens," the document says.

The appeal has been signed by the Agrarian Democratic and Socialist Unity factions. The opposition factions of the Popular Front and the Bloc of Peasants and Intelligentsia refused to, for they consider it wrong to grant any status to the region. They stand up for solving the Dniester problem in the framework of the law on the administrative-territorial set-up of the Republic of Moldova.

Simultaneously with publishing the appeal and the draft status law, the Chisinau status drafting team appealed to the population to send their remarks and comments to Chisinau.

### Official Sees Dniester Solution Linked to Moscow Elections

*AU1312081995 Chisinau INFOTAG in English
1930 GMT 11 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, December 11 [INFOTAG] — "The recent resolution of the Russian State Duma promoted in no way whatsoever the Dniester problem settlement," Fedor Angheli, deputy chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, told INFOTAG.

In his words, when the Moldovan Parliament was considering a reply statement, he was among those deputies who demanded tougher document formulations, because the case implied an interference into Moldova's internal affairs.

In his opinion, it would be useless to establish a separate parliamentary committee for settling the Dniester dispute, and the further development of situation around the region's status will depend on the forthcoming Russian parliamentary election results.

"If Russia is really interested in solving the Dniester problem, it should not use double standards in its external policy. Both Chechnya and Dniester are showing clear signs of separatism, but Moscow is demonstrating different approaches to this problem," Mr. Angheli said.

Commenting Boris Yeltsin's reply letter to President Mircea Snegur, in which the Russian leader wrote, among other things, about the necessity to open a Russian consular office in Tiraspol, Fedor Angheli pointed out that no heads of state were ever involved in solving such matters, for this is a prerogative of ministries of foreign affairs.

"In this particular case, when we cannot control the eastern Dniester region, our opening a foreign consular section would be comparable with self-destruction. This would be comparable with a situation when the president of a state, whose mercenaries were involved in the Chechen conflict, would request Yeltsin to open the country's consular office in Groznyy," Fedor Angheli said.

## Russian Envoy Calls For Resumption of Dniester Talks

*AU1312082095 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930 GMT 11 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, December 11 [INFOTAG] — The representative plenipotentiary of the Russian president at the Dniester negotiations, special envoy Vladlen Vassev, has called the sides to "urgently resume the talks," and has expressed hope that this appeal will be duly appraised by them.

The ordinary summit, which had been scheduled for November 29, did not take place for several reasons, Mr. Vassev told INFOTAG.

"The sides interpret differently the summit upset. Fortunately, both are saying the talks have been not stopped but just postponed. These statements are already important, the more so that they both admit a possibiiity to continue the regular work of the two expert teams who are drafting the status law, and to continue the activities of governmental specialists who are seeking to make closer the economic, social, legal, infrastructure and other relations which are urged by life itself and the interests of the population on both river sides," Vassev said.

Negotiation mediators consider it necessary to continue the talks, and are sparing no efforts to achieve that, the Russian special envoy said.

## Kazakhstan

### Deputy Prime Minister Views Trips to U.S., Japan

*LD1312094195 Almaty Kazakh Television First Program Network in Russian 1500 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Nyghmetzhan Yesengharin, a first deputy prime minister of Kazakhstan, gave a news conference today [12 December], at which he briefed correspondents on the results of his trip to the United States and Japan as well as on problems currently facing Kazakhstan's economy.

Yesengharin expressed the hope that the republic would end this year with the [annual] level of inflation below 60 percent. According to the first deputy prime minister, during his trip to San Diego he met representatives of the [?Loter Bok] firm, who expressed willingness to take part in the development of the republic's new capital, Akmola.

The main result of the Kazakh Government delegation's visit to Japan was the signing of an agreement with the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund on giving our republic a soft credit of $70 million for the development and reconstruction of the Druzhba station [on the Kazakh-Chinese border] and a number of other Kazakh railway establishments. Yesengharin said that the main problem he faced in Japan was that major Japanese companies would be willing to invest capital in Kazakhstan's economy only if they were given government guarantees. However, Yesengharin noted, Kazakhstan has almost given up this practice. It was this that proved the stumbling block at talks between Yesengharin and the head of a Japanese engineering company who was interested in the reconstruction of the Atyrau oil refinery.

At the end of the news conference, the first deputy prime minister rejected the rumor circulating since [Chechen Government head] Doku Zavgayev's visit to Almaty [on 6 December] that Kazakhstan was ready to grant economic assistance to Chechnya immediately. Speaking about the possibility of oil from Kazakhstan being refined in Chechnya, Yesengharin said that this could be done only after peace was established and the political situation stabilized in the Chechen Republic.

### Kazakh-U.S. Rights Group Criticizes Senate Elections

*LD1212213895 Almaty KARAVAN-BLITS in Russian 7 Nov 95 p 3*

[FBIS Translated Text] The elections to the Senate held recently did not cause any stormy reaction on the part of the public. But there were enough skeptical opinions on the part of interested observers. Sufficiently harsh criticism came from the Kazakh-American human rights office. Its executive director, (Evgeniy Zhovtis), gives his view:

The constitutionality of elections of deputies to the Senate raises doubts. The reason is very simple — the senators were elected by so-called "electors" [vyborshchiki], that is, by deputies to the maslikhats [local assemblies]. But, in 1993, when we were electing these same deputies to the maslikhats, we were in no way giving them the right to elect deputies to the Senate. Nor will the adoption of the new Constitution, in which this system is defined as the principle of indirect voting rights, remove this question from the agenda. And it is not a question of the system here, but of delegating my definite voting right to a definite person. It is absolutely clear that, from the point of view of international rights, elections of deputies to the maslikhats should have been held first (the more so, that the present maslikhats were elected on the same principle as the last "unconstitutional" parliament), and after them the others.

[KARAVAN-BLITS] Concerning rights, you refer to international norms, but Kazakhstan, as far as I know, has not joined most of the international treaties.

[Zhovtis] This is precisely the main problem. Kazakhstan has joined only the convention on children's rights. Our bureau has repeatedly asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs why there is such, I would say, such strange reluctance to enter the system of international rights, but we have not received any intelligible answers.

Moreover, the deputies of the last parliament repeatedly said that they had no right to put to the agenda on their own issues relating to joining international treaties and conventions. According to diplomatic norms, this is the exclusive prerogative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But, as I have said before, it is obstinately reluctant to do this.

[KARAVAN-BLITS] Why, in your opinion?

[Zhovtis] Here everything is simple enough. For example, there is a European convention on the criteria of free and just elections. Ratification of this convention establishes certain standards regarding the system of holding elections in general. This includes all the norms, starting with the principles and mechanisms of forming the election commissions and ending with the very procedure for voting itself. So, Kazakhstan's joining this convention would unavoidably have shown that a number of positions in the present decree on elections (and by the way, in the former code too) do not correspond to its provisions.

[KARAVAN-BLITS] For example?

[Zhovtis] First of all, the fact that the existing decree all but lacks a mechanism for setting up election commissions does not correspond. The only mention of them is that they are set up by the akims [heads of local administration] of the relevant regions, that is, by the executive power.

But allow me to ask: according to what procedure is this implemented? How is observance of different political interests by these commissions guaranteed? To what degree can the public control their activities, and I mean constantly, not just on the day of voting? Alas, nobody knows. Of course, the relevant resolutions may be issued, all possible directives, but they do not carry the force of the law! There has to be legislative provision, not regulations setting up structures, whether they be the Central Electoral Commission or the administration of the akims.

[KARAVAN-BLITS] Does the same go for the forthcoming elections to the Majlis [lower house]?

[Zhovtis] It has to be admitted that they are more constitutional, although, having adopted the majority system, we have automatically eliminated the possibility of multi-party elections. Thus, we are in fact denying the possibility of political implementation of our own interests through the struggle between platforms, but not through the struggle between leaders. Of course, Kazakhstan is not yet ready to apply the proportional election system adopted in most developed countries. But, I assure you, the republic is completely ready for a mixed system. Then, some of the deputies could have been elected from party lists, and the political interests of different groups of the population could somehow have been realized.

But this is by no means a matter for the nearest future. In my opinion, in the initial stages, the government must think about bringing our legislative norms more in line with international standards. This will be a big step forward.

## Tajikistan

### Agreement Signed With India Opens Relations

*LD1212165295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1601 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Kozmin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] DELHI, December 12 — The agreements signed in Delhi, envisaging the strengthening of friendly ties between India and Tajikistan, are opening a new chapter in relations between the two states, President of Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmanov, told a news conference in the Indian capital today.

The head of the Tajik state is currently in India on an official visit, the first one in history of Tajik-Indian relations.

Emomali Rakhmanov stressed that the Declaration on the further development and deepening of friendly relations between Tajikistan and India, signed on the basis of the results of the talks with the head of the Indian Government P.V. Narasimha Rao, became one of the main documents reflecting the foundations on which relations between the two states would be built in the future.

"I hope that contacts between our countries will serve for the benefit of intensification of ties between the peoples of India and Tajikistan," the president said.

The head of the Tajik state specifically noted the importance of the agreement signed in Delhi on the establishment of an inter-government commission for trade and economic, scientific and technical and cultural cooperation, which will put into practice those agreements that were reached during the talks between the two sides in Delhi.

"Cooperation between Tajikistan and India in the field of economy has already certain experience. For example, five joint ventures in different spheres of production have been set up and are operating now in Tajikistan, and the concluded agreements envisage further steps in this direction," Emomali Rakhmanov pointed out.

He also informed that signed in Delhi were also agreements envisaging the intensification of cooperation in the field of art, in mass media and an exchange of advanced technologies.

During the inter-government Tajik-Indian talks in Delhi the sides also discussed actual regional issues.

The representatives of India and Tajikistan exchanged views on problems connected with curbing international terrorism and the non-intervention in internal affairs of sovereign states.

Specifically, the sides condemned any attempts of interference of external forces in internal affairs of Afghanistan and spoke for the peaceful settlement of the situation in this country.

On December 15 the president of Tajikistan, after the trip to India, is due to leave for the capital of the United Arab Emirates where it is planned to sign a number of documents on the expansion of economic ties between the two states.

### Russian Border Post Shelled, Border Guard Killed

*LD1312114995 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 0600 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border remains extremely complicated. The 12th border post of the Moscow border guards detachment came under intensive fire today, and one Russian border guard was killed. The press center of the command of the Russian border troops in Tajikistan reports that 40 rockets were fired by the Tajik side at the military base itself and the Turk strategic heights.

## Armenia

### Yerevan To Participate in Partnership for Peace

*LD1212204495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1939 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[By Tigran Liloyan]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEREVAN, December 12 (Itar-Tass) - Armenia will present the version of its participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace programme to the Brussels headquarters of the North-Atlantic Alliance within the next few days, Armenian Foreign Minister Vagan Papazyan said on Tuesday.

Papazyan noted that Armenia wants to cooperate with NATO in military, political, economic and scientific spheres.

### Papazyan News Conference on European Tour

*NC1212211295 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Armenian Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan held a news conference at the Foreign Ministry today. Here is a report from our colleague Gevorg Asaturyan:

[Begin Asaturyan recording] The Armenian foreign minister briefed reporters on his visits to Geneva, Brussels, and Budapest over the first 10 days of December.

Papazyan specifically stressed the importance of his visit to Switzerland because it was motivated by a number of political considerations. That country will chair the OSCE as of 1 January 1996, and Armenia's primary goal is to submit Armenia's official position on the Karabakh problem. Switzerland requires all embassies to be located in Bern. Armenia is probably the only country, said Vahan Papazyan, whose mission in Geneva will continue working as Armenia's embassy.

The foreign minister next visited Brussels where on 6 December he attended the conference held within the framework of the cooperation of the North Atlantic countries. It was convened to settle the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem.

The Armenian foreign minister held a number of meetings at NATO headquarters. Armenia will submit its views on the Partnership for Peace program in the coming days.

In referring to the Budapest talks, Papazyan noted that detailed examinations were held on the package concerning the resolution of the Karabakh problem. A decision by the Council of Ministers and a statement by the cochairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group were adopted during the Budapest talks held at the OSCE foreign ministers level.

In reply to reporters' question, the foreign minister stressed again that Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia cannot hold different positions on the issues under discussion, otherwise the negotiations could enter an impasse. Armenia continues to insist that the status issue should not be included in the talks for the time being. Nagorno-Karabakh has a slightly different position, said the foreign minister.

Finally, Armenian Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan informed the reporters that Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan will leave on an official visit to India tomorrow [13 December]. The delegation will include Armenian foreign minister, Industry Ministry Ashot Safaryan, and a number of officials from the economic sector. [end recording]

### Papazyan on Results of North Atlantic Council Meeting

*NC1212221095 Yerevan SNARK in English 1607 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, December 12 (SNARK)—Vahan Papazyan, Armenian Foreign Minister, held a press conference today dedicated to results of the North-Atlantic Council's meeting conducted on December 6. He told reporters that participants of the Brussels conference understood that NATO can play no role in the Karabakh conflict settlement.

The Minister reported that in the near future Armenian will submit NATO an individual project for participating in the Partnership for Peace Program. He noted the necessity of developing relations with NATO's structures in military, political, economic and scientific fields. However, Papazyan did not give priority to the military cooperation. According to him, there is no need to establish military cooperation with NATO when Armenia has good relations in this field with the former USSR countries, especially with Russia. Nevertheless, Armenia will appreciate cooperation with NATO in other spheres, Papazyan added.

## Azerbaijan

### Iranian Deputy Minister Meets Gasanov, Aliyev

#### Regional Issues Discussed

*LD1212224995 Tehran IRNA in English 2159 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, Dec. 12, IRNA — In a meeting here today with Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Euro-American Affairs Mahmud Va'ezi said that no problem exists between Tehran and Baku that cannot be solved.

Va'ezi underlining the need for regular talks at various levels between the two countries' officials, said the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan have an understanding on the major topics at the regional and international levels.

He also referred to the economic development of the region and called as "important" the connecting link between Iranian and Central Asian railways as well as building of the Amirabad seaport on Iran's Caspian shore in order to help develop the economy of regional states such as Azerbaijan.

Gasanov warmly welcomed Va'ezi's visit and expressed hope that it would prove to be a turning point in the two countries' relations.

During the meeting the formation of the Cooperation Council of Caspian Sea Littoral States was also discussed.

Gasanov attached importance to the formation of the proposed council and called for setting up of a joint committee of the two countries' experts for purusing the subject.

The Iranian deputy foreign minister arrived here on Monday on a four-day official visit.

On Monday Va'ezi discussed expansion of Tehran-Baku relations in a meeting with the Azeri president's foreign policy advisor Vefa Gulizade.

Gulizade briefed Va'ezi on the latest developments in the Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and expressed hope that by resolving the problem the way would be paved for the economic development of his country.

The two sides also reviewed regional and world developments as issues of mutual interest.

### Iran's President Wants Aliyev Meeting

*NC1312072895 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1800 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev today received Mahmud Va'ezi, deputy foreign minister of Iran.

In conveying the greetings of Iranian President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Va'ezi noted that he has also brought a congratulatory letter from the Iranian parliament to the newly elected Azerbaijani parliament. The guest indicated that Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani wants to hold another meeting with the Azerbaijani president in order develop and broaden the ties established since Azerbaijan's independence. Hence, Rafsanjani has proposed that Aliyev visit Tehran (?within) a specific program and [words indistinct].

Mahmud Va'ezi said: We have brought eight Azerbaijani POWs who were living in difficult conditions in Armenia, and we consider this the beginning of the initiative for the complete liberation of Azerbaijani POWs in Armenia. We like Geydar Aliyev's policy aimed at broadening and expanding ties between independent Azerbaijan and Iran. We also believe that the newly appointed ambassador to Azerbaijan 'Ali Reza Bikdeli will successfully carry out his mission—that no matter what, relations between independent Azerbaijan and Iran should go not backward but forward. [words indistinct]

Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev said he gladly accepts the Iranian president's greetings and invitation. He noted that independent Azerbaijan adopted its own new constitution and elected its parliament a month ago [words indistinct]. The presence of the constitution and a legislative organ will create the foundation for the development of ties with Iran, which is our greatest neighbor. [Words indistinct] an unseen hand caused a cooling in our relations. However, it is a good sign that both the Azerbaijani and Iranian leadership took steps to warm relations. During my meetings with Rafsanjani in Baku in October 1993 and last summer in Tehran, I became convinced that our ties would reach the highest level. I met Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati in Almaty and in New York. All these talks will help enrich and enhance ties between Azerbaijan and friendly countries. We signed various documents during my meetings with the president and foreign minister, and now the real issue is to implement these agreements. We have set up a joint Iranian-Azerbaijan commission to forge cooperation in the economic field. The chairmen of this commission, Mr. Hashemi and Yashar Aliyev, are preparing a joint action plan. [sentence indistinct]. I consider the transfer of POWs to Iran as a major step and applaud it. The cease-fire with Armenia has gone into its 19th month. The Azerbaijani government, people, and I personally will not allow the resumption of the war. I am sure that Iran will support us in this work. In the field of cooperation we should look not backward, but forward.

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov, State Adviser on Foreign Affairs Vafa Guluzade, and Iranian Ambassador to Baku 'Ali Reza Bikdeli took part in the meeting.

### Aliyev Hails Iran Relations

*LD1312120895 Tehran IRNA in English*
*1126 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, Dec. 13, IRNA — Azeri President Geydar Aliyev in a meeting with Iranian deputy foreign minister for Euro-American affairs Mahmud Va'ezi here on Tuesday, stressed that he considers Iran as the big neighbor of Azerbaijan, hence he did not agree to having frosty relations with the Islamic Republic.

He accused certain powers of making Tehran-Baku ties chaotic and critical by exploiting the alleged coldness of relations between the two sides.

He vowed to put a stop to these types of activities and promised to resist similar attempts exerted from outside.

Aliyev remarked that foreign journalists have always asked him during his trips to foreign countries, about Azerbaijan's ties with Iran, stating that he had recently outlined in London the framework of Irano-Azeri relations.

The two countries share a long border and have a common culture and history, he said, adding that these factors make the people of Iran and Azerbaijan closer to each other.

In the meeting with Va'ezi, the Azeri president also lauded Iran's efforts in freeing Azeri prisoners of war (POWs) and expressed hoped that the Karabakh dispute, through the liberation of Azeri lands, would be settled at the quickest possible time.

Emphasizing on the fact that 19 months following the cease-fire in the Karabakh conflict, Aliyev announced Azerbaijan's unwillingness to resume war in this region.

Aliyev said he hoped that Iran would not let the war to be resumed and to help Azerbaijan towards this objective.

Underscoring the fact that the head of the joint Irano-Azeri cooperation commission, Yashar Aliyev, has been re-elected to the same post, the Azeri president hoped that the commission would provide the required ground for the expansion of ties between the two countries.

Aliyev, terming Iranian President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani's tour to Azerbaijan and also his trip to Tehran as a turning point in bilateral links, noted the significance of the memoranda of understanding (MOUs) inked by Tehran and Baku and called for the full implementation of all these agreements.

In the meeting moreover, the Azeri president praised Iran for the attention that it has given to the Republic of Nakhichevan and asked for further assistance from the Islamic Republic in this area.

Va'ezi, in turn, dubbed Geydar Aliyev's remarks as providing a sound and appropriate ground for the holding of serious negotiations to expand bilateral ties.

Briefing the Azeri president about the Monday and Tuesday meetings held with Azeri Foreign Minister Gassan Gasanov, the Iranian official underlined that both sides exerted their utmost to determine the prospects for future relations.

He added that it was necessary to care about bilateral links considering the sensitivity of the region and noting the obstacles hindering the promotion of ties between Iran and Azerbaijan.

Va'ezi also underscored Tehran's success in liberating the eight Azeri POWs, hoping that this would be a starting point for freeing other Azeri prisoners.

The Islamic Republic's readiness to solve and settle Azerbaijan's problems was likewise reiterated by Va'ezi.

Geydar Aliyev, expressing his willingness to visit Tehran, called for an exchange of visits between officials of the two countries and invited President Rafsanjani to visit Baku.

The deputy foreign minister arrived in the Azeri capital for a four-day visit.

### Caspian Development Proposal Again Sent to Iran

*NC1312112795 Baku TURAN in English*
*1124 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU 12/12/95 TURAN — "Azerbaijan is ready to conduct joint development of the oil-fields in the Azeri section of the Caspian together with Iran", SOCAR's [State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic] Vice-president, Hoshbaht Yusifzade [name and tile as received], said in his interview to BBC radio station.

He noted in the near future the research works together with the foreign companies are to start on the Shahdeniz field. "We would like Iran's National Oil company to take part in it as well. This proposal has been once again forwarded to Iran", Yusifzade mentioned. He said Iran has not expressed its attitude towards this proposal yet.

Tehran's sources report Iran is to work out its position to this issue. However, presently there are no reasons to say Iran will decline Azerbaijan's proposal.

The same sources say during the Oil and Gas Conference holding currently in Tehran, Iran and Russia have expressed their dissatisfaction with unilateral steps of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan for development of their oilfields. They are also dissatisfied with the fact that while signing the contracts between Azerbaijan and the western consortium and between Kazakhstan and Chevron company, the interests of the Iran and Russia were not taken into account.

The Oil Minister of Iran Agazadeh addressing the conference said Tehran stands for shipment Kazakh and Azerbaijani oil to Europe through Iran. He said laying of the oil pipelines through Iran is the most economic variant.

## Estonia

### Military Cooperation Pact Reached With UK

*WS1312084395 Tallinn BNS in English*
*1620 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Dec 12, BNS — Estonian and British defense ministries concluded Tuesday in London an agreement on military cooperation in 1996.

The memorandum provides for reciprocal visits by defense officials and joint seminars, Peep Jahilo, the charge d'affaires at the Estonian Embassy in London, told BNS.

Estonian officers will under the agreement have the opportunity to train in Britain.

Enn Tupp, the head of the Defense Ministry department for defense policy planning who signed the memorandum for Estonia, and parliamentary Defense Committee Chairman Peeter Lorents are in London for a seminar on the role of armed forces in the society arranged by the British defense ministry.

### Commander of Defense Forces Protests Dismissal

*LD1312094495 Moscow INTERFAX in English*
*2249 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, Dec 12 (INTERFAX) — Commander of Estonia's defense forces General Aleksandr Einseln has expressed his disagreement with President Meri's decision to free him from his duties.

Speaking in parliament during the hearings on his dismissal Tuesday he said that his "unfair and unexpected dismissal would be counterproductive to democratization in the Estonian defense forces." He also said that he had done nothing that would go against the interests of the state, and that the president's decision was a serious mistake.

In answer to the question about a party that might be interested in his dismissal, he stated: "The only party that might be pleased by it is Russians."

President Meri took the decision to free Einseln from his duties at the end of November. On May 12, 1993 Einseln asked the president to dismiss him when he found necessary.

Vice Chairman of the parliamentary Commission for State Defense Janus Betlem said, however, that the "questions related to the commander's dismissal are kept under wraps."

According to INTERFAX sources, the real motive of Einseln's dismissal is instances of illegal imports and exports of weapons by General Staff officers, revealed by the security police, and also personal disagreements between Einseln and Meri.

The president's decision to remove Einseln from his post shall be endorsed by parliament. On Tuesday the parliament interrupted the hearings on the issue and postponed them until December 18.

### Ministry: Russian Orthodox Statement 'Regrettable'

*WS1212145695 Tallinn BNS in English*
*1000 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Dec 11, BNS — The Estonian Foreign Ministry views a recent statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry on the Orthodox church in this Baltic country as regrettable and not conducive to a peaceful solution of the conflict.

Russian politicians and departments are trying to introduce political overtones into the row between the two Orthodox churches, Foreign Ministry spokesman Juri Arusoo told BNS Monday.

The Estonian government's position is that the conflict between the churches will have to be solved by court, he noted.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said Saturday in a strongly worded statement the quarrel over property rights among Orthodox Christians in Estonia may in future have an adverse impact on Estonian-Russian relations.

The statement described nonrecognition of the Russian Orthodox Church led by Archbishop Cornelius under the Moscow Patriarchate as the legal owner of the properties of the Orthodox church in Estonia as repression of Orthodox Christians. "Estonia's higher echelons of power, not blushing to interfere in church affairs, set the tone in this campaign," the Russian Foreign Ministry said in the statement.

Estonia has legally registered the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church which wants to return the church to the governance of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople (Istanbul). The Stockholm-based governing body of the church, the synod, has been recognized as the legal successor of the independent Estonian Orthodox Church active in the Baltic country before it was occupied by the former Soviet Union.

The Moscow-oriented church is seeking registration under the same name and keeps refusing to adopt some other name so as not to lose its alleged title to church-owned lands and buildings.

The Tallinn City Court on Friday turned down a suit brought by Archbishop Cornelius seeking recognition of the Russian Orthodox Church as a subject of property reform.

### Riigikogu Speaker Praises Schengen, WEU Assembly

*LD1112144795 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 2000 GMT 10 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] An interparliamentary Schengen conference in Luxembourg has adopted a resolution on cooperation with the Baltic states. This is what Arnold Ruutel, the Riigikogu [Estonian parliament] deputy speaker, said on his return from Luxembourg today. Ruutel, attending the conference as a member of the Baltic Assembly's presidium, said that visa-free travel is very important to the Baltic states. According to Ruutel, entry into a common relations space would create better conditions for participation in the common economic space.

According to Toomas Alatalu, a Riigikogu member who attended the conference as a member of the Baltic Assembly's presidium, this is the first cooperation agreement between the Baltic states and the Schengen countries. Under the agreement, consultations between the Baltic states and the Schengen countries would begin next year so as to make travel easier between the countries who are members of this group.

Arnold Ruutel and Toomas Alatalu, members of the Baltic Assembly, who returned today from Paris from the sitting of the Western European Union [WEU] Assembly, have stated that Estonia has been included in the WEU security program. According to Alatalu, Estonia's involvement in the WEU program shows in the common defense conception for 27 European countries adopted three weeks ago by the WEU's defense and security committee, which covers also the Baltic countries. The Assembly recommended that the WEU provide military assistance to the Baltic states and create a permanent and common naval force with the participation of Germany, Denmark, Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia. The view that security in the Baltic Sea region could be strengthened by the creation of the permanent Baltic Sea naval force was given support; it will be called the Hanseatic corps. Toomas Alatalu and Arnold Ruutel stated that this would not be a military alliance, but first and foremost a naval force ensuring security on the Baltic Sea, whose prime task would be involvement in rescue operations, prevention of drug trafficking, monitoring compliance with fishing regulations, environmental protection, and border guarding.

### Foreign Minister Kallas Leaves for Finland

*WS1312094095 Tallinn ETA in English 0754 GMT 13 Dec 95*

[From 13 December POSTIMEES, EESTI PAEVALEHT, pp 2,3; "News Bulletin" No. 246]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Foreign Minister Siim Kallas left for a working visit to Finland where he will have a meeting with the Finnish President Matti Ahtisaari, Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen and Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen. Kallas will give a press conference later on the day and a reception in the evening in the new building of the Estonian Embassy, which he is to open formally.

The building in Itainen Puistotie 10 housed Estonian embassy before the World War Two but was used later by both the Soviet Union and Finland, in the 1970-ies housing the Embassy of Bulgaria. In the beginning of 1994 the building was returned to Estonia.

POSTIMEES publishes an interview with the Estonian ambassador to Finland Jaak Jderuut in its December 13 issue, where the ambassador describes the situation in the bilateral relations and expresses conviction that visa free travel between the countries is sure to come, although the exact date has not yet been determined.

## Lithuania

### Lithuania Submits Application To Join EU

*LD1112151495 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1401 GMT 11 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Lithuania today submitted an official application asking to admit it to the European Union. [passage omitted.]

[Correspondent Laimonis Radzins] Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys submitted an official application of the Republic of Lithuania to join the European Union to Carlos Westendorp, the Spanish secretary of state for the European Communities, in Madrid this morning. Spain is currently presiding in the European Union. The document had been signed by State President Algirdas Brazauskas and Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius.

Following Estonia, Latvia, and four other countries, Lithuania has become the seventh Central and Eastern European country to have submitted an official application to join the European Union. [passage omitted] Latvian radio, Lithuania. [End]

### Two Banks Merge; To Begin Work Early 1996

*LD1312094995 Moscow INTERFAX in English*
*2249 GMT 12 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VILNIUS, Dec 12 (FIA-Interfax) — Vilnius commercial banks, the Lithuanian Incorporated-Innovation Bank and Litimpeksas, are merging their capitals to create a major financial institution named Lietuvos Jungtinis Bankas (Lithuanian United Bank).

The press service of Litimpeksas told Interfax's Financial Information Agency that the decision on merger had been made at a joint meeting of the two banks' shareholders in Vilnius Tuesday. However, the new financial institution will begin working only in early 1996 after it is registered by the State Bank of Lithuania.

Lietuvos Jungtinis Bankas will have assets of about 1 3 billion litas ($325 million) and share capital of 120 million litas ($30 million). The new bank's share capital is expected to rise to 200 million litas ($50 million) in the next six months due to an issue of 8 million bearer shares, 10 litas ($2.5) par value.

Local experts say Lietuvos Jungtinis Bankas will account for about 20 percent of Lithuania's overall bank capital. Gintautas Preidys, former head of Litimpeksas, will be the chairman of the new bank's board of directors.

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